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FoRewoRd
by Mary Robinson
As I write these lines, new tragedies are unfolding for thousands of individuals 
and families in China and Myanmar. It is sobering to reflect on how poorly 
equipped we are to manage the devastation wrought by natural catastrophes. 
We lack early warning systems, efficient response mechanisms, and – as the 
suffering of the Burmese people in particular cruelly reminds us – the global 
solidarity and coordination needed to deliver help where and when it is most 
needed. 
We know there will be more natural catastrophes in future. But they will not 
always involve horrific headlines and images of hurricanes and tsunamis. More 
commonly, they will be cumulative and unspectacular. People who are already 
vulnerable will be disproportionately affected. Slowly and incrementally, land 
will become too dry to till, crops will wither, rising sea levels will undermine 
coastal dwellings and spoil freshwater, species will disappear, livelihoods will 
vanish. Occasional cataclysms will exacerbate these trends. Mass migration 
and conflicts will result. Only very gradually will these awful consequences 
reach those whose lifestyles and activities are most to blame. 
Climate change will, in short, have immense human consequences. 
We have known this for a long time. This report is not by any means the first to 
draw attention to the urgency of the many human impacts that climate change 
will entail, nor to broach the difficult justice questions it raises, nor to inquire 
into its long term implications for development. Each of these concerns has 
been discussed repeatedly since the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature in May 1992, and indeed 
before then. What this report does for the first time, however, is think through the 
human rights implications of climate change and ask how the substantial body 
of international human rights law and experience can help us to prepare. 
Human rights law is relevant because climate change causes human rights 
violations. But a human rights lens can also be helpful in approaching and 
managing climate change. The human rights framework reminds us that climate 
change is about suffering – about the human misery that results directly from 
the damage we are doing to nature. Many communities already feel the adverse 
effects of warming temperatures – yet so far few remedies are available to them. 
While we cannot say precisely who will be affected in future, or how severely, 
the signs are nevertheless clear. Where information is still lacking, as it often 
is, we know where and how to gather it. As this report makes clear, if we build 
human rights criteria into our future planning, we will better understand who is 
at risk and how we should act to protect them. 
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Attending to human rights also mean recognizing that as we take steps to 
address climate change, we must not do so at the cost of the most vulnerable. It 
is surely possible to repair our environment while still assuring our fellow human 
beings a path out of poverty and insecurity. Ensuring that good information 
exists – and that it is in the hands of those most affected – can enhance 
participation in efforts to prevent and manage climate change. Beyond that, we 
must design with care global and regional programmes that substitute fuels, 
preserve forests, apply new technologies, or redesign markets. At each step 
we must ask where the heaviest burden falls and whether it should be shared 
otherwise. 
Finally, human rights make clear that government obligations do not stop at 
their own borders. For example, states have a special responsibility to monitor 
and, where necessary, regulate the behaviour of private entities within their 
purview, including those operating abroad. This is especially important in the 
case of climate change, where the causes are generally found in private acts. 
Large emitters must not fall through the net of a global system that (rightly) 
imposes different obligations on rich and poor countries. Rather, entrepreneurial 
ingenuity must be harnessed towards equitable solutions that can target and 
head off unacceptable human harms.
Climate change already threatens the livelihoods of peoples in distant corners 
of the world, from North Alaska to the Pacific islands. It is contributing to rising 
prices for grains and staples that are undermining food security for millions, 
particularly in countries with unstable weather patterns. It poses a profound 
threat to development in states that currently lack the resources to fulfil basic 
human rights. 
The scope of these problems – and of the action required to treat them – reach 
beyond previous human challenges. Yet in the sixteen years since the UNFCCC 
was signed, global negotiations have proceeded at a glacial pace. We have 
collectively failed to grasp the scale and urgency of the problem. Climate 
change shows up countless weaknesses in our current institutional architecture, 
including its human rights mechanisms. To effectively address it will require 
a transformation of global policy capacity – from information-gathering and 
collective decision-making to law enforcement and resource distribution. 
This year, as we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, it is worth remembering that document’s injunction that 
“everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which [their] rights 
and freedoms … can be fully realized”. Climate change disrupts that order. But 
perhaps it is also an opportunity, if we are willing to grasp it, to create the kind 
of international and social order that the framers of the Universal Declaration 
dreamed of. 
Mary Robinson, President, Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative.
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by Romina Picolotti
As this publication goes to press, the Organization of American States has 
just approved Resolution 2429 on Human Rights and Climate Change in the 
Americas. The resolution calls on the hemisphere’s various development and 
human rights agencies to help States understand the adverse effects of climate 
change on the most vulnerable populations of the region, and to build the ability 
of States to adapt to evolving climate phenomena more effectively. 
There is little doubt now that climate change has serious development impacts, 
and seriously threatens the capacity of individuals and communities to realize 
their human rights. The causes of global climate impacts, originating historically 
in industrialized nations, economies, and industrial sectors, not only affect the 
lives of millions and even billions of people: they also place undue strains 
on other States to uphold their international human rights commitments. And 
unfortunately, some of the most climate vulnerable States and communities are 
also some of the most human rights sensitive. 
Thinking about climate change from a human rights perspective is not only a 
fundamental necessity in terms of guiding our international development policy 
framework, but also offers us an invaluable opportunity to reappraise the most 
pressing needs of a highly inequitable global society, with greatly differing 
social, environmental and economic levels of development. 
The international debate on climate change has largely focused on the 
discussions between a handful of nations in terms of their commitments, or failure 
to commit, to emissions reductions. Further, much current information, statistics, 
and policy debate revolves around, and is generated by, States and actors that 
are part of the climate problem, limiting discussion of their commitments to the 
costs they are willing to forego in order to slow climate change. 
The debate hence is largely focused on the economic and industrial costs of 
addressing climate change. This emphasis leaves out a more important focus 
on the human and environmental costs of climate variation to vulnerable groups 
and climate-sensitive ecosystems. Some of the more active current negotiators 
pay lip service to their intention to support adaptation, but the reality is that both 
adaptation actions in developing countries, and the commitments to financing 
adaptation from industrialized countries, remain far below what is needed.
The global climate crisis is not just a matter of fixing industry so that it can 
produce profitably and contaminate less. There is a far more pressing issue 
facing us: how to address the negative climate impacts of development that 
is irresponsible in terms of its human and environmental costs. Mitigation and 
adaptation are two fundamental pillars of the climate debate. Technological 
equity and efficiency (mitigation) and the capacity of communities to brace 
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themselves in the face of climate change (adaptation), are both fundamental to 
advance international climate change negotiations. 
We need to shift our attention to the opportunities offered by transferring modern 
technologies (accompanied by financial transfers) from industrialized societies 
to developing countries, to work towards energy efficiency and security. This will 
ensure that developing countries can continue to develop while nevertheless 
working to phase out contaminating industries. It will also benefit many millions 
of people in some of the world’s poorest regions, by providing cost efficient 
energy solutions that also help the environment. 
We also must focus on helping climate vulnerable countries and communities 
effectively address the disastrous negative impacts of climate change on their 
quality of life and their ability to protect and realize basic human rights. For 
the most part, climate vulnerable countries and communities have contributed 
little or nothing to the current climate crisis, yet they bear a disproportionate 
portion of its burden. A climate-justice agenda and a proper understanding 
of the development imbalances caused by climate change, will be critical to 
effectively infuse the climate change debate with human rights in a way that is 
equitable for the most climate-vulnerable groups. 
Human rights provide a framework within which to think through the risks of 
climate change and the policy structures and mechanisms required to provide 
effective responses to those that most need them. 
States and affected communities must begin by understanding who is affected 
by climate change and in what way, so that appropriate policy and normative 
responses can be devised. As is evident from recent natural phenomena related 
to climate change – such as droughts, floods, fierce storms, water temperature 
changes, and habitat destruction, and the devastating impacts on human life 
and the natural environment these are causing – it is imperative that we address 
the social dimension of climate change without delay. 
Thinking through climate change from a development perspective and through 
a human rights lens, as the present report recommends, will undoubtedly serve 
us well as we develop national climate strategies and programs and mitigation 
and adaptation policies, and as we identify the appropriate and necessary 
financing, allocate resources, and generally set the tone for future negotiations 
and global policy geared to equity and balance in our global climate policy. 
Throughout this process, nothing is more important than to remember and 
understand the perspective of the climate victim. It falls to States, and to us, 
acting as individuals and in organizations, to address the human emergencies 
that anthropogenic activities are causing in global society, because they 
threaten our lives, our health, our safety and our environment.
Romina Picolotti, Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development, Argentina.
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exeCutIve suMMARY
This report discusses a spectrum of human rights concerns raised by 
anthropogenic climate change and by the strategies devised to address it. It 
does not seek to reframe climate change as a “human rights issue” or to buttress 
the many existing grounds for urgent cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
with human rights rationale. Rather, it pinpoints areas where climate change 
will have direct and indirect human rights impacts, and where human rights 
principles might sharpen policy-making on climate change, including in the two 
core policy areas of adaptation (preparing for the unavoidable and foreseeable 
effects of climate change) and mitigation (reducing GHG emissions in order to 
curb climate change). 
The report is intended primarily as a mapping exercise. It lays out a range of 
research agendas that deserve greater attention than they can be given here. 
It also assesses the adequacy of human rights conceptions and processes 
to the larger justice concerns climate change raises. Although human rights 
considerations arise throughout climate change policy, the report suggests that 
human rights applications will be most useful if they are narrowly tailored to 
specific problems.
The report has five chapters. The introduction provides an overview of human 
rights concerns raised by climate change and asks why they have received so 
little attention to date. It discusses briefly the likely drawbacks and potential 
benefits of applying a human rights optic to climate change, and summarises 
existing rights-based perspectives on the subject. 
Chapter II examines policy. Human rights analyses will be relevant in formulating 
the detailed research agendas needed to inform overarching climate change 
policy options, including strategies for mitigation and adaptation. This involves 
thinking through the long-term human rights impacts of policy choices already 
on the table. The report introduces the notion of human rights thresholds 
as a means to permit the practical application of human rights norms and 
standards. One research priority is to refine the assessment of the human costs 
of climate change for the most vulnerable communities, in order to mobilise 
substantial adaptation funding and direct it where it is most needed. Human 
rights thresholds can also assist in planning sound mitigation strategies, to 
help evaluate or refine policies on forestry, fuel substitution, carbon trading and 
technology transfer.
Chapter III turns to litigation. Litigants have started to use human rights 
instruments to address harms caused by climate change, and the chapter 
tentatively assesses the scope and prospects of human rights and other 
litigation. As climate change impacts are felt increasingly concretely, human 
rights cases will multiply. Litigation will remain an important response to policy 
failures. However when it comes to larger climate change challenges, it will 
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likely bring too little relief too late. Its usefulness will lie rather in pointing the way 
towards, and generating support for, the adoption of better policies to prevent 
or minimise climate change-related harms. 
Chapter IV discusses procedural human rights. These are well established 
under both human rights law and international environmental law and policy. 
A range of treaties entrench norms of information provision and public 
participation. These standards might have untapped applications in the 
climate change context, and may be relevant to the conduct of international 
negotiations. The design and implementation of effective adaptation policies, 
for example, will depend on collecting and analysing accurate baseline 
information. Yet poorly resourced states have received minimal international 
help in this area. Negotiations on international allocations of adaptation funding 
have repeatedly stalled and been occasionally acrimonious. The states most 
likely to suffer severe human rights harms due to climate change often lack the 
means to compile quality data and to attract broad-based international support. 
In addressing the resulting trust gap, the report recommends that attention be 
paid to the principles embodied in treaties such as the 1998 Aarhus Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters. 
Finally, further research is needed to understand the human rights dimensions 
of several ethical and legal concerns that have consistently surfaced in the 
context of climate change. Chapter V examines four of these. First, competing 
justice claims saturate and sometimes distort the climate change debate; but 
it is not always clear how they interact, and whether the mix of solutions now 
on the table addresses them adequately or consistently. Second, notions of 
“equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities” lie at the heart of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the centrepiece of the evolving international climate change regime. These 
principles appear to open the way to consideration of human rights claims 
across borders, but they have yet to fulfil that promise in practice. Third, human 
rights lawyers are already grappling with the difficulty of assigning liability to 
public and private actors for climate change related harms. The report reviews 
this issue and considers structural obstacles that make it difficult to assign fault 
in this context. Fourth, the report looks at the potential value of the right to 
development. Though contested, ongoing negotiation of this right has provided 
an official forum for reflection on human rights and development that may prove 
constructive in future climate change discussions. 
A concluding chapter summarises the report’s main findings and suggests 
what these might imply for future climate change policies and programmes. 
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I. IntRoduCtIon: wHY HuMAn RIGHts 
Two starting points inform this report. The first is that, as a matter of simple 
fact, climate change is already undermining the realisation of a broad range of 
internationally protected human rights: rights to health and even life; rights to 
food, water, shelter and property; rights associated with livelihood and culture; 
with migration and resettlement; and with personal security in the event of 
conflict.1 Few dispute that this is the case. 
Moreover, the interlinkages are deep and complex. The worst effects of 
climate change are likely to be felt by those individuals and groups whose 
rights protections are already precarious.2 This is partly coincidence. As 
it happens, the most dramatic impacts of climate change are expected to 
occur (and are already being experienced) in the world’s poorest countries, 
where rights protections too are often weak. But the effect is also causal and 
mutually reinforcing. Populations whose rights are poorly protected are likely 
to be less well-equipped to understand or prepare for climate change effects; 
less able to lobby effectively for government or international action; and more 
likely to lack the resources needed to adapt to expected alterations of their 
environmental and economic situation. A vicious circle links precarious access 
to natural resources, poor physical infrastructure, weak rights protections, and 
vulnerability to climate change-related harms. 
At another level, the close relation between climate change and human rights 
vulnerability has a common economic root. Rights protections are inevitably 
weakest in resource-poor contexts. But resource shortages also limit the 
capacity (of governments as well as individuals) to respond and adapt to 
climate change. Worse, where governments are poorly resourced, climate 
change harms will tend to impact populations unevenly and unequally, in ways 
that are de facto discriminatory because the private capacity of individuals to 
resist and adapt differs greatly. 
The construction of an international climate change regime too has rights 
implications. Mitigation policies have clear human rights dimensions. On one 
hand, any strategy (or mix of strategies) that is successful at global level will 
tend to determine the long-term access that many millions of people will have 
to basic public goods. On the other, choices made in the shorter-term – such 
1 The present report does not deal with all of these topics directly. On the rights 
of indigenous peoples under conditions of climate change, see IUCN, 2008. On 
migration, see IOM, 2008. On gender, see IUCN, 2007. On conflict, see German 
Advisory Council on Global Change, 2008; European Council Doc. 7249/08 Annex, 
Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High Representative 
and the European Commission to the European Council (March 2008).
2 The vast literature on climate change vulnerability raises significant human rights 
concerns. See, for example, Brooks et al., 2005; Ribot, 1995; Guèye et al., 2007.
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as whether and where to cultivate biofuels or preserve forests – will affect food, 
water and health security and, by extension, the cultures and livelihoods of 
numerous particular persons in particular places. 
Adaptation policies will raise comparable human rights concerns. Adaptation 
may be reframed as a compensatory or corrective response to potential or 
actual climate change-related human rights violations. Adaptive interventions 
before or during climate change impacts reduce the likelihood that rights 
violations might result from those impacts; adaptation actions after the fact may 
provide redress where violations have already taken place. Indeed, discussions 
of adaptation at international and government level (as opposed to autonomous 
local measures) already assume a rights basis for policy construction, even 
if it is rarely articulated in those terms. At the same time, adaptation actions 
can themselves affect human rights – such as, for example, if communities 
or individuals are forcibly removed from disaster or flood-prone areas, or, less 
forcibly, expected to conform to new economic policy imperatives (by adopting 
different cash crops or energy sources, for example). 
Despite the obvious overlaps outlined above, the mainstream climate change 
literature and debate has, until very recently, given little or no attention to 
human rights concerns.3 This has been so even though the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have steadily examined the 
social impacts of climate change – in particular on food, water and health – and 
have progressively expanded their sphere of reference to include the social 
as well as the physical sciences. Nonetheless, perhaps unavoidably, climate 
change analyses generally remain aggregated at continental or subregional 
level: the available information is still not sufficiently nuanced to cover the 
situation of individuals and communities who experience climate impacts 
directly as rights infringements. This too reflects the resource asymmetries that 
everywhere inform climate change discussion and research. Information is far 
more detailed for those areas likely to experience lesser impacts than for those 
where the consequences will be most devastating.
The paucity of rights-specific information is not, of course, merely a cause of 
the negligible analysis of the human rights dimensions of climate change, it is 
also a consequence. Given their salience to the main themes discussed in the 
IPCC’s fourth assessment report (“IPCC AR4”), for example, it is remarkable 
3 The situation is now changing. At its seventh session, in March 2008, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution on human rights and climate 
change. See UN Doc. A/HRC/7/L.21/Rev.1 (26 March 2008). The resolution calls 
on the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights to undertake “a detailed 
analytical study of the relationship between climate change and human rights” for 
consideration by the Council. A series of projects investigating the link have been 
initiated at universities and non-governmental organisations and elsewhere.
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that human rights are scarcely signalled in almost 3,000 pages of analysis.4 
This would appear to indicate a near complete disciplinary disconnect, an 
impression borne out by a glance at the 10,000-strong participants’ list for the 
recent (thirteenth) Conference of the Parties of December 2007, among whom 
no more than a tiny handful hailed from human rights backgrounds. Scanning 
for human rights “language” is, of course, a poor analytical tool. Similar 
concerns may be addressed using different terms – and this appears to be 
at least partly true in this instance. Nevertheless, the choice of language and 
disciplinary lens will determine to some extent the relevance of certain kinds of 
information, orientation and response. Since the IPCC reports are essentially 
literature reviews, the shortage of rights references no doubt indicates a mere 
vacuum in the literature rather than any conclusion, bias or failing on the part of 
the IPCC authors. That vacuum says as much about an absence of interest in 
climate change among human rights professionals to date as vice versa. 
Why	the	silence	on	human	rights?	
What explains this mutual disinterest? The primary cause appears to be a 
kind of disciplinary path-dependence. The study of climate change began 
among meteorologists, became firmly entrenched in the physical sciences, 
and has only gradually – if inevitably – reached into the social sciences. The 
basic orientation has remained pre-eminently, though not solely, economic. 
Climate change negotiations have centred on consensus-driven welfare-based 
solutions, approaches that have historically thrived independently of and in 
parallel to human rights. Human rights organisations, for their part, are unlikely, 
as a matter of professional orientation, to take up issues framed as “hypothetical” 
or scenario-based, quite aside from the disciplinary boundaries that have 
long existed between environmental and human rights law. It may be that 
consideration of “new and additional” future harms simply escapes the ordinary 
purview of human rights analysis. The confluence is consequently marginal: on 
the few occasions human rights are mentioned in the IPCC reports, it is almost 
exclusively in connection with harms that have already taken place.5 
In addition, experts in either discipline might identify plausible reasons for 
doubting that a “human rights approach” would assist the formation of effective 
policies to address climate change. Listed below are five such reasons.6 
4 Human rights are mentioned occasionally in IPCC AR4 (each volume is named after 
its relevant working group (WG)). The discussion of legal instruments for mitigation 
in Chapter 13 (IPCC AR4, WGIII, pp. 793-794) notes the existence of human rights 
litigation, without commentary. Passing references also appear, again without 
analysis, in IPCC AR4, WGII, Chapter 15, p. 661; Chapter 17, p. 736; and Chapter 
20, p. 818. See further below pp. 29-31.
5 The Inuit case is the primary example. See the short discussion in IPCC AR4, WGIII, 
Chapter 13, and in Chapter III below.
6 These schematic points are not intended as expressions of legal doctrine.
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The rights at issue are difficult to enforce. Climate change generally (if not 
exclusively) affects categories of human rights that have notoriously weak 
enforcement mechanisms under international law – social and economic rights, 
the rights of migrants, rights protections during conflicts.7 Even those rights that 
have strong protections, such as rights to life and to property, are not subject 
to their normal enforcement procedures, because the harms caused by climate 
change can be attributed only indirectly to the identified perpetrators. In the 
absence of strong enforcement institutions, either at national or international 
level, it is not immediately obvious what human rights can add to a policy 
discussion that is already notably welfare-conscious, even if focused on the 
general good rather than on individual complaints. 
Extraterritorial responsibility is hard to establish. Under human rights law, a 
person’s government ordinarily has the primary duty to act when rights are 
violated. In the context of climate change, however, responsibility for impacts 
in the most vulnerable countries often lies not with the government nearest 
to hand, but with diffuse actors, both public and private, many of whom are 
located far away. Human rights law does not easily reach across international 
borders to impose obligations in matters such as these.8 
Local accountability is hard to establish. Although countries that lack economic 
resources and infrastructure are least likely to be major emitters of greenhouse 
gases, they are most likely to suffer devastating effects of climate change – 
effects whose human consequences will be worsened by their low capacity to 
adapt. Resource constraints inevitably impair a state’s ability to provide quality 
public goods to its population. This problem, which underpins the inadequate 
7 Nevertheless, human rights bodies, notably the European Court of Human Rights, 
have found rights violations due to environmental impacts, including of the right to 
health. See Shelton, 2001, pp. 225-231; Robb, 2001. In a recent case, Öneryıldız 
v. Turkey (App. no. 48939/99, decision of 30 November 2004), the Court found 
against Turkey for failing to act on an environmental impact assessment, thereby 
contributing to deaths caused by a methane explosion at a rubbish tip.
8 Extraterritorial responsibility is a fraught area of international human rights law. 
Existing case law suggests that states have responsibility for (i) state actions taken 
in other countries, (ii) human rights protections in countries where they exercise 
“effective control”, and (iii) some violations committed abroad by private actors 
who fall under their jurisdiction. See, for example, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, HRC 
Comm. No. R12/52 (1979), Views of 29 July 1981; Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion 
of 9 July 2004; Coard et al. v. United States, IACHR Case No. 10.951, Reports no 
109/99, 29 September 1999; Bankovic v. Belgium (App. 52207/99, Decision of 12 
December 2001). However, the case law is sparse and its applicability to climate-
related harms unclear. Alternative mechanisms involving “long-arm” domestic 
jurisdiction – such as the United States’ Alien Tort Claims Act – may be of limited 
potential value. Although state responsibility for extraterritorial violations of social 
and economic rights has not been widely discussed, the particular harms caused 
by global warming may generate plausible claims of this kind. See the discussion 
below, pp. 70-71.
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fulfilment of social and economic rights in some countries, has led to the notion 
of “progressive realisation” of those rights under international law. Under existing 
circumstances, however, climate change is likely to lead to a progressive 
deterioration of those same rights. If a government cannot be held accountable 
for failing fully to protect those rights in the ordinary course, it will surely be even 
harder to hold it responsible for circumstances it did not create.9 
Emergency conditions limit the application of human rights law. The most severe 
climate change impacts will be catastrophic – drought, floods, famines, mass 
migration, wars – and will affect large numbers of people. In such circumstances, 
a common response is to declare an emergency. International human rights 
treaties and most national constitutions typically allow for the suspension 
(“derogation”) of many human rights in times of emergency.10 Emergency 
regimes are habitually critical or dismissive of human rights constraints, 
tending instead to adopt an ends-oriented and charity-centred language of 
humanitarian relief. Governments are empowered to act expediently, with less 
regard to individual rights and interests that might act as a brake on achieving 
the greater good. Human rights, traditionally conceived as a bulwark against 
expansive state discretion, become less relevant as legal tools at such times 
(although their rhetorical force may increase). Indeed, many human rights 
traditionalists might be expected to oppose climate change action on precisely 
the grounds that it will empower government, both nationally and internationally, 
at the expense of individuals.11 
Rights may conflict. Human rights protect others besides those who are 
potentially harmed by climate change. Economic actors are also rights-holders 
and it is foreseeable that some of them will invoke the human right to property 
or peaceful enjoyment of their possessions to prevent or reduce action on 
climate change. The right to property has been given a broad interpretation by 
international tribunals and could be asserted by those who have been licensed 
to act in ways that harm the environment. Other human rights claims too – such 
as to culture, or freedom of religion, or family reunion – may bring individuals into 
conflict with climate change policies. All of these rights, like other rights, may be 
limited for the public good, and struggles can be expected over exactly where 
the line should be drawn in such cases. Adversarialism is, of course, part of the 
9 Some vulnerable countries are themselves becoming significant emitters, of course. 
Examples include China and to a lesser extent India and Brazil. In such cases, the 
relevance of human rights law will depend increasingly on the legal expression and 
enforcement capacity of human rights norms in the countries in question.
10 For accounts of the applicability of human rights during emergencies see, Inter-
Agency Standing Committee, 2006; and OHCHR, 2003, Chapter 16.
11 It has become increasingly common to adopt the language of emergency when 
referring not only to climate change effects but to the phenomenon in its entirety. 
Even if this language is intended to be emotive rather than literal, it tends to remove 
climate change impacts from the ordinary reach of human rights law, at least 
rhetorically.
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ordinary human rights landscape. As climate change policies will necessarily 
generate choices about the distribution of costs and benefits, the invocation 
of human rights can be expected to produce struggles, pitting interest groups 
against one another in a way that is markedly different from the consensus-
building and compromise that has traditionally guided climate negotiations. 
The above objections are not negligible. But they nevertheless rely, perhaps 
excessively, on a legalist vision of human rights that, if frequently effective, is 
not necessarily definitive. Legal scholars will quickly recognise a long-standing 
dichotomy between formal and substantive justice: the hard rule-of-law 
formalism of human rights on one hand versus the soft law, policy orientation of 
the UNFCCC on the other. The ethical language of “equity” and “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” of the UNFCCC has a quite different texture to the 
moral certainty and universalism of statements like the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (UDHR) and the international human rights covenants. 
Indeed “equity”, as it appears in the UNFCCC, might be thought difficult to 
reconcile with the formal equality that underpins human rights law, much as 
the UNFCCC’s distinction between “Annex I” (wealthy or “developed”) and 
“non-Annex I” (“developing”) countries seemingly runs counter to the universal 
obligations held by all countries under human rights law.12 Fortunately, however, 
as this report will show, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
Possible	benefits	of	a	human	rights	Policy	orientation
As harms due to climate change are increasingly felt, it is very likely that many of 
those affected will turn to the hard law language of human rights for protection. 
Indeed, this is already happening.13 However, human rights can be articulated 
in registers other than law. In approaching climate change, a case might be 
made for a less legalist application of human rights principles to the climate 
change field, in favour of an approach better suited to the immense policy 
challenges that lie ahead. Five potential benefits of such a policy orientation 
are identified below. 
Human rights prioritise harms to actual persons. As mentioned, human rights 
discourse cannot easily sustain discussion of hypotheticals: it reverts quickly 
to actual facts and outcomes. But this can be an advantage. In a debate 
necessarily steeped in scenarios and probabilities, human rights law requires 
that hard lines be drawn where possible. The important questions about 
impact scenarios would then be: who, precisely, is likely to suffer what and 
why? Human rights standards provide thresholds of minimum acceptability.14 
12 See Chapter V below.
13 See Chapter III below.
14 The notion of human rights as thresholds is borrowed from the work of Simon Caney. 
See Caney, 2005, 2006 and forthcoming (2008).
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If an effect of climate change is to cause the living conditions of specific 
individuals to sink below these understood thresholds, it might be considered 
unacceptable (or even unlawful). This approach (discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter) is more modest than one that argues for equal rights 
to the atmosphere, or to a given level of aggregate prosperity, or to the notion 
of “utility maximisation” common in economic analysis. Because it is modest, 
achievable and fair, and uses a language to which few will object, a policy 
orientation based on human rights thresholds potentially provides a platform for 
broad-based dialogue on burden sharing of a kind that has frequently lacked 
in climate change debates.
Looking forward, mitigation and adaptation policies too might be framed or 
evaluated by reference to human rights thresholds. Deforestation, biofuel 
substitution, even emissions trading will all lead to outcomes that, like climate 
impacts themselves, can be reviewed in advance for their likely human rights 
effects. If specific policies are forecast to lead to faltering rights fulfilment, 
they could be altered or rejected. For vulnerable states, a focus on affected 
populations rather than (or in addition to) environmental damage may prove 
useful in mobilising international assistance.15 
Ethical demands translate into legal obligations. Human rights thinking 
habitually resituates ethical imperatives within a legal framework. Observers 
of climate change negotiations have long noted that the distribution of climate 
change impacts is inherently unfair: the costs are carried less by those who 
created the problem than by innocent others elsewhere. One long-standing 
ethical worry has been that this original injustice will be reproduced throughout 
an international climate regime, allowing the beneficiaries of carbon overuse to 
pass their costs onto others distant in time or space. This hard ethical problem 
has always been close to the heart of climate change negotiations. It is unlikely 
that human rights law can resolve it. But human rights values might usefully 
refocus or perhaps help to ground the debate. 
Accountability. The human rights preoccupation with accountability might be 
helpful in constructing a climate regime. In general, international environmental 
treaties have been slow to introduce judicial instruments or other mechanisms of 
direct accountability, preferring to emphasise collaborative action. However, as 
the climate regime extends, as the urgency of addressing the problem grows, 
and as the instruments involved increase in complexity, accountability is likely 
to become more important. Accountability mechanisms of some sort will be 
needed to underpin any functional climate regime, because compliance will be 
15 Thinking of human rights as thresholds also has a bearing on the distribution of 
responsibilities when addressing climate change. Those who are extremely 
disadvantaged should not be required to pay the costs when doing so pushes 
them below a certain threshold.
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vital to credibility.16 This is an area where human rights activists and lawyers have 
relevant experience – for example, of identifying and endeavouring to mend 
(albeit with limited success) the institutional gaps that obstruct the prosecution 
of transnational private actors for human rights violations. The incorporation of 
human rights assessments in policy projections could also help to determine 
who is accountable for what, and how accountability should be attributed. 
Focus on the most vulnerable. Human rights analysis and advocacy have 
always paid particular attention to those who are on the margins of society 
as a result of poverty, powerlessness, or systemic discrimination. It is widely 
acknowledged that social and economic vulnerability greatly increases the risk 
of suffering from the impacts of climate change. Those who are less well off 
often lack the information or resources to make informed choices on adapting 
to or otherwise avoiding future damages.17 They are also less likely to have a 
sustained voice in, or influence over, policy-making, and so in times of crises the 
vulnerability of marginalised groups can increase dramatically. A human rights 
focus can redirect attention to people who are otherwise likely to be ignored or 
unheard. Where communities are already living in precarious circumstances 
(shanty towns, polluted or otherwise fragile environments), posing human rights 
questions may help to locate some of the hazards posed by climate change – 
from desertification, water salination, sea level rise, and so on – as well as those 
who are most at risk from them. Particularly in countries and societies where 
poverty is linked to discrimination – ethnic, racial or religious – an analysis 
sensitive to the dynamics that drive exclusion is likely to foresee future trends 
and vulnerabilities more clearly. 
Procedural guarantees. Various doctrines of procedural or process rights 
have evolved within human rights law, many of which have been adopted in 
international environmental law.18 In principle these can help those harmed by 
climate change to influence policies that affect them, and can assist policy-
makers to understand and take account of public needs. These rights are 
particularly relevant to adaptation policy and will be discussed further in 
Chapter IV below. 
Taken together, these strengths suggest that human rights could play a 
valuable role during climate change negotiations and when implementing 
policies, particularly in ethically fraught areas. Human rights supply not only 
legal imperatives, but also a set of internationally agreed values around which 
common action can be negotiated and motivated. They provide a language of 
16 See the discussion in Stern, 2006 (“The Stern Review”), Part VI, Chapters 21 and 27.
17 See text at note 2 above.
18 Notably Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
and the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (“Aarhus Convention”), 
discussed below in Chapter IV.
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minimum thresholds, legally defined, about which there is already widespread 
consensus. They are potentially very relevant where the recent Bali roadmap, for 
example, speaks of “a shared vision for long-term cooperative action … taking 
into account social and economic conditions and other relevant factors”.19 The 
rule-of-law formalism of human rights practice might even provide backbone for 
the ethical aspirations and policy assumptions embedded in such language. 
rights-based	PersPectives	on	climate	change
Several attempts have been made to place rights at the centre of the future 
climate change regime. These have not, however, generally been human 
rights-focused: they have not been based upon or referred to human rights 
law, jurisprudence, policy experience or practice. When human rights have 
been invoked, it has been in a schematic fashion, as a set of background 
ethical assumptions that, for example, everyone has an equal entitlement to 
“fair treatment” in a “just” climate change regime, particularly in the context of 
mitigation options. 
A general premise underlying many rights-based approaches to climate 
change mitigation is the distinction between “luxury emissions” and 
“subsistence” or “survival emissions” first put forward in 1991 by the India-
based Centre for Science and the Environment, and further consolidated by 
the political philosopher Henry Shue.20 Rather than assuming that everyone 
has an equal right to emit greenhouse gases in a world where overall emissions 
must be limited, the model distinguishes the use of carbon fuels (and other 
GHG sources) to fulfil basic human needs from use to perpetuate luxurious 
lifestyles. Whereas the former might be regarded as a fundamental (or human) 
right, the latter cannot be. This intervention has proved helpful by contrasting 
excess GHG use in some countries with continued need for future GHG use in 
others. The problem then becomes one of redressing an imbalance, which in 
turn involves inter-state obligations. This case might arguably be strengthened 
by linking “subsistence emissions” to the satisfaction of basic human rights, 
such as to food, health, water and so on – on the grounds that these rights are 
already widely accepted and governments are already bound by them. There 
have been curiously few attempts to explore this connection, however.21 
19 Decision -/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (Advance Unedited Version), Article 1(a). See 
also the Stern Review, 572-3. The Bali Action plan is online at http://unfccc.int.
20 Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1993.
21 A recent exception is the “greenhouse development rights” framework, discussed 
further below. One reason for caution in reading human (social and economic) 
rights into any right to “subsistence emissions” might be a concern that obligations 
would then be deflected from the governments of countries producing excess 
luxury emissions onto those in low-emission countries, who are less responsible. 
These issues are treated more fully in Chapters II and V below.
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The best known rights-based approach to climate change mitigation is the 
“contraction-and-convergence” (C&C) framework presented by the Global 
Commons Institute (GCI) at the second Conference of the Parties in 1996. The 
idea, very briefly, was to articulate a long-term mitigation regime that, while 
reducing the overall amount of greenhouse gas in use over time, would also 
equalise greenhouse gas emissions per person on a global scale over time. 
In such a regime, as overall global emissions dropped, the fall would be more 
precipitate in wealthy countries, while usage in poorer countries would continue 
to rise for a period in line with their greater development needs – towards 
convergence between rich and poor countries at some point in the future. 
Initially, GCI abjured the term “rights” in reference to C&C – because they 
regarded the atmosphere as a global commons that “cannot be appropriated 
by any state or person”.22 Today, however, GCI claim that C&C “establishes a 
constitutional, global-equal-rights-based framework for the arrest of greenhouse 
gas emissions”.23 This appears to be in line with a general shift towards the 
language of rights in the climate change arena.
Whereas the “rights” at issue in models such as C&C amount to speculative 
universal “rights to emit”, with no obvious basis in human rights law, they might 
be considered to derive from the “right to development”, which is mentioned 
in the UNFCCC.24 This would depend on demonstrating that “subsistence 
emissions” were in fact required to achieve basic human rights, a claim that 
is at least plausible. The right to development has declaratory (non-binding) 
status under international law, and has been a subject of protracted discussion 
within the United Nations.25 Whatever its doctrinal status, discussion of this right 
has evolved with time, gradually providing elements of a bridge between the 
languages of development and human rights within the UN. It may therefore be 
helpful in any investigation of the human rights implications of climate change.
One recent model for GHG mitigation is explicitly based upon the right to 
development: the “greenhouse development rights” (GDR) framework put 
forward in 2007 by Tom Athanasiou, Paul Baer and Sivan Kartha.26 They suggest 
22 AGBM/1.9.96/14, “Draft Proposals for a Climate Change Protocol based on 
Contraction and Convergence: A Contribution to Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,” Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, 1996, at www.gci.org.uk/contconv/
protweb.html. The authors suggest using “quotas” rather than rights.
23 See www.gci.org.uk.
24 UNFCCC, Article 3(4): “The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development.” In this ambiguous wording, however, the guaranteed right appears 
to be the state’s “right to promote” development.
25 See for example Saloman, 2005. See contributions to Andreassen and Marks, 2006; 
Alston, 2001, p. 283. The right to development is discussed further in Chapter V 
below.
26 Baer et al., 2007. The report was co-produced by the Stockholm Environmental 
Institute, EcoEquity and Christian Aid.
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that the climate change regime should give priority to violations of human 
rights (to food, water, health and shelter) associated with current low levels 
of development. In terms of allocating rights and duties, the GDR framework 
is less concerned with convergence towards equivalent emissions than with 
ensuring that all countries are permitted (and aided, where necessary) to reach 
a comparable “development threshold” at which basic rights might be fulfilled.27 
The GDR framework offers pointers for determining the level at which different 
countries should cap their GHG emissions and emphasises the importance of 
technology transfer, swift and substantial adaptation funding, and other forms 
of assistance. These require levies on wealthy countries, which the authors 
calculate on the basis of excess GHG usage.
Finally, a rights-based approach has, in fact, been adopted at the heart of 
the climate change regime through the emissions market introduced by the 
Kyoto Protocol. Rights to buy or sell emission reductions amount in effect to 
rights to emit for those who obtain them. Questions might be raised about the 
appropriateness of allocating use rights to the atmosphere in an alienable – as 
opposed to inalienable – guise. As noted above, when rights to the atmosphere 
were put forward in the early climate change debates, they were consistently 
treated as fundamental, universal and inalienable. Their legal incarnation, 
however, has instead taken the form of exclusive tradable commodities. The 
ease with which this notion passed into international law (in the Kyoto Protocol) 
arguably demonstrates the comparative facility of establishing new property 
rights under international law as compared with new human rights.
Even though human rights play an increasingly prominent role in each successive 
rights-based appraisal of climate change, the latter have remained generally 
utilitarian, relying on cost-benefit and other economic analyses. They draw 
on human rights primarily for their normative value, to underpin distributional 
justice models, and give little weight to their achieved positive status under 
international law. Existing approaches mobilise human rights rhetoric in the 
interests of conceiving a just global regime for mitigating climate change, but 
do not examine specific human rights violations resulting from climate change 
or consider actions to address it. They speak about human rights as a means 
to spur climate change mitigation; they do not broach climate change policy in 
order to mitigate human rights violations that might result from it.28 To note this 
is not, of course, to criticise these approaches. It is simply to register how few 
attempts have been made to apply international human rights tools to address 
harms resulting from climate change. The remainder of this report suggests 
what such an application might look like.
27 The “threshold” is schematically set at US$ 9,000 per capita at purchasing power 
parity.
28 Some organisations have called for adaptation transfers on the basis that adaptation 
funding should be viewed as “compensation” for harms inflicted by the actions of 
the rich world. This model too invokes human rights as an ethical rather than a legal 
imperative. See, for example, Oxfam International, 2007.
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rights,	needs,	develoPment	and	the	state
This report draws on the vocabularies of two different bodies of policy and 
law that do not always sit easily side by side. Certain terms familiar from one 
register sound jarring in the other. Human rights are presumptively universal. 
There is little obvious space for “equity” or for distinctions between countries 
along the lines of “developed” and “developing”.29 By contrast, climate change 
law and policy have striven to avoid absolute claims in favour of a flexible and 
discretionary “framework” language better suited to guiding compromise and 
consensus. This short section teases through some definitional issues that arise 
at the intersection of these discourses. 
In this report, the term “human rights” refers to the core set of rights proclaimed 
under international law on behalf of all individuals, regardless of “race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”.30 The primary source texts are the 1966 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of which derive from the 1948 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The two Covenants are legally binding 
on all states that have ratified them – the vast majority of the world’s countries 
– and are supplemented by further binding treaties that protect the rights of 
children, migrant workers, and people with disabilities, and that prohibit torture 
as well as racial and gender discrimination. Regional binding human rights 
treaties also exist within Africa, the Americas and Europe. All these texts are 
further supported by the case law of international, regional and national courts, 
by a body of “soft law” (that is, non-binding resolutions and other texts from 
international bodies such as the UN General Assembly), and, to a lesser 
degree, by the doctrinal analyses of international lawyers and scholars. 
The human rights laid out in these documents are generally referred to as 
“civil and political” on one hand and “social, economic and cultural” on the 
other. The former include rights to life, liberty, property, freedom of expression 
and assembly, political participation, a fair trial, privacy and home life, and 
protection from torture. The latter include rights to work, education, social 
security, to “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health”, and to “adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions”. Whereas the former rights are typically 
guaranteed through judicial mechanisms, including at international level, the 
latter have generally been dependent upon domestic welfare mechanisms in 
the absence of any dedicated international judicial machinery.31 
29 See Chapter V below.
30 Common Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights.
31 Social rights have increasing judicial traction. An Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 
currently being developed, would create an international tribunal for these rights.
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Human rights therefore capture a range of concerns that are evidently relevant 
to climate change, including many that are elsewhere framed as “basic needs”. 
For example, the assertion in the first Article of both Covenants that “[i]n no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence” is clearly relevant 
where a changing climate is having precisely this effect.32 To speak of basic 
subsistence needs (water, food, healthcare, shelter and so on) in terms of rights 
means more than merely to adopt a legal vocabulary in place of a charitable 
one. It also implies referral to a body of internationally agreed norms that have 
raised those needs to the level of entitlements for all. Under human rights treaty 
law, the duty to fulfil these entitlements lies with states (not with private actors 
or the “international community”). Each state that has ratified the ICESCR has 
a duty to “respect, protect and fulfil” the rights laid down in that treaty for those 
coming within their jurisdiction, and these duties have their own specific scope 
under the treaty. The obligation to respect a right means the state must take 
no steps that would violate that right; the obligation to protect requires states 
act to ensure that other actors, including private and international actors, are 
not permitted to violate the right; the obligation to fulfil requires that states take 
steps over time to “progressively realise” citizens’ rights to food, shelter, health, 
education and so on.33 The Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 
which is the UN body that oversees the ICESCR, commonly requests that states 
demonstrate constant progress in the fulfilment of these rights. The Committee 
further provides guidelines on how human rights assessment can be integrated 
into development planning.34 
States are thus the central actors in both regimes: they carry the primary 
responsibility for protecting human rights, and this responsibility extends 
into the negotiation of a solution to climate change. In the latter negotiations, 
states implicitly set in place global conditions that will affect the protection 
and fulfilment of human rights for which they are responsible at home. That 
responsibility should (and does) influence the negotiating positions states take. 
Poor countries have good reason to fear, for example, that emissions caps 
will adversely impact their obligation to respect, protect, or fulfil basic social 
rights. According to the ICESCR, states have an obligation to “undertake steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation” to fulfil 
rights, and are required to use “the maximum of its available resources” to that 
end (Article 2). This would seem to indicate not only that recipient states must 
32 ICHRP would like to thank Kate Raworth of Oxfam for this point.
33 See for example UN Docs, E/C.12/1999/5, CESCR General Comment No. 12, The 
right to adequate food (Article 11) (12/05/99); E/C.12/2002/11, CESCR General 
Comment No. 15, The right to water (Articles 11 and 12) (2002); E/C.12/2000/4, 
CESCR General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (Article 12) (11/08/2000). There are 149 states parties to the ICESCR. The 
United States is not among them, having signed but not ratified it.
34 UN Doc. E/C.12/1991/1, Revised general guidelines regarding the form and 
contents of reports to be submitted by states parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (17 June 2001).
14 Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide
channel international assistance firstly to ends that will alleviate rights deficits, 
but also that they are obliged, in accepting aid, to refuse “conditionality” that 
might undermine those rights, including in climate change related funding. 
Indeed, on these grounds, recipient countries might themselves impose 
conditions on any funds accepted. 
However, while the ICESCR, reinforced by the Committee’s commentaries, 
encourages wealthier states to provide assistance to other states to fulfil social 
and economic rights, there is no binding obligation upon them to do so. A 
binding obligation to provide assistance does appear, however, in the climate 
change regime. As discussed in Chapter V below, the UNFCCC requirement 
on wealthy states to provide “new and additional” funding for adaptation is 
arguably stronger than the duty of international assistance under human rights 
law, and is applicable to broadly similar activities. There is presumably scope 
for mutual reinforcement between these complementary treaty obligations. 
Although social and economic rights are clearly relevant to economic 
development in “developing countries”, the language of rights has only 
been partially integrated in development discourse. The reasons for this 
are too complex to enter into here. While a number of bilateral development 
agencies and development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
explored a variety of “human rights-based approaches” and UN agencies have 
“mainstreamed” human rights, in practice their adoption has been uneven and 
international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and private 
foreign investors have largely refused to adopt a human rights methodology. 
Indeed the very applicability of international human rights law to these actors 
has often appeared uncertain, given that they are neither states nor, so it is 
argued in some cases, subject to specific territorial jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
international law provides no clear means to evaluate development activities 
for their rights outcomes or to hold the principal development actors to account 
on this basis.35 The relationship between development and rights remains, as a 
result, complicated; and their integration in terms of practice is at best a work 
in progress. This partly explains, no doubt, the relative neglect of human rights 
in climate change discussions. 
The present report follows the UNFCCC in speaking of “developed” and 
“developing” countries but recognises that these categories are simplistic. 
Neither category is monolithic: each contains countries that have very different 
characteristics in terms of those who need most protection from climate change 
harms and those who bear most responsibility. Similar differences exist within 
individual countries, both rich and poor. Elite groups in poor countries occupy a 
disproportionate share of the environmental space as they do in rich countries, 
and these groups are often allied. Powerful political and economic links exist 
between “North” and “South”; and the major companies in large developing 
35 The literature on the human rights obligations of the main development actors is 
voluminous. For a good recent overview, see Tan, 2008a.
 Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide 15
countries are increasingly significant global producers in their own right. Finally, 
the responsibility and negotiating stances of outlier countries, particularly those 
that act with least apparent regard for the shared environment, such as the 
United States and China, need to be viewed in a distinct and nuanced manner. 
So whereas the report speaks of “developed” and “developing” countries 
because the terms are legally significant in the context of the UNFCCC, the 
language is used for convenience rather than for its precision.
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II. HuMAn RIGHts As tHResHolds:  
PolICY GuIdAnCe FoR MItIGAtIon  
And AdAPtAtIon PRIoRItIes
This chapter argues that closer attention to the foreseeable human rights 
consequences of climate change, and of the policies to address it, will improve 
those policies. Drawing on the notion of human rights as “thresholds”, it 
suggests that human rights analysis might add to the knowledge-base upon 
which climate change predictions rely, and so feed into appropriate policy 
responses. The chapter examines, first, the need to locate likely human rights 
harms in order to orient adaptation policies for current and future climate 
change impacts. Second, it suggests incorporating human rights criteria into 
longer-term assessments of mitigation strategies, particularly where these will 
lead to redistribution of resources and where they will affect future development 
prospects. 
Although, as suggested earlier, human rights activists frequently privilege 
fact over speculation and may harbour a suspicion of “pre-emptive” action, 
forward thinking is nevertheless fundamental to human rights protection. Law 
enforcement and judicial systems are themselves deterrence mechanisms, 
warding off future violations via the threat of punishment. The distinction 
between facts (in human rights) and probabilities (in climate change) is one of 
degree: the probability of a given human rights violation taking place can – like 
a predicted climate change impact – increase or diminish over time according 
to the relative robustness of the institutions designed to prevent it. Seen from this 
perspective, a significant portion of human rights advocacy is also concerned 
with hypotheticals: calling for new laws, reforming judiciaries, training police 
officers are all means to prevent human rights abuses or at least reduce the 
probability of future occurrence. 
But there is a difference. Whereas human rights prevention mechanisms are 
familiar to lawyers and policy-makers, and can be pictured and planned 
following known designs, even where they do not yet exist, those needed to 
prevent damage from climate change are still largely speculative. The means of 
prevention are as hypothetical as the impacts they must prevent; indeed more 
so, given the unpredictable feedback effects of many interventions. This has 
made climate change forecasting highly dynamic, reliant on multiple feedback 
loops. Predicted impacts are constantly readjusted to take account of varying 
or changing assumptions. Innumerable mitigation, adaptation and development 
paths can be designed, each with different baseline assumptions and impact 
ranges. Tweaking any one aspect of a given input – scientific, economic or social 
– leads to domino alterations elsewhere. Human rights impacts are a relevant 
aspect of that dynamism, subject to different levels of protection and fulfilment 
under different scenarios, but to date they have not been factored explicitly 
into calculations. To mobilise the policy value, and indeed the legal force, of 
human rights in the construction of a climate change regime, therefore, requires 
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the injection of likely human rights impacts and outcomes into the dynamic 
forecasting that already characterises climate change scenario construction. 
human	rights	thresholds	in	Practice
Human rights risks will arise when there are reliable expectations that coastal 
cities will be flooded, or desert regions will suffer drought, or food shortages will 
become severe, or insect-borne diseases will flourish. If these outcomes result 
in migration or conflict, further rights are threatened.36 Even under best case 
scenarios today, certain impacts cannot be avoided. Their human rights risks 
and consequences are already being felt. The climate literature now devotes 
considerable space to evaluating the human impacts of global warming, on 
food, water and health. Yet climate change scenarios remain broad brush, 
constrained to take sweeping overviews rather than locating specific harms. 
Factoring future human rights threats explicitly into climate change scenarios 
would provide an analytical tool for refocusing climate change impacts more 
narrowly on their likely human costs. This would in turn help not only to determine 
whether human rights risk being breached, but also to identify future duty-
bearers and the adequacy of response institutions and redress mechanisms.37 
One way to organise data collection and modelling of this kind might be to think 
in terms of human rights thresholds: levels of protection for individual rights 
which can be regarded as the minimum acceptable outcome under a given 
policy scenario.38 A policy requirement that basic threshold levels should not be 
breached – either as an effect of climate change itself or as a by-product of a 
given mitigation or adaptation policy – ought not to be controversial, especially 
as such a goal is also a legal requirement for policy-actors. Basic human rights 
standards are broadly accepted. In addition such a goal is modest. It does not 
require large-scale social engineering or assume equal and universal access 
rights to the atmosphere – as contraction and convergence arguably might. 
Nor does it involve epic calculations across vast datasets. Rather essential 
needs are identified for attention on the basis of their likely breach, and further 
resources can be concentrated on assessing and mitigating risk by finding 
appropriate technological and institutional fixes. 
36 A recent report by the International Organization for Migration attempts to extrapolate 
likely future migration trends due to climate change on the basis of three different 
climate scenarios described in IPCC AR4. See IOM, 2007 pp. 27-31.
37 The General Comments of the UN’s Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights are relevant here. See, for example, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, General 
Comment No. 15 (2002), The right to water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), para. 8. This highlights the link 
between “environmental hygiene”, safe drinking water and health, stating among 
other things that “States parties should monitor and combat situations where 
aquatic eco-systems serve as a habitat for vectors of diseases…”.
38 See Caney, above note 14.
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Embedding human rights thresholds into policy objectives might first involve 
reviewing existing climate change scenarios to identify specific human costs 
across time and in different places, and then asking how countries – provincial 
and local governments, and eventually communities – are equipped to respond 
(socially, financially, technologically and institutionally). Down the road, real-
time monitoring would need to be supplemented by predictive forecasting of 
human rights threshold levels under a series of scenarios. 
Such scenario building would help guide both adaptation and mitigation policies. 
Since it is widely recognised that some impacts are now inevitable, adaptation 
measures are already required for countries likely to be hardest hit. However 
existing adaptation plans and funding have run into numerous obstacles and 
continue to advance with difficulty. Identifying likely transgressions of human 
rights thresholds would refocus attention on the human priorities that ought to 
drive debate. At the same time, building human rights assessments into long-
term mitigation and adaptation scenarios would refine and improve policies, 
and provide criteria for their adoption or rejection.
Straightforward as this may sound, it is far from easy. Nothing in human rights 
reporting compares to the close monitoring and reporting on oceanic and 
atmospheric changes that has generated more than 50 years of records. Nothing 
compares either to the panoply of measurements and tools that scientists take 
for granted – not to mention the complex of tested assumptions, empirical data 
and computer generated modelling techniques that have been so essential to 
climate change analysis. Clearly a major investment in information gathering 
will be needed, especially in countries that are likely to be most affected and 
least equipped to conduct monitoring of this sort. New tools and techniques 
will be required, as well as a vast effort in training and capacity building, 
because so much of the information must be gathered locally at multiple 
locations. Moreover, although each element appears simple in itself (as does 
measurement of gas concentrations, ocean temperatures, rainfall, and so on, 
taken individually), collating such information cogently will be demanding. Yet 
without such an effort, foreseeing and managing the human consequences of 
adaptation and mitigation policies will be guesswork at best.39 
Viewing climate change impacts in terms of human rights thresholds will 
raise a number of questions that have barely been touched upon to date. 
Take, for example, the level at which global warming becomes “dangerous”.40 
The consensus (until recently) that an average rise of no more than 2ºC from 
preindustrial levels is acceptable may appear reasonable from an aggregate 
perspective, but will appear much less so to those for whom such an increase 
involves irretrievable losses to livelihood and culture, or those living in places 
39 A useful model here might the French early warning system introduced following the 
severe heat waves of 2003.
40 See UNFCCC, Article 2.
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likely to experience warming at higher levels than average.41 While a cost-benefit 
analysis might conclude that hardships in one place can be set off against 
benefits in another, such calculations are impermissible for human rights, which 
views each individual harm on its own terms. 
Further questions arise once it is acknowledged that average global warming 
is in fact unlikely to remain below the “dangerous” 2ºC.42 The pool of individuals 
certain to be affected grows with each incremental increase in the global level of 
warming. Should all those caught in this pool be compensated? If so, by whom? 
Will they have viable claims? Or will it make more sense, having identified those 
most at risk, to channel resources in advance towards actions that will ward off 
their future predicament? In either case, there is a solid argument for identifying 
as far in advance as possible the likely victims and the mechanisms needed to 
protect their rights. 
Human rights-centred climate change scenarios would have highly practical 
applications. Three come immediately to mind. First, human rights language 
can add considerable normative traction to arguments in favour of strong 
mitigation and adaptation policies. For human rights groups and activists to 
argue for an effective climate change regime is a natural fit, given that the 
consequences of failing to produce one are likely to be catastrophic from a 
rights perspective. Human rights provide a legitimate set of guiding principles 
for global public policy because they are widely accepted by societies and 
governments everywhere. As well as imposing legal requirements, they also 
provide something approximating an international value system, at both 
rhetorical and policy level, around which support can be rallied. 
Second, human rights principles can strengthen the case for amending and 
improving relevant areas of international law. Whereas progress on international 
human rights law has been incremental at best for decades, the scale of the 
challenge climate change poses to public policy will create increasing pressure 
to review and reorganise international rights and duties. A research agenda 
might therefore seek to incorporate human rights language and concerns into 
upcoming climate change agreements, for example in the post-2012 regime 
now under discussion. 
Third, regardless of whether the relevant law refers explicitly to human rights, 
the danger will remain that mitigation and adaptation policies may themselves 
undermine human rights. It will therefore be important to ensure that mitigation 
41 It is a further irony that on many predictions, the effects of a rise between 2ºC and 
3ºC, although devastating in some parts of the world, particularly small island states, 
may actually be beneficial (on balance) in some OECD countries. Such predictions 
might presumably delay the urgency to act in countries better equipped to handle 
the rise.
42 See the discussion on pp. 27-28 below.
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and adaptation policies take account of human rights consequences from the 
outset. Today, climate change mitigation and adaptation discourse is largely 
silent about rights. It may be useful, from the point of view of both climate 
negotiations and human rights protections to investigate the regimes currently 
on the table with a view to identifying their strengths and weaknesses from a 
human rights perspective, and suggest how they might be improved. This is not 
overly idealistic. As a result of intensive international negotiation and subsequent 
litigation, established human rights standards are relatively detailed, realistic 
and practical, fashioned for concrete application by governments. 
The following sections concentrate on the third of these applications, principally 
because it is the most useful, innovative and challenging for both human rights 
and climate change experts.
the	human	rights	dimensions	of	adaPtation	Policies
“Adaptation” refers to actions taken to adjust lives and livelihoods to the new 
conditions brought about by warming temperatures and associated climate 
changes.43 It is commonly used in three distinct ways. It refers first to actions 
that individuals take at their own initiative. Confronted by warmer weather or 
more severe storms, for example, people may choose to use new materials in 
home construction or switch crops or livelihoods. It refers second to government 
measures designed to achieve the same or similar ends (as the Netherlands 
plans to build sea-walls to protect against rising tides, for example). Third, 
adaptation has a more technical meaning derived from the UNFCCC and 
subsequent negotiations. Because the resource imbalance between the 
perpetrators of climate change and its victims was recognised from the outset, 
the UNFCCC included a requirement that wealthier countries should provide 
“new and additional funding” to poorer countries to enable them to address 
climate change.44 This funding was to be “additional” to official development 
assistance (ODA). The practical content of “additionality” (to use the jargon) 
has remained elusive, however. This is partly because there is no clear baseline, 
since few wealthy country countries have reached the agreed international aid 
target of 0.7% of GDP (gross domestic product), and partly because very little 
adaptation funding has ever materialised. In what follows, adaptation is used 
in this third sense, to refer to the elaboration of an international policy that will 
deliver adaptation funding to countries that most need it, and to programmes 
that such funding might support.
43 The third IPCC Assessment Report defined adaptation as “adjustments in ecological, 
social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and 
their effects or impacts. [Adaptation] refers to changes in processes, practices, 
and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit from opportunities 
associated with climate change”. Smit and Pilifosova 2001, pp. 877–912.
44 UNFCCC Article 4 (3). This paragraph, and much of the section, relies on Mace, 
2005; Müller, 2006 and 2007.
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Extrapolating from existing “climate sensitive” ODA, the World Bank reckons 
that adaptation is likely to cost anywhere from US$4 billion to $37 billion each 
year.45 Yet at present adaptation funding has not reached even close to the 
lower end of this scale; and what has been pledged has not been committed 
or spent. Four adaptation funds exist, all managed by the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), which works through implementing agencies (the World Bank, 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP)) to channel multilateral funding for projects 
related to the principal multilateral environmental treaties.46 Climate change is 
one of six GEF focal areas, but adaptation has consistently been a much lower 
priority for the GEF than mitigation. Finally, to address long-standing criticism 
of its lack of an effective adaptation policy, the GEF introduced a Special 
Priority on Adaptation (SPA) in 2005. The SPA (which never graduated beyond 
a “pilot” phase), was available to developing countries on application, subject 
to a complex assessment of their capacity. An original allocation of US$50 
million to the SPA had not been spent by the end of the initial pilot period, 
but no further funds were added for the next “replenishment” period (2007-
2010).47 Expenditure has been and remains excruciatingly slow. According to 
GEF’s latest report, for example, only one of 10 GEF-supported climate change 
projects in financial year 2006-07 concerned adaptation through the SPA, 
amounting to just US$1 million of a total US$81 million spent on climate change 
projects.48 The rest was geared towards mitigation (developing countries do not 
have mitigation obligations). Application procedures for the SPA are complex 
and many developing countries are not aware of what is on offer or how to 
access these funds. 
Three other adaptation funds have been created under international instruments; 
all are moving at an equally slow pace.49 Adaptation is one of four programme 
areas of the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) created under the UNFCCC 
and funded by discretionary pledges of developed countries. Funds may only 
cover adaptation costs that are “additional” to ordinary ODA.50 Inactive until 
recently, seven SCCF projects were finally approved in 2006-07 and involved 
45 Cited in Stern Review, Part V, Chapter 20, p. 442.
46 See for a good overview, Stern Review, Part VI, p. 557. Known as the Rio Conventions 
because they were all signed in Rio in 1992, these are the UNFCCC, the UN 
Convention on Biodiversity and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification.
47 See FCCC/CP/2007/3, Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference 
of the Parties, 13th session Bali, 3–14 December 2007 (27 November 2007), para. 
8: “Once the remainder of the initial US$50 million of funds devoted to the SPA is 
committed to projects, an evaluation will be undertaken to draw initial lessons and 
to assess the potential for mainstreaming adaptation into GEF’s focal areas.”
48 Ibid., paras. 16-17. 
49 Figures are from ibid, paras. 19-27.
50 US$71.5 million has been pledged to date.
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eight countries (there are 121 developing country parties to the UNFCCC).51 
A Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), also created under the UNFCCC, 
is likewise managed by the GEF, and funded through discretionary pledges. 
It has provided US$200,000 apiece for the preparation of National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs), designed in-country to address urgent and 
priority adaptation needs (32 have been finished to date). On the basis of 
NAPAs existing at the time, the Stern Review projected that US$1.3 billion would 
be required for the “immediate” adaptation needs of the 47 Least Developed 
countries (LDCs).52 So far nothing close to this amount is forthcoming.53 Finally, 
an Adaptation Fund was created through the Kyoto Protocol, to be replenished 
from a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.54 Procedures 
for its management were eventually approved at the 13th Conference of the 
Parties in Bali and involve a Board with strong developing country representation. 
The GEF acts as the Secretariat of the Board and is to take direction from the 
Board and the Parties. This is a compromise hard fought for by developing 
country representatives in agreeing to allow the GEF a further managerial role 
in adaptation funding, given its poor track record.55 
It is widely recognised that adaptation funding cannot be delivered effectively 
until it is known where assistance will bring the most benefit. Unfortunately, it is 
just this information that is generally lacking. The reason, as with so much in the 
climate change debate, is resource related. Because expertise and financing 
are concentrated in wealthy countries, the latter have much more complete 
information about the likely impacts of climate change and suitable responses 
to it, compared with sub-Saharan Africa, for example. The IPCC reports cite 
countless practical examples of adaptation in rich countries, many of which are 
already underway; forecasts for poorer countries, by contrast, remain vague 
and sweeping. The Stern Review makes the point as follows:
Adaptation will depend on comprehensive climate monitoring networks, 
and reliable scientific information and forecasts on climate change – a key 
global public good… [D]eveloping-country governments should provide 
information to their own citizens but currently lack the capacity to do this, 
51 These amounted to US$24.4 million of SCCF funds. A further US$92.7 million of 
funding from other sources was leveraged through these projects.
52 Stern Review, p. 442. 
53 By late 2007, US$0.6 million (of a pledged total of US$163 million) had been allocated 
to preparing NAPA projects in four countries. The GEF notes that “approximately 
US$150m remains to be programmed to meet the urgent and immediate adaptation 
needs of the LDCs under the LDCF”. FCCC/CP/2007/3, para. 27.
54 For a description of the Clean Development Mechanism, see below, pp. 36-40. 
55 The Adaptation Fund is set to become operational in 2008. To these four might 
be added the World Bank’s new Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, one of its 
Climate Investment Funds introduced in 2008, although it was not created under 
the UNFCCC and lacks official status or widespread support. For more on this new 
fund, see http://go.worldbank.org/58OVAGT860. See below, pp. 52-54.
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demonstrated by the shortage of weather watch stations. The international 
community should therefore support global, regional and national research 
and information systems on risk, including helping developing-country 
governments build adequate monitoring and dissemination programs at 
the national level. Priorities include measuring and forecasting climatic 
variability, regional and national floods, and geophysical hazards.56 
The list of priority areas identified in the Stern Review demonstrates the scale of 
the challenge. Physical science data must necessarily precede, and provide a 
base for, research on social and rights impacts. But the latter too are critically 
important, since the primary purpose of policy in this area is to reshape the 
human, social and economic environment. In this context, human rights 
thresholds can provide a compass for policy orientation, helping to decide 
where research should be directed and what policy should prioritise. So while it 
is vital to know at what temperature increase we might expect severe droughts 
to occur or sea-levels to rise, for example, it is no less important to learn who 
these events will affect and where precisely; what institutional or other support 
is available; and how this support might be strengthened. 
These considerations fit naturally within the agenda outlined in the Bali Action 
Plan of December 2007, which calls for:
Enhanced action on adaptation, including … International cooperation to 
support urgent implementation of adaptation actions, including through 
vulnerability assessments, prioritization of actions, financial needs 
assessments, capacity-building and response strategies, integration of 
adaptation actions into sectoral and national planning, specific projects 
and programmes, means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation 
actions, and other ways to enable climate-resilient development and reduce 
vulnerability of all Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate 
needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change, especially the least developed countries and small 
island developing States, and … countries in Africa affected by drought, 
desertification and floods.57 
There is already, therefore, a good basis in the emerging climate change regime 
for the integration of human rights-focused research into adaptation policy. 
Human rights organisations have developed considerable expertise in identifying 
the risks that vulnerable and less visible communities face. Combined with more 
detailed assessments of physical impact, their methodologies can usefully set 
social and economic funding priorities for adaptation programmes.
The short-term benefits are evident. Certain climate change impacts are now 
being felt and others cannot be halted, because of the extent of historical and 
current emissions and the timelag between emissions and their effects on the 
56 Stern Review, Part VI, p. 563.
57 Decision -/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (Advance Unedited Version), Article 1(c)(i).
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climate. In the most vulnerable places – Arctic regions, for example, Saharan 
Africa, and some small island states such as Tuvalu – a human rights optic can 
help make the case for swift, substantial and directed adaptation funding. Who 
is at risk and what can be done where crop-based or coastal livelihoods are 
threatened? What kind of local and international mechanisms exist to handle the 
practical and legal complexities of relocating threatened island communities 
from sinking territories? (Such individuals find themselves in the unprecedented 
situation of being citizens of a state that no longer has territory, and relocating as 
de facto refugees, but outside any existing Convention definition of the term.58 ) 
How might existing mechanisms in each of these contexts be improved? The 
moral imperative to act in identifying and treating such cases joins neatly with 
the legal duty to make adaptation funding available. 
Long-term adaptation needs are more complex. Considerable information 
already exists on the expected human impacts of climate change. Adopting 
a rights focus would help to orient future research, set priorities, assist in 
evaluation and galvanise support. Excerpts from the IPCC AR4 and the Stern 
Review, provided in appendices at the end of this report, outline the expected 
impacts by affected human right (not Stern’s term) and by region. These 
predictions illustrate both the scale of human rights impacts expected in the 
short- to middle-term, and the extent to which more information will be required 
in order to locate affected communities and to provide the institutional support 
they will need. 
Both reports further point out that the effect of climate change impacts in 
developing countries are exacerbated by the relatively greater dependence of 
their economies on climatic conditions, on one hand, and by the relatively less 
comprehensive management of natural resources, such as water, on the other 
(see the box below). Even where water supplies are predicted to increase, as in 
South and East Asia, “much of the extra water will come during the wet season 
and will only be useful for alleviating shortages in the dry season if storage 
could be created (at a cost)”.59 Furthermore, climate change throws existing 
development policies off course. In parts of Africa, for example, development 
scenarios would ordinarily have relied upon future massive irrigation schemes; 
but as their viability has been undermined by climate change, no obvious 
alternative strategy has become available. 
58 For an informed discussion, see E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/28, Expanded working paper 
by Françoise Hampson on the human rights situation of indigenous peoples in 
States and other territories threatened with extinction for environmental reasons 
(16 June 2005). A total of just under half a million individuals are likely to be 
affected, from the islands of Tuvalu, Nauru, Kiribati, Maldives and the Bahamas. 
Ibid, para. 25. 
59 Stern Review, p. 63.
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Finally, adequate fulfilment of human rights within vulnerable states would 
itself provide a solid basis for autonomous adaptation (that is, measures 
spontaneously initiated by citizens in response to climate changes). Local 
provision of information, guarantees of public participation in government, 
and freedom of speech and association all provide affected communities with 
the voice and capacity to force change in their local settings. Economic and 
social rights also matter. Education is as important as health: a well-educated 
population is better equipped to recognise in advance the threats posed by a 
exacerbating Factors. Stern Review, pp. 93-97 (references excised).
Already fragile environments: Developing countries are especially vulnerable to the 
physical impacts of climate change because of their exposure to an already fragile 
environment, an economic structure that is highly sensitive to an adverse and changing 
climate, and low incomes that constrain their ability to adapt.
Dependence on agriculture: Developing economies are very sensitive to the direct 
impacts of climate change given their heavy dependence on agriculture and 
ecosystems, rapid population growth and concentration of millions of people in slum 
and squatter settlements, and low health levels. Agriculture and related activities are 
crucial to many developing countries, in particular for low income or semi-subsistence 
economies. The rural sector contributes 21% of GDP in India, for example, rising 
to 39% in a country like Malawi, whilst 61% and 64% of people in South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa are employed in the rural sector. This concentration of economic 
activities in the rural sector – and in some cases around just a few commodities – is 
associated with low levels of income. The concentration of activities in one sector also 
limits flexibility to switch to less climate-sensitive activities such as manufacturing and 
services.
Dependence on vulnerable ecosystems: All humans depend on the services provided 
by natural systems. However, environmental assets and the services they provide 
are especially important for poor people, ranging from the provision of subsistence 
products and market income, to food security and health services. Poor people are 
consequently highly sensitive to the degradation and destruction of these natural 
assets and systems by climate change.
Population growth and urbanisation: Developing countries are also undergoing rapid 
urbanisation, and the trend is set to continue as populations grow. The number of 
people living in cities in developing countries is predicted to rise from 43% in 2005 to 
56% by 2030. In Africa, for example, the 500km coast between Accra and the Niger 
delta will likely become a continuous urban megalopolis with more than 50 million 
people by 2020. 
Adaptive capacity: People will adapt to changes in the climate as far as their resources 
and knowledge allow. But developing countries lack the infrastructure (most notably 
in the area of water supply and management), financial means, and access to public 
services that would otherwise help them adapt.
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changing climate and to make preparations. This is one of many areas where 
ordinary development aid, properly directed, can potentially achieve multiple 
objectives at once, serving classic development and human rights aims while 
at the same time contributing to societies’ long-term ability to adapt to climate 
change. 
the	human	rights	dimensions	of	mitigation	Policies
Perhaps inevitably, the greater part of climate change negotiation is devoted 
to “mitigation”. This term refers to the actions and policies that seek to prevent 
global warming from causing “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the 
climate, as required by the UNFCCC.60 Although no “dangerous” threshold is 
mentioned in the treaty, a rise of average global temperatures by no more than 
2ºC above preindustrial levels was until recently cited in most policy documents 
(although it now seems increasingly unlikely that it will be achieved). Before 
investigating the human rights dimensions of mitigation policies, the scientific 
and policy context is briefly set down in the following two paragraphs.61 
In the IPCC AR4, greenhouse gas emission levels in the atmosphere were 
estimated at 455 parts per million of carbon dioxide equivalent (ppm CO2e),62 
almost double preindustrial levels and rising fast. Current concentrations of 
greenhouse gases have already warmed the globe and will lead to further 
warming even if all new emissions were stopped immediately. However, high 
levels of emissions are certain to continue in the short- to mid-term, and 
discussion has therefore centred on identifying a point at which emissions 
concentrations might be stabilised in future to keep warming to a minimum. 
There is little agreement on the appropriate stabilisation level: different studies 
reach different conclusions, and all are couched in the language of probability. 
Recent estimates reckon that if emissions levels are stabilised at 445-490 ppm 
CO2e there will be an even chance (50%) that the average global temperature 
rise will still exceed 2-2.4ºC.63 At 550 ppm CO2e, the probability of temperatures 
exceeding 2ºC is closer to 80%, and there is an even chance that average 
global temperatures will rise by 3ºC over preindustrial levels. 
60 For a discussion, see the Stern Review, Part III, Chapter 13, p. 289. 
61 This account relies on IPCC AR4, WGIII, Technical Summary, and on the Stern 
Review, Part III, especially Chapters 7-10. More detailed information is provided in 
IPCC AR4, WGIII, Chapters 1-3. 
62 The figure of 455 ppm CO2e accounts for the intensity of all greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, measured as equivalents of Carbon Dioxide. The amount of Carbon 
Dioxide itself is estimated at 379 ppm. IPCC AR4, WGIII, Technical Summary, p. 27, 
which adds: “Incorporating the cooling effect of aerosols, other air pollutants and 
gases released from land-use change into the equivalent concentration, leads to an 
effective 311-435 ppm CO2-eq concentration.”
63 See Table TS.2 in IPCC AR4, WGIII, Technical Summary, p. 39. Also UNDP, 2007, 
p. 46.
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Keeping emissions to 450 ppm CO2e presents an immense political challenge 
and few governments are currently aiming at national emissions targets 
consistent with a peak of 2ºC. The consequences of overshooting will be much 
worse for some than for others, and is likely to destroy life and livelihoods on 
some small islands and in certain Arctic regions. According to IPCC AR4, 
however, even the looser target of 490-535 ppm CO2e is formidably daunting. 
For that, total global emissions must still peak by 2020, and have fallen sharply 
by 2050, by between 50% and 85% from 2000 levels.64 Over that same period, 
the world’s population is expected to increase by about 50%, to 9 billion or so, 
while economic growth, particularly in fast growing economies such as China, 
drives energy demand ever higher. Viewed in this light, the mitigation task is 
truly gargantuan. Despite multiple upward pressures – population, economic 
growth and development – emissions will need to fall dramatically between 
2020 and 2050, by at least 85% from 2000 levels in rich countries, given that 
elsewhere they must initially rise. By 2030 or so it is unlikely that emissions 
levels can increase anywhere: in developing countries too they will need to 
have peaked (see below, p. 37).65 
GHG emissions can be reduced in several ways. At present, negotiations 
seek to establish global targets. Though these have yet to be agreed, binding 
national targets were accepted by those developed countries that ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol.66 Having accepted commitments, individual countries can meet 
their obligations in a variety of ways. Mitigation strategies may include fuel 
switching (to biofuels, renewable energy sources or possibly nuclear), carbon 
taxes, forestry growth or preservation, and GHG emissions trading. 
A widely accepted principle, entrenched in the UNFCCC, is that developed 
countries – which historically contributed most to the problem – have greater 
obligations to mitigate than developing countries. The lion’s share of emissions 
reductions must take place in wealthy countries. While there is general 
consensus that developing countries should not have to compromise their 
future economic growth, there is little agreement on how sharp global cuts 
are to be achieved while growth continues. At the same time, it is evident that 
developing countries too must move towards low-carbon economies in the mid- 
to long-term. Paradoxically, the cheapest ways to reduce future emissions may 
64 Even these figures may be optimistic. Jim Hansen recently claimed that current 
CO2 levels are already unsustainable: “If humanity wishes to preserve a planet 
similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, 
paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will need to 
be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm [CO2 (not CO2e)]. ... If 
the present overshoot of this target CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding 
irreversible catastrophic effects.” See Hansen et al., 2008. 
65 IPCC AR4, WGIII, Technical Summary, p. 90.
66 Developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed to reduce their emissions 
by varying amounts from 1990 levels by 2012. Not all will succeed. At time of writing, 
no framework has been agreed for the post-2012 period. 
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involve actions taken in poor countries today. For example, building non-carbon 
intensive energy production and transport platforms in developing countries 
steers them away from “business as usual” development paths that would 
presumably have been emissions intensive. Forests are another example. 
Forests act as sinks, absorbing carbon dioxide and so reducing greenhouse 
gas intensity in the atmosphere. Reducing the rate of deforestation in poor 
countries is perhaps the cheapest way to push future emissions down, with the 
result that wealthy countries are keen to limit forest activities abroad. Partly for 
these reasons, “flexible mechanisms” were introduced in the Kyoto Protocol, 
allowing high-emitting states to take credit for mitigation actions taken in poorer 
countries.67 These mechanisms (the emissions trading market and the clean 
development mechanism) are described further below (pp. 36-40). 
What does the choice of mitigation policies imply for human rights? Human 
rights fulfilment in any given state depends upon a basic level of economic 
wherewithal and stable access to resources. However, a mitigation regime 
– or mix of regimes – will work only if it succeeds in reorienting productive 
capacities and access to resources on a massive scale. Whatever the mix 
of mitigation strategies arrived at, if effective it will have two broad effects. It 
will drastically reduce access to and dependence upon fossil fuels – the most 
reliable and cost effective fuel source available (in terms of energy yield per 
unit access cost). And it will curtail the development policy options available 
to governments everywhere, but especially in those countries that have not yet 
reached a level of economic growth sufficient to guarantee basic needs. Not 
only will climate change mitigation policies profoundly influence the allocation 
and use of scarce resources, they will do so far into the foreseeable future. In 
short, climate change mitigation efforts will reorient and fix national development 
paths over the long-term, and these in turn will tend to set limits on countries’ 
capacity to fulfil basic human rights, albeit to different degrees. 
This linkage between climate change mitigation, development paths and human 
rights fulfilment is recognised explicitly in IPCC AR4:68 
Development paths underpin the baseline and stabilization emissions 
scenarios discussed [elsewhere in the report] and are used to estimate 
emissions, climate change and associated climate change impacts. For a 
development path to be sustainable over a long period, wealth, resources, 
and opportunity must be shared so that all citizens have access to minimum 
standards of security, human rights, and social benefits, such as food, 
health, education, shelter, and opportunity for self-development.
Ultimately, as the IPCC report acknowledges here (without elaboration), the 
ability to orient and implement any mitigation policy depends upon identifying 
67 Stern Review, Part III, especially pp. 203-205, 239 and 245-246 (on the lock-in 
effect of capital investment). 
68 IPCC AR4, WGIII, p. 696.
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and prioritising acceptable social outcomes in advance, human rights among 
them. Human rights fulfilment depends upon development capacity, and 
that consideration must in turn guide the choice of paths towards carbon 
stabilisation. Latent within this view is the understanding that human rights 
protection is costly.69 It is not so much a question of a right to development 
(discussed in Chapter V below) but a more basic concern: without development 
(and, of course, appropriate policies) there can be only limited fulfilment of 
human rights.70 
Moreover, although the consensus position is that any mitigation strategy 
will have distributional consequences, to date these have remained largely 
underexplored. The fourth IPCC report is explicit on this point too. It suggests 
that distributional outcomes should be one of four criteria for evaluating 
mitigation policies, but admits that comparison in terms of this criterion “has 
proved difficult – and ranking impossible” because, according to the report’s 
authors, assessment is inevitably subjective.71 This is no doubt true. At the 
same time, human rights standards and thresholds offer one way to manage 
the dilemma of subjectivity because they provide benchmarks of acceptable 
outcomes based on widely-agreed principles and, indeed, on legal stricture. 
If a global regime proceeds without integrating human rights, it will not only 
miss an opportunity to promote and fulfil human rights but will also be blind 
to countless possible harms that might otherwise be foreseen and averted. 
The guidance provided would necessarily be rough, prone (like much climate-
related prediction) to unexpected feedback effects. It would be a set of pointers 
rather than a formula or social “blueprint”; but would nevertheless provide 
specific tools for identifying and managing risk. 
Those with human rights expertise therefore have good reason to think through 
the human rights consequences of different mitigation strategies – at national 
and local, but perhaps especially at international level – given that the effects 
will be profound, of long duration and probably irreversible. At national level, for 
69 For a good account countering the common argument that economic and social 
rights are inherently more costly than civil and political rights, see Holmes and 
Sunstein, 1999. 
70 See Baer et al., 2007, p. 23: 
 [T]here is no road to development, however conceived, that does not greatly 
improve access to energy services. Yet, as economies are now structured, 
as development is now envisioned, and as long as we rely on today’s energy 
technologies, this will imply increases in CO2 emissions that are entirely 
incompatible with a precautionary climate policy. And thus our dilemma: There 
is simply not enough “environmental space” for the still-poor to develop in the 
same way – or in anything like the same way – as that which was taken by the 
already-rich.
71 IPCC AR4, WGIII, p. 752. The other three criteria are environmental effectiveness, 
cost efficiency and “political acceptability”, each of which has a better established 
role in mitigation choices. All, of course, are “subjective” to some degree.
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example, what will be the consequences in human rights terms of large forest 
conservation efforts, extensive biofuel cultivation for export markets, or nuclear 
power dependence? Who will be affected and how? Are institutional forms of 
redress available in cases of rights violations? Can long-term development be 
maintained if carbon use is restricted? How will hard choices be decided? At 
international level, how will differential access to the “global carbon dump” 
affect local development paths?72 Where the effect is harmful, are compensatory 
mechanisms available, and are they effective and appropriate? In principle, the 
likely human rights and developmental consequences of different mitigation 
strategies should be built into forecast scenarios for comparative purposes, 
something that has not been done to date.73 
Any such analysis will need to take account of the particular role developing 
countries are likely to play in any global mitigation regime. As the Stern review 
states, “[s]preading the mitigation effort widely across sectors and countries 
will help to ensure that emissions are reduced where it is cheapest to do so, 
making policy cost-effective”.74 The review is quick to point out that social and 
other factors must be taken into account in making decisions about where and 
how to make cuts. The absence of such data has not stopped a surge in efforts 
to achieve cuts in developing countries. Deforestation, biofuel cultivation and 
emissions trading will in different ways each operate to alter the economic stakes 
and capacities of persons who already, in many cases, lack secure access 
to basic needs. Assessing the possible human rights impacts of strategic 
decisions in these areas, though urgent, nevertheless requires considerably 
more data than is currently available.
By extension, it would be useful to analyse the likely impact of given mitigation 
strategies on the potential for alternative development paths for poorer countries. 
Is clean technology transfer facilitated? If so, is this done in a sustainable and 
equitable manner, geared to a country’s development needs rather than the 
economic interests of the exporting country alone? Does the policy mix shift 
development paths, stimulate wealth creation and also consolidate basic 
threshold rights for all? Clearly such questions go beyond the ordinary scope of 
human rights inquiry. Clearly too they imply new research. 
72 The term “global carbon dump” captures the notion that the atmosphere can support 
only a limited amount of greenhouse gases – and so there can be no unrestricted 
right to send carbon into it. See Lohmann, 2006. 
73 Climate change narratives have traditionally focused on impacts in developing 
countries and mitigation in developed countries. While this seems sensible, because 
carbon emissions are concentrated in rich countries while poorer countries suffer 
the brunt, it leaves one vital issue undiscussed – the future development of poor 
countries under global emissions constraints.
74 Stern Review, p. 239. See also pp. 245-246: “some countries can cut emissions 
more cheaply than other countries, so ‘what’ flexibility is important.” 
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The following sections look briefly at three mitigation strategies that would 
benefit from human rights review: REDD, biofuels, and emissions trading.75 
Reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (Redd)
The decision to proceed with REDD programmes was one of the few 
breakthroughs at the Conference of the Parties in Bali in December 2007. 
Recent estimates have concluded that deforestation and land use degradation 
account for approximately 20% of man-made greenhouse gas emissions, 
which places some developing countries (notably Brazil and Indonesia) among 
the world’s top greenhouse gas emitters. Forests were barely addressed in 
the Kyoto Protocol, because there was little agreement at the time on how to 
measure forest-related emissions or reductions. Technological improvements 
have since allowed agreement on an international REDD regime. In outline, it 
is likely that countries will be compensated for retaining forest cover above a 
baseline “business-as-usual” level.76 Because avoided deforestation is seen 
as a low cost way to reduce emissions, the inclusion of a REDD system within 
a transnational climate regime might sharply reduce the carbon price – an 
outcome that would make it significantly easier for big polluters (countries and 
companies alike) to meet reduction commitments. For this reason, interest in 
REDD projects runs extremely high.
Any internationally orchestrated approach to forestry will have direct impacts 
on the human rights of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. “The World 
Bank estimates that 90 percent of the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty 
around the world depend on forest resources for some part of their livelihood. 
In Indonesia, for example, some 6 million poor people live in state forest zones 
with good forest cover; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 40 million people 
rely on forests for food, medicines, energy, and income.”77 There is a long 
history of abuse of indigenous rights in connection with forest exploitation, by 
governments asserting claims over lands without formal title, and also by large 
logging companies, sometimes employing private militia. Government and 
big loggers have often worked together: the logging industry has a notorious 
reputation for corrupt practice. Forest conservation has in some cases led 
to tightened restrictions on indigenous peoples without a correspondingly 
proportionate restraint of commercial logging. 
75 Other mitigation options would also bear closer scrutiny from this perspective: the 
imposition of carbon taxes and the possibility of recourse to nuclear power. 
76 Among other sources, this section relies in particular on Frances Seymour, “Forest, 
Climate Change and Human Rights: A Brief Summary of the Issues”, a note prepared 
for an ICHRP roundtable on human rights and climate change of October 2007 and 
on Marcus Colchester, “Forest Peoples, Customary Use and State Forests: the case 
for reform” draft paper to the 11th Biennial Congress of the International Association 
for the Study of Common Property, Bali, Indonesia, 19-23 June 2006. 
77 Seymour, 2002; World Bank, 2002. 
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The key feature of a REDD policy regime is its potential to significantly increase 
the financial benefits accruing from control over forest resources. These 
benefits might fall to forest-dependent indigenous populations, which might in 
turn yield human rights benefits. However, unless human rights safeguards are 
built into REDD programming from the outset, better established and resourced 
actors are likely to obtain most of the benefit. Much research and advocacy has 
already been done to protect indigenous rights in the context of forest usage. 
REDD adds urgency and a new layer of complexity to such work. 
There is also a larger structural concern. The monetisation of carbon credits 
from the conservation of forests is an apparent boon for developed and 
developing countries alike. The latter can generate income by leaving a 
natural resource untouched. The former will be able to buy carbon credits to 
set against increasingly sharp emissions targets. For developing countries, the 
scheme nevertheless involves an important trade-off. If credits from avoided 
deforestation are to offset emissions, host countries too will have to take on 
targets eventually (otherwise the system cannot lead to global cuts and will 
fail). When they do so, every carbon credit sold to other countries or industries 
will represent a foregone opportunity for carbon-based development at 
home. In principle, revenue from carbon sales can be channelled into clean 
development or alternative forms of energy. Indeed, some guarantee of this 
outcome is necessary for such a scheme to be equitable. Revenues would 
need to be managed and invested wisely, however, to ensure that REDD 
contributes to, rather than detracts from, long–term development (on which 
basic human rights fulfilment inevitably depends). Given that emissions rights 
are a public resource, their sale would need to be overseen by competent public 
authorities. Otherwise, where governments are corrupt, or merely incompetent, 
or closely linked to the buyers of credits or other powerful interest groups, the 
credits and the development potential they represent might both be lost. As 
the scheme stands, no such safeguards exist. Before developed countries and 
their companies proceed to buy REDD credits, they should require that solid 
safeguards are in place to ensure that sales of carbon credits from REDD are in 
the development interests of the countries concerned. 
Biofuels
Although its potential to mitigate climate change has been sharply challenged 
recently, many countries have started biofuel substitution programmes (the 
cultivation and conversion of crops such as corn, sugar cane or palm oil into 
ethanol, for use as fuel rather than food).78 Both the European Union (EU) and 
the United States (US) recently approved large increases in biofuel production 
– rising to 10% of total energy sources by 2020 in the EU and to 132 billion litres 
78 Dufey, 2007; COM (2006) 34 final, “An EU Strategy for Biofuels” [SEC (2006) 142], 
Brussels (8 February 2006); Simon Robinson’s Big Biofuels blog (www.icis.com/cgi-
bin/mt/mt-search.cgi?tag=EU&IncludeBlogs=3).
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by 2017 in the US (where the stated reason is energy security rather than climate 
change mitigation).79 The effect has been to encourage farmers to switch from 
food to biofuel production. At present, crop switching is happening in both 
poorer and richer countries. In principle, like REDD, it offers greater returns if 
undertaken in poorer countries because agricultural investment is cheaper.80 
Although agricultural trade protections have limited the extent to which some 
developing countries can supply these products for Northern markets (tariffs 
vary widely and many countries are subject to preferential agreements),81 
developing countries (especially the poorest) are being offered incentives to 
produce biofuels, through programmes such as the EU’s Biofuels Assistance 
Package. These supplement the existing subsidies OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries pay their domestic biofuel 
producers, which reportedly amount to US$11 billion per year (US$6 billion in 
the US alone) and continue to rise.82 
Intensive promotion of biofuels has inevitable side effects. Crop switching 
from food to biofuels can harm food security regardless of location, because it 
drives up world prices for staples such as corn and rice, and rapidly forces very 
poor consumers out of the market. To illustrate, US biofuel subsidies replace 
subsidies traditionally available for corn; in practice the crop simply changed 
category. The EU is promoting biofuel production in part as a response to a 
WTO (World Trade Organization) ruling against its sugar subsidies. Under its 
new biofuel policy, sugar-producing countries are encouraged to switch sugar 
processing from food to biofuel. (The effect of the category change under 
international trade law, if any, is still unclear; the status of “environmental goods 
and services” in the WTO is under negotiation in the Doha round, and biofuels 
might not, in any case, qualify). The effect of these policies (exacerbated by 
79 Energy security is a likely driver of European policy on biofuels too. See, European 
Commission, 2007, pp. 17-20. By the same token, climate change is a likely co-
driver of US biofuel policy. 
80 The EU Commission’s “strategy for biofuels” puts the situation as follows: 
 Biomass productivity is highest in tropical environments and the production costs 
of biofuels, notably ethanol, are comparatively low in a number of developing 
countries. Bioethanol produced from sugar cane is currently competitive 
with fossil fuels in Brazil which is the world’s leading producer of bioethanol. 
Moreover, the fossil energy input for producing ethanol from sugar cane is lower 
than for ethanol produced in Europe, so the corresponding emission reductions 
are greater. For biodiesel, the EU is currently the principal producer and there is 
no significant trade. Developing countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, that currently produce biodiesel for their domestic markets, could 
well develop export potential. (COM (2006) 34 final, 6.)
81 The EU, for example, imposes no duties on biofuels from African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries, or from least developed countries. It is negotiating tariffs 
through the WTO Doha Round and a free trade agreement with Mercosur countries, 
including Brazil. The US imposes tariffs of up to 70% on ethanol from Brazil, the 
world’s largest producer. 
82 Global Subsidies Initiative, 2007. 
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a series of other factors) is to reduce the worldwide supply of food and so 
increase its cost. According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation:
Currently 37 countries worldwide are facing food crises… [F]ood security 
is being adversely affected by unprecedented price hikes for basic food, 
driven by historically low food stocks, droughts and floods linked to climate 
change, high oil prices and growing demand for bio-fuels. High international 
cereal prices have already sparked food riots in several countries.83 
Rising food prices are particularly problematic when crop switching occurs 
in countries that already suffer from weak food security, particularly those hit 
directly by climate change. In Swaziland, for instance, the severe drought that 
has affected at least 40% of the population is thought to be climate change-
related (although there is insufficient data to affirm the cause confidently). At the 
same time, 500 hectares of land have been turned over to a private company 
(USA Distilleries) for the production of jatropha, a hardy oil-producing plant, 
for biofuel export.84 The extent to which such projects exacerbate the existing 
food shortage is difficult to gauge. The government blames the food shortage 
on global, rather than local, biofuel production, claiming that rising wheat 
prices have pushed bread beyond the reach of ordinary Swazis.85 (Swaziland 
has a no-tariffs agreement with the EU.) To this must be added the dangers of 
cultivating crops that are known, in some cases, to be “invasive species” and 
may choke or destroy other food sources.86 What is clear is that a combination 
of climate change and uncoordinated international mitigation policies can lead 
to unforeseen effects, on food and water supply and other essential needs. To 
date little time and few resources have been devoted to predicting what these 
impacts might be and how they might be averted. 
Moreover, as energy-intensive nations seek to overcome their addiction to 
carbon fuels, they will use their considerable economic power to transform 
global energy markets, inevitably producing many other knock-on effects. 
Unless these are actively considered and researched in advance, the effects 
may be unpredictable and damaging, especially to those less able to offset risk. 
83 “FAO calls for urgent steps to protect the poor from soaring food prices” (17 
December 2007), online at: www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000733/index.
html.
84 See, for example, “Swaziland: Food or biofuel seems to be the question”, 15 
October 2007, IRIN news; “SD spots seeds of recovery in bio-fuel plant”, 30 July 
2007, Biofuel news; Siwa Msangi, “Biofuel revolution threatens food security for the 
poor”, 6 December 2007, SciDev.Net. 
85 “Swaziland: Too much bread to buy a loaf”, 7 December 2007, IRIN news.
86 See Rosenthal, 2008: “Jatropha, the darling of the second-generation biofuels 
community, is now being cultivated widely in East Africa in brand new biofuel 
plantations. But jatropha has been recently banned by two Australian states as an 
invasive species. If jatropha, which is poisonous, overgrows farmland or pastures, 
it could be disastrous for the local food supply in Africa, experts said.”
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Yet the EU’s “biofuel strategy” and “biofuel action plan” expect only to monitor 
“environmental impacts”. They make no mention of the possible impacts on 
food security or human rights. Given the scale of their possible influence, it 
is surely essential to make sure that such programmes take account of social 
effects, including effects on human rights.
Food security is not the only human rights risk associated with biofuel production. 
In Indonesia, a major project to produce palm oil (as a cooking oil for local 
consumption and a biofuel for the European market), has caused significant 
forest destruction and violations of customary land rights, prompting a rebuke 
from the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).87 
emissions trading and the Clean development Mechanism
The nascent international emissions market is likely to be at the centre of a future 
global mitigation regime.88 As emissions trading is potentially both the most 
far-reaching mechanism, the most speculative in its potential outcomes and 
the least independent in terms of its broader effects, its human rights impacts 
are not easy to assess. That said, it is possible to flag some broad concerns 
to do particularly with market access and the allocation of rights to emit, both 
discussed below. Before turning to these issues, the following paragraphs 
briefly describe the trading system.
Under an emissions trading regime, mandatory national emissions reductions 
are converted into tradable commodities. The principle is to achieve cuts as 
cheaply as possible by allowing those who are best placed to make cuts the 
freedom to do so, and permitting others, for whom cuts are too expensive, to 
buy them instead. Companies that can make cuts cheaply can sell their excess 
reductions (which amount to rights to emit) to those for whom it is cheaper to buy 
these rights to emit than to achieve reduced emissions. Again, differences in 
the relative costs of making reductions makes it attractive to include developing 
countries within the regime. According to the Stern Review:
The ability to trade obligations across borders would improve efficiency by 
ensuring that deployment takes place where it is cheapest to do so. The 
benefits from this may be significant where there are major differences 
87 CERD/C/IDN/CO/3 (15 August 2007), Concluding observations of CERD, para. 
17. For background see “Request for Consideration of the Situation of Indigenous 
Peoples in Kalimantan, Indonesia, under the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures”, 
submitted by 13 NGOs on the occasion of CERD’s 71st session (6 July 2007), 
especially Appendix B, Oil Palm and Other Commercial Tree Plantations, Mono-
cropping: Impacts on Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure and Resource Management 
Systems and Livelihoods, UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Working 
Paper, E/C.19/2007/CRP.6
88 See IPCC AR4, WGIII, Chapter 13. 
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between countries in, for instance, the availability of a natural resource such 
as sunshine, or in lower labour or other costs.89 
These benefits are already built into the mitigation regime. Companies from 
Annex I countries are not constrained to make cuts solely at home. Through 
the Clean Development Mechanism, companies reduce emissions cheaply in 
developing countries (relative to what would “otherwise” have taken place) and 
can then trade those reductions on the emissions market (known as CERs or 
Certified Emission Reductions). By substituting cleaner technologies for dirtier 
ones, the CDM also aims to facilitate lower carbon development paths in poorer 
countries. At present, a very limited number of CDM CERs can be traded on the 
main existing market, the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS). (Other markets 
too are being tried and tested.)
The trading system has other objectives. It is intended to spur technological 
innovation, particularly among institutions and states for whom it will be 
particularly expensive to achieve future targets. Research into and development 
of (R&D) clean technologies ought, in principle, to become a better investment 
for companies over time than repeatedly buying and using rights to emit.90 
Trading also provides a means to set a price on carbon, which is generally 
acknowledged as vital if the social cost of producing greenhouse gas emissions 
is to be internalised by companies and other users. (Trading is not the only way 
of establishing a carbon price, of course: taxes or simple fines would have a 
similar effect.) In the interests of efficiency, the optimal carbon price should 
be global – carbon emissions should cost the same everywhere.91 Trading 
too, therefore, ought ideally to function globally.92 The Clean Development 
Mechanism is a step towards creating such a global system. 
Backing up the emissions trading regime are the hard mathematics of long-
term stabilisation. As noted above, if average global temperature rises are to 
be kept below a “dangerous” threshold, total global emissions need to have 
fallen by at least 50-85% from 2000 levels by 2050, which on most accounts 
means that the heavily polluting OECD countries will need to have reduced 
emissions by 85-90%. This is well-known. Less often discussed, however, is 
the arresting fact that, even if this ambitious target is achieved, developing 
countries will probably have collectively to have cut their emissions by 30-60% 
89 Stern Review, Part VI, Chapter 24, p. 529.
90 It is far from clear that these incentives are, in fact, built into the system as currently 
designed. See Lohmann, 2006, pp. 104-121 and pp. 175-186.
91 Stern Review, Executive Summary, xviii (“Economic efficiency points to the 
advantages of a common global carbon price: emissions reductions will then take 
place wherever they are cheapest”).
92 In principle, a carbon tax too could achieve a global price if there was international 
harmonisation. For discussion see Stern Review, Part VI, p. 470. See also Stiglitz, 
2006. 
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(having peaked around 2025).93 In just a couple of decades, in other words, no 
country will be in a position to increase greenhouse gas emissions, not even 
those that today lack the resources necessary for basic public goods, such as 
food security, clean drinking water and access to basic health services. The 
dilemma is well captured in a report recently published by the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation.94 
[I]f we are to [achieve a] plausibly precautionary global pathway, the South’s 
emissions must leave their projected path almost immediately, and be 
dropping precipitously by 2025. And even [under] optimistic assumptions 
about both equity and economic growth, many people in the South would 
still be struggling against poverty when its emissions had to begin this steep 
decline. Moreover, the less stringent pathways – despite their substantially 
higher risks of catastrophic climate change – provide only another few extra 
years of emissions growth.
The problem is that the emissions trading regime now in design, focused as it 
is on easing cuts in rich countries, has little to say about the vast cuts needed 
in developing countries, beyond vague promises of cleaner technologies and 
adaptation funding that has been slow to materialise. As the same report points 
out, the enormous challenge facing poorer countries can only be met by taking 
actions to ensure that by 2025 even the poorest countries will be on transition 
paths to low-carbon economies while continuing a sustained development drive 
all the while. Fulfilment of developmental needs will depend on the intermediate 
steps taken by then to ensure that such countries have maximised their limited 
carbon use or have access to inexpensive low-carbon technologies. So far, no 
such plan of action exists. Indeed, the trading regime tends to presuppose that 
carbon allocations of this kind will be sold on rather than maximised. It is against 
this background that questions must be raised about the longer-term human 
rights implications of the emissions trading regime as currently designed. 
Further dilemmas will arise regarding the allocation of emission rights today 
and equitable access to them in the market and in future. A country’s emission 
cap is the basis for determining its allocation of emission rights. At present only 
Annex I country parties to the Kyoto Protocol (wealthy “developed” countries) 
have emission caps. These have mostly been passed onto national private 
actors in the form of rights to emit, which can then be traded between them.95 
93 See Baer et al., 2007, pp. 23-24.
94 Ibid.
95 The principal technique for allocation has been “grandfathering”. National emissions 
caps reflect historical emissions in each country. Emissions permits for individual 
companies are also based upon current emission levels. When these companies 
are multinational, they may be able to shift their emissions to countries with lesser or 
no caps. Furthermore, companies may trade permits internally. They may initiate or 
negotiate CDM deals abroad. Existing markets, such as the EU’s ETS (see p. 37 and 
p. 58) allow limited interchange between these sources. As new trading regimes 
emerge and integrate, the emissions rights will become increasingly fungible. 
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Since developing countries do not have caps, they do not (indeed cannot) 
have emission rights at present, which means, for example, that reductions 
generated through the CDM can only be cashed in by the Annex I-based partner 
(for whom it is a revenue source additional to any initial project investment). 
Furthermore, as CDM emission reductions are additional to the caps taken by 
Annex I countries, they represent a net increase in global emissions that cannot 
be properly factored into the global account.96 In order to be functional and 
reliable over time, the emissions trading regime will eventually require the long-
term accession of all relevant actors to a system of caps, including CDM host 
countries. 
For middle-income developing countries (Brazil, China, India and some 
countries of East and Southeast Asia), the scenario just described might not 
pose a significant problem. They may be able to defer taking on caps (and so 
joining an international trading regime) until they have reached the point where 
their economies can manage a low carbon system. This option might not be 
available to the poorest countries (LDCs), however. So although it may seem 
wise for such countries not to accept caps at present (indeed they have fought 
hard to avoid doing so), over time the number of allocations available can only 
fall, and will do so increasingly sharply. When poor countries enter the game, 
fewer allocation rights will be available, and they will be more expensive.97 
Market mechanisms are, of course, premised on discrimination: they discriminate 
against those who cannot afford to pay, which in this case means the very same 
countries that have not historically used the carbon dump and have most need 
of its benefits. By mid-century, fewer emission rights will be available; they are 
likely to be in high demand and scarce; and wealthy countries will be pushing 
hard for concessions. A high price will nominally suit countries that cannot, in 
any case, use up all their allocation;98 but any benefits from sales would depend 
on having sound governance, redistribution and investment mechanisms, which 
many of the countries in question currently lack. 
96 Arguably, since in the long-run emissions from CDM projects must be set against 
global targets, CERs derived from CDM projects amount to a free gift to rich countries 
from poor countries. Early discussions as to whether they might be “banked” by 
host countries came to nothing.
97 In one version, the “contraction and convergence” model proposed allocating 
emission rights (caps) to developing countries at levels significantly higher than 
present usage. This would have provided an extra source of income, year on year, 
that could have been earmarked for technological investment up until convergence. 
It was not adopted.
98 In principle, emissions allocations will be renewable: targets will be fixed within a 
period, following which new caps will be set and new allocations made. However, 
with each step, caps will become tighter than before. For poorer actors, selling 
may appear profitable even if gains are short-term. Banking will be difficult and 
purchasing may be impossible.
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In effect, regardless of negotiating position, it is extremely unlikely that many of 
the poorest countries will ever be able to rely on carbon-based energy to fuel the 
kinds of living standards that would ensure even basic rights guarantees for all. 
They will therefore have to rely on the appearance of affordable technological 
fixes. This in turn presumes not only that rich countries will invest seriously in R&D, 
but also that they will encourage and facilitate the transfer of new technologies, 
and prevent intellectual property barriers to access. Yet technology transfer 
has not received the volume of attention devoted to emissions trading. As 
things stand, the available store of emission allocations will run dry before the 
poorest countries reach a sustainable level of development. Without robust and 
detailed policies of technology transfer and adaptation, their development and 
policy options will steadily shrink, with deleterious effects on basic rights. From 
a rights perspective, therefore, it will be important to assess the extent to which 
potential impacts on rights are taken into account when trading regimes are 
implemented. Where the social consequences are likely to be inequitable, as 
suggested above, they should be revised.
The above paragraphs are speculative. They name several issues of long-
term equity that emissions trading raise, and suggest that the systems now 
being devised need to be assessed rigorously in terms of their social and 
developmental consequences, viewed as human rights concerns. In theory, 
of course, a portion of any country’s emission rights might be considered 
inalienable, or emissions rights might be reallocated to the least developed 
countries. The adoption of a market mechanism, however, presumes against (if 
it does not actually preclude) these solutions. That is likely to penalise the very 
countries that are already most vulnerable to climate change impacts.
A core question raised by the emissions market, then, is whether it will put 
carbon-based development out of the reach for certain countries, without 
making any alternative readily available. From this perspective, the human 
rights impacts of emissions trading can only be properly assessed in the context 
of other elements of the climate regime, now and in future. These include: 
robust adaptation policies and programmes; research and development of 
new technologies, and affirmative approaches to technology transfer; the 
relaxation of access barriers (to intellectual property for example); and so on. 
These policy vectors do not necessarily depend on the trading regime and are 
ordinarily viewed in isolation from it; but they will certainly impact upon it and, 
if properly organised, might make trading less profitable for current emission 
rights holders.
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III. lItIGAtIon: A ResPonse to PolICY FAIluRes 
As understanding of climate change increases, as its effects are felt, and as 
consensus continues to spread that human actions are responsible, litigation 
is likely to increase. Given the nature of climate change impacts, human rights 
law will often be invoked. This is proving true already, despite the fact that legal 
actions in this area confront numerous obstacles to success. Although lawsuits 
cannot themselves provide long-term or far-reaching solutions to most human 
rights problems raised by climate change, litigation can still be an effective 
strategy even when complaints fail. Lawsuits draw attention to harmful effects 
that might otherwise remain below the public radar, put a name and face to the 
otherwise abstract suffering of individuals and provide impetus and expression 
to those most affected by the harms of climate change. They can thus mobilise 
public opinion in support of policy change.99 
By raising and sifting through hard questions of fault, liability, standing, 
jurisdiction, causality, and harms, litigation can help clarify appropriate 
responses to climate change, and thereby contribute to improved policy-
making. In addition, tort litigation can present polluters with costly trials and the 
uncomfortable prospect of debilitating damages and reputational costs, all of 
which can encourage behavioural change. 
The following chapter looks first at a groundbreaking case brought by a group 
of Inuit in North America, that illustrates both the potential and the limitations of 
human rights litigation in the context of climate change. It goes on to examine 
other options, particularly in the United States, before concluding with some 
general comments concerning the trend towards litigation in this field. 
the	inuit	case
Climate change and human rights were first linked explicitly, it seems, in 
December 2005, when an alliance of Inuit from Canada and the United States 
led by Sheila Watt-Cloutier filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights. The petition alleged that the human rights of the plaintiffs had 
been infringed and were being further violated due in large part to the failure 
of the United States to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. In the words of 
the petition: “the effects of global warming constitute violations of Inuit human 
rights for which the United States is responsible.”100 The petition provided a 
99 Comments made at the ICHRP roundtable, Geneva, 13 October 2007.
100 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from 
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the 
United States, Submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, with the Support of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, on Behalf of All Inuit of the Arctic Regions of the United 
States and Canada, (7 December 2005, p. 70). 
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comprehensive list of rights violations, including rights “to enjoy the benefits of 
their culture”, “to use and enjoy the lands they have traditionally occupied”, “to 
use and enjoy their personal property”, “to the preservation of health”, “to life, 
physical integrity and security”, “to their own means of subsistence”, and “to 
residence and movement and inviolability of the home”. 
The case was innovative in several respects. It not only confronted an 
international tribunal with the serious human rights consequences of global 
warming, but joined up the dots between the “acts and omissions” of the US 
government (and other emitters) and the suffering of particular peoples located 
in climate-sensitive territories at a distance. The argument that rights to culture 
and health (among others) were effectively violated by the actions of polluters 
– and by extension the government that failed to stop them – plausibly applied 
the widely accepted human rights norm that governments and private actors 
have, at a minimum, a negative obligation to desist from harmful actions that 
lead to social and economic rights violations.101 The case further sought to 
hold one state responsible for activities undertaken in several different states – 
applying both criminal law principles of joint liability and, more innovatively, the 
UNFCCC’s own principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. The 
plaintiffs claimed that, being a major polluter and Annex I country, the United 
States arguably bore a special responsibility towards those affected. 
While the Commission ultimately did not find the Inuit case admissible, it did invite 
the petitioners to request a public hearing on the matter, which subsequently 
took place on March 1, 2007. On that occasion, the Commissioners asked in 
particular how one state could be held liable for actions also conducted in 
numerous other states. Martin Wagner, counsel for the petitioners pointed out 
that posing the question in these terms was “like saying if two people stab 
a knife into someone together, we have to figure out how much each one is 
responsible” in order to assign any liability at all. A more correct interpretation, 
he contended, is that each state is responsible separately as well as jointly.102 (As 
of May 2008, the Commission had not issued a report based on the hearing.) 
The Inuit case’s many potential innovations also constitute possible pitfalls. In 
seeking to assign liability, courts will need to be persuaded that the plaintiff 
before them has been directly injured by the actions of the defendant in the suit. 
In climate change cases, this means establishing first that the plaintiff has in 
fact been injured by manmade climate change (not just, for example, by freak 
weather events that might have taken place anyway), and that the defendant 
in question caused the event or played an indispensable role in it or could 
101 See note 8 above for the relevant case law. On the notion that climate change 
places a negative obligation on governments with regard to social and economic 
rights, see Sachs, 2006. 
102 Statement of Martin Wagner at the IACHR public hearing. The hearing can be heard 
on the IAHCR website: www.oas.org/OASpage/videosasf/2007/03/CIDH_1.wmv. 
The issue is discussed in greater detail in Mank, 2005. 
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reasonably have stopped it. The complex causal chains that underlie climate 
change harms do not easily fit this model of liability. Yet it is neither unreasonable 
to assume that certain observed impacts are in fact due to a changing climate, 
nor that major states could, in fact, have taken earlier and more decisive action 
to mitigate these impacts (see pp. 65-68 below on state responsibility). Nor is 
it unreasonable to suppose that major industries, certainly when considered as 
a group, are directly implicated in climate change harms (see pp. 68-73 below 
on private liability). Proving liability along such lines will nevertheless require 
innovation and evolution in the law and case law. Pioneering cases such as the 
Inuit case will play an important part in creating space for innovation, assisted 
by a widening understanding of the reality of anthropogenic climate change 
and its potential to injure. 
The Inuit case suggests how human rights tribunals might borrow, as they have 
done on other issues, from general principles of tort or civil rights litigation. For 
example, it is common in environmental litigation, where there are numerous 
polluters, for a court to shift the burden of proof and hold the defendant 
liable unless he or she can mitigate responsibility by proving the proportional 
liability of other wrongdoers. Under theories of joint and several liability, each 
wrongdoer is held responsible for the entire harm in some circumstances. Such 
doctrines serve to deter pollution by all and ensure greater likelihood of redress 
for victims. 
Massachusetts v. epa	and	other	actions	in	the	us
In the United States, the federal government has not only failed to initiate 
comprehensive climate change mitigation policy, it has also placed numerous 
obstacles in the path of states wishing to take autonomous policy steps. 
This has sparked much recent litigation, notably between states wishing 
to regulate and federal regulators attempting to forestall regulation. States 
seeking stronger regulation have successfully sued two federal regulators – the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) – in federal courts. The NHTSA was sued by California 
and other states (Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA) for failing to account 
for the costs of greenhouse gases emissions in its fuel-efficiency regulations.103 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the NHTSA to review its rules on fuel 
standards and assign a cost to the known climate change-related damage of 
fuel emissions. 
A more significant success was achieved in the Supreme Court in April 2007, 
in the case Massachusetts v. EPA.104 The Environmental Protection Agency 
103 Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 508 
F.3d 508, 547 (9th Cir. 2007).
104 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.___,127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
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had refused to regulate CO2 as a pollutant under the federal Clean Air Act of 
1979. Among other assertions, the agency claimed that any attempt to regulate 
greenhouse gases might impede a “more comprehensive” strategy emanating 
from the White House. The justices disagreed and ordered the EPA to review 
a request by the state of Massachusetts for guidelines on regulating CO2.105 
In the course of reaching a conclusion on this fundamentally narrow technical 
question (whether EPA had the right to refuse a petition to regulate CO2 under 
a law that does not name CO2 as a “pollutant”), the justices grappled with some 
of the trickier legal questions that climate change poses when considered from 
a rights perspective. 
The principal argument concerned Massachusetts’ standing to bring the case 
before the court. In general a plaintiff has to demonstrate three things in order to 
show standing: that an injury of some kind has been suffered, that the injury is 
caused in some respect by the entity being sued (“causation”), and that a court 
ruling can bring some relief (“redressability”).106 The court acknowledged that 
Massachusetts cannot easily show standing. Most harms from climate change 
lie in the future; the causes are diffuse; and a court’s ruling will not, in any 
case, reverse climate change. Despite these difficulties, the majority concluded 
that “special solicitude” was required in view of “the unusual importance of the 
underlying issue” (and the fact that the state was invoking its sovereign rights 
to preserve its environment on behalf of its citizens). Evidence of sea-level rise, 
together with credible predictions of future harms resulting from climate change 
were sufficient, in their view, to show that the injuries in question were “concrete”. 
Given this, EPA’s refusal to regulate was a likely cause both of present injuries 
and of future damages. Although regulation would not reverse climate change, 
the court said, this was not sufficient reason to avoid it: global warming might 
yet be stopped or slowed. To reach this point, the court did not need to grapple 
extensively with climate change science; it needed only to accept evidence of 
scientific consensus, and on that basis judge the credibility of a claim of future 
harms and the possibility that deliberate action might slow it down. 
Other climate change related cases have produced mixed results. When 
fourteen states, including California, were sued by a group of carmakers for 
regulating carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles, a Vermont court ruled (in 
September 2007) in favour of the states.107 However, introducing the regulations 
105 In late 2007, the EPA ordered 17 US states not to introduce fuel efficiency standards 
for automobiles superior to those mandated by the federal Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007. Echoing its position in Massachusetts v. EPA, the regulator 
again argued that state-level action would impede federal policy. See Broder and 
Barringer, 2007. As of May 2008, California was suing the EPA. 
106 The present discussion raises issues similar to those broadly discussed in the 
previous section, but there is a distinction: there is a lower bar for establishing 
causation for purposes of standing than for the merits in a given case. 
107 Green Mountain Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge et al. v. Crombie et al. (ruling of 12 
September 2007).
 Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide 45
in question still depends on a waiver from the EPA, which was denied in late 
2007 (for the first time in 50 years).108 In the same month, California lost a case 
against an alliance of automobile companies who, the state claimed, were 
causing a “public nuisance” due to the intensive aggregate emissions from the 
cars they produced. While superficially contradictory, the rulings were in fact 
quite consistent. In both, the courts chose to conclude that regulation rather than 
litigation was the appropriate forum for setting policy on an issue as charged 
as climate change. In the California “public nuisance” case, for example, the 
court found “that injecting itself into the global warming thicket at this juncture 
would require an initial policy determination of the type reserved for the political 
branches of government”.109 In this, the US courts highlighted perhaps the 
greatest obstacle to climate change litigation: where a highly contentious area 
of policy is still undecided, the law is necessarily indeterminate. 
In such circumstances, human rights considerations may nevertheless prove 
helpful. This is because regardless of the court’s reticence to set climate change 
policy, there is much less doubt about the need for action and redress in cases 
of human rights violations. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Massachusetts 
v. EPA takes some steps in that direction. It demonstrates that courts are more 
likely to step in where harms are already “concrete”. While the ruling’s impact 
on federal policy remains unclear,110 it provides impetus and argument to those 
wishing to challenge the actions of major emitters in other judicial fora both 
inside and outside the United States. Once again, however, such cases will 
be most effective after the fact, when climate change impacts have been felt. 
Litigation in cases of future harms can only be indirect. They may act as a 
deterrent if suits against private actors succeed; encourage or oblige states to 
regulate or pass law where they have not done so; or otherwise clarify complex 
policy questions by closely examining the justice issues at stake. 
international	and	other	fora
The cases examined above all concern the United States and focus primarily 
on domestic obligations in a national jurisdiction. (A peculiar feature of the Inuit 
case is that although the plaintiffs hailed from both Canada and the United 
 
 
108 See note 105 above. 
109 People of the State of California v. General Motors et al. (ruling of 17 September 
2007).
110 The ruling may have contributed to a shift in federal policy, embodied in the 
Energy Independence and Security Act signed into law on 18 December 2007, 
which requires increased fuel efficiency in US automobiles by 2020 and mandates 
large increases in subsidised domestic biofuel production. However, following the 
passage of the act, the EPA has again sought to limit autonomous state regulation 
of climate change (see note 105 above).
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States, only the United States was named as a respondent in the petition, 
presumably because it is by far the greater contributor to global warming.111) 
As climate change effects deepen, however, other opportunities for litigation 
will present themselves. Cases have already been initiated in other fora 
and jurisdictions; many of them rely on human rights norms. In addition to 
providing redress for actual human rights harms experienced by individuals 
and communities as a result of climate change, these cases may also fulfil a 
number of other roles. They may draw attention to policy gaps; prod states to 
take action individually or collectively; tease out complex questions of liability 
and accountability; or provide an opportunity for detailed discussion of the 
allocation of benefits and burdens under a given climate change policy. 
Human rights lawyers (and others) may wish to approach international 
human rights fora such as the Human Rights Committee, or the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination has already spoken out against violations of the rights of 
indigenous persons in Indonesia, in the context of large state-driven biofuel 
plantations.112 In general, international human rights fora may complement 
litigation in domestic courts, encouraging or obliging governments to take 
steps to prevent additional climate change, to compensate those affected, or to 
implement climate policy in a rights-friendly manner. Outside the United States, 
climate change-related litigation is also underway in Nigeria (where Shell and 
the national oil company are being sued for damages associated with gas-
flaring, although the suit is not framed as climate change-driven); Germany 
(where export-credit agency support for fossil fuel related commercial activities 
have been challenged); and Australia (challenging the use of coal and claims 
to use “clean coal” in power stations).113 The Kyoto Protocol itself may provide 
options for litigation: environmental groups in Canada are suing the government 
in a Canadian federal court for its stated intention to miss its Kyoto targets.
111 The case is further complicated by the fact that neither Canada nor the United 
States have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which means that 
the only applicable treaty under the Inter-American system is the softer American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. For an argument that litigation 
targeting the United States is likely to be neither effective nor strategically helpful 
against climate change, see Posner and Sunstein, 2007.
112 CERD Concluding Observations on Indonesia, 71st session, CERD/C/IDN/CO/3 (15 
August 2007), para. 17. Further background is available in the NGO submission to 
CERD entitled “Request for Consideration of the Situation of Indigenous Peoples 
in Kalimantan, Indonesia, under the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination’s Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures” (6 July 
2007).
113 Documentation on each of these cases can be found on the Climate Law website: 
www.climatelaw.org. 
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To assert the interstate obligations that arise in the context of climate change 
– even where human rights violations play a central part – states and activists 
will most likely turn to fora other than the international human rights machinery. 
There are many options, foremost among them the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). But cases alleging state responsibility for transboundary harms, 
originally recognised in the pathbreaking Trail Smelter Case in the 1930s, will 
be hard pressed to succeed in the face of the complexities of climate change 
and the ongoing international quest for a treaty solution.114 Tuvalu – which is 
experiencing irreversible damage due to rising sea levels – sought legal advice 
on who might be held responsible for the imminent loss of homes and lifestyles, 
but chose not to pursue litigation.115 The legal options available to small island 
states facing disappearance at low warming thresholds have been investigated 
in some detail.116 Relevant questions concern the rights of “environmental 
refugees”, the status of states whose territory disappears, and the obligations 
upon other states to receive climate migrants and provide conditions for the 
continued survival of their cultures. Should negotiations continue to stall, the 
effects of climate change on societies and public policy is likely to trigger 
renewed examination of legal options.117 
There may be scope for interstate litigation elsewhere, for example under the 
WTO dispute settlement process, where states find themselves disadvantaged 
by the unwillingness of other states to control the emissions of private actors 
within their jurisdictions.118 The failure of some states to honour obligations to 
prevent climate change under the UNFCCC might be viewed as an effective 
subsidy. At a minimum, states might justifiably take steps against recalcitrant 
states such as the United States.119 Continued subsidies to national fossil fuel 
industries are also emerging as a likely target. At a minimum, global warming is 
set to reignite the long-running disputes between environmentalists and trade 
enthusiasts, played out inconclusively in cases such as Shrimp/Turtles.120 
114 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 RIAA 1907 (1941); Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovenia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 7. See 
Sands, 2003, pp. 291-307); Gupta , 2007. See pp. 68-75 below.
115 Okamatsu, 2006; Price, 2002; Ralston et al., 2004; Rinnerberger, 2006. 
116 See especially E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/28 (16 June 2005), above note 58.
117 If so, the work in the UN’s International Law Commission on “shared natural 
resources” (recently moving beyond transboundary groundwater to examine oil 
and gas deposits) may further buttress the doctrinal weight of such cases. See 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/580, Fourth Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary 
Groundwaters, by Mr. Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporteur (March 2007).
118 See IPCC AR4, WGIII, p. 793; Stiglitz, 2006; Cosbey, 2007; New Economics 
Foundation, 2003. 
119 Stiglitz, 2006.
120 WTO Appellate Body Report on US - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998). See also Howse, 2002. 
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Court rulings are clearly no substitute for robust policy on global warming. 
Indeed where cases have been brought, they have been necessary precisely 
because of an existing policy vacuum and have served in the main to prod a 
process slowly forward.121 Lawsuits will likely be most effective as a stopgap, 
at national rather than international level, when climate change impacts can be 
traced to specific policy inaction or failure, to ensure that regulatory and other 
actors take steps to limit present and future emissions and impacts. 
121 Other fora include the international tribunal under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which may provide possible recourse for states that 
can demonstrate harms resulting from pollution of the marine environment (such as 
to coral reefs). Burns, 2006. A series of petitions have been filed with UNESCO’s 
World Heritage Committee, which oversees the World Heritage Convention, seeking 
recognition of the threat to world heritage sites presented by global warming and 
requesting special protections. See www.climatelaw.org. 
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Iv. PRoCeduRAl RIGHts: voICe And PRoCess 
This chapter briefly describes how procedural rights and tools can be factored 
into international, national and subnational policy processes. It relies in particular 
on the incorporation into recent international environmental law of rights outlined 
in both the UDHR and ICCPR.122 These are principally the rights to information, 
public participation and effective remedy.123 The first significant source is the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, proclaimed by the UN 
General Assembly at the same time as the UNFCCC was opened for signature, 
which includes the following principle: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens… At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate 
access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall 
be provided. (Rio Declaration, Principle 10).
Rio Principle 10 received its fullest expression to date in the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. This treaty establishes 
comprehensive and binding standards in each of the three procedural areas 
of its title.124 Although Aarhus has a regional (European) basis, it is open for 
signature to all states, and provides standards that might usefully be drawn 
upon at international level and by states everywhere faced with the peculiar 
hazards posed by climate change. 
access	to	information	
Information rights have received special attention under international 
environmental law. The reason for this is the recognition, indicated in Rio 
122 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 19 and 21; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 19, 22 and 25. 
123 For a full account of the history and relevant legal background, including on access 
to justice (not discussed here), see Shelton, 2001, pp. 194-213 and pp. 218-225. 
124 Full text online at www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. The Right to 
Information also appears in the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
(PIC Convention); EC Directive on Combating Air Pollution from Industrial Plants, 
84/360/EEC, OJL 188 of 16 July 1984; Directive 90/313/EEC of 27 June 1990 on the 
Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, OJL 158 of 23 June 1990. 
Also WHO European Charter on the Environment and Health. See Shelton, 2001, 
pp. 200-203.
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Principle 10, that effective action on environmental degradation requires the 
collection of much information – environmental impact assessments, monitoring 
of toxins and other pollutants, tracking of species populations and so on. At the 
same time, it has long been recognised that information on the environment 
should be publicly available, not only as a matter of right, but also to improve 
policy efficiency. Easy access to information increases the effectiveness 
of environmental monitoring, by generalising public understanding of a 
given policy goal. Furthermore, in association with guarantees of effective 
participation, access to comprehensive, high quality and accessible information 
is fundamental to democratic process. 
Chapter II discussed some of the challenges that policy-makers face because 
information on the likely effects of climate change is lacking in many countries. 
The human right to information, as commonly codified in national legislation, 
might not appear at first glance to be of much help faced with these challenges, 
because it only affirms the general public’s right to receive on request 
information already held by public authorities. This could not be applied to 
advance adaptation policy in countries where relevant information has not been 
collected. 
The Aarhus Convention goes beyond the usual wording of freedom of information 
acts, requiring that states actively compile periodic reports on environmental 
risks, update them systematically, and make them available to the public 
proactively (Aarhus, Article 5). On its own, this stipulation is still insufficient to 
resolve the information dilemmas facing developing countries in the context of 
climate change. An Aarhus equivalent for African states, for example, would 
not overcome the resource and capacity gaps that stymie good information 
gathering in many countries. Nor would it necessarily strengthen the hand of 
developing country delegates (or civil society groups, journalists or others) at 
large negotiating events. However, the Aarhus Convention goes still further. 
Article 3(7) states that:
Each Party shall promote the application of the principles of this Convention 
in international environmental decision-making processes and within 
the framework of international organizations in matters relating to the 
environment.
This principle is binding on Aarhus parties, including all EU member states 
(except Ireland). It presumably applies to the international adaptation and 
mitigation negotiations in which these countries are involved, and must also 
inform the obligations outlined in the UNFCCC and reiterated and expanded 
in the Bali roadmap.125 It is surprising, given the essential role that information 
and participation must play in developing adaptation policies, that Aarhus 3(7) 
appears not to have been invoked or insisted upon in those negotiations. 
125 Decision -/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (Advance Unedited Version), Article 1(c)(i). See 
pp. 23-24 above.
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The principles of the Aarhus Convention underline the fact that information 
gathering involves choices and decisions about resource distribution and 
capacity, about what and how much to gather at what cost, and about who 
should receive it and how it may be used. How, for example, might the 
application of Aarhus affect the respective roles of national and international 
actors in information-gathering, analysis and dissemination for adaptation? 
Given the recurrent impasse in international adaptation negotiations, such 
questions merit further investigation and advocacy. 
The Aarhus principles are equally relevant to international mitigation policies, 
particularly given their cooperative dimension. Because emission caps 
under the Kyoto Protocol are restricted to Annex I countries, discussions of 
mitigation strategies too have barely involved non-Annex I parties. As a result, 
the most significant long-term mitigation structures – the emissions markets 
under construction, including the EU Emissions Trading System – have gone 
ahead as though they were of limited interest or relevance for non-participating 
states. They are not, of course, given that the markets in question distribute a 
(henceforth) strictly limited global commodity. A broad combination of actors 
from Annex I countries, both public and private, have been actively constructing 
this market for over a decade, with the result that the trading regime has 
become increasingly complex, well-resourced and jargon-laden. The immense 
significance that emissions trading will have for the long-term economic 
prospects of non-Annex I countries has barely been registered or researched 
in those countries, with the exception of the larger “middle income” countries 
whose involvement is critical to the market. Over time, an initial information gap 
has led to limited participation by LDCs, and diminishing appreciation of finer 
policy detail for those outside the loop, particular among the general public in 
those countries. The result is de facto exclusion from discussions of carbon 
trading of very many whose futures will be directly affected.
The Clean Development Mechanism has led to the active involvement of some 
larger developing countries, such as China, in the trading scheme. Indeed the 
CDM is the first and most obvious area where an effectively global regime will 
impact directly upon development in poorer countries. As outlined in Chapter 
II above, however, depending on how it is ultimately structured, the trading 
regime may ultimately price the poorest countries out of the market for access 
to the carbon dump (see pp. 36-40 above). It would seem important to ensure 
that parties with an interest are adequately informed and equipped for full 
participation, in order to head off such an outcome. Because developing 
countries, particularly those with the fewest resources, focus on the immediate 
threats posed by climate change and the urgency of adaptation, it is essential 
to ensure that mitigation negotiations are transparent, that information about 
policies and programmes is properly communicated, and that all parties 
participate effectively. At present, discussions of emissions trading treat their 
relevance to non-Annex I countries as a matter of CDM prizes on one hand, 
and of the eventual universal adoption of emissions caps on the other. Large 
host countries such as China can enter this trading regime on their own terms, 
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but for others the stakes of the global market rather concern their long-term 
development capacity, and this is rarely discussed. 
Public	ParticiPation	
Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention concerns public participation:
Each Party shall make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for 
the public to participate during the preparation of plans and programmes 
relating to the environment, within a transparent and fair framework, having 
provided the necessary information to the public.
Climate change negotiations have long suffered from complications of process 
and participation, rooted in systemic inequalities.126 Resource-poor countries 
in need of adaptation funding often can afford only a few delegates at climate 
negotiations, where wealthy countries can field hundreds. As a result, those 
present face inevitable difficulties, given the complexities and inter-dependence 
of the many themes under negotiation at a given time. In these circumstances, 
diplomats are unlikely to influence outcomes effectively even when the states 
they represent have a clear interest. 
Not surprisingly, the situation has fuelled distrust, even acrimony, between 
the parties.127 Donor countries have been criticised for apparently seeking 
to avoid a participatory process through the UNFCCC to fund the immense 
adaptation needs of developing countries. The GEF’s core funds have been 
subject to criteria that, while sensible for mitigation activities, have little to do 
with adaptation. Projects must contribute to “global environmental benefits” 
to qualify, whereas adaptation actions will necessarily bring primarily local 
(rather than global) benefits. Projects are funded on an “incremental costs” 
basis, which makes sense for mitigation activities, where the GHG emissions 
of a given project can ordinarily be reduced at an additional cost, but not 
for adaptation, where costs are likely to be wholly new, like the causes they 
address.128 As the World Resources Institute has remarked, this suggests that 
adaptation is somehow parasitic upon existing development planning, ignoring 
the unique character of adaptive responses to climate change. “The lack of 
126 See generally Mace, 2005.
127 McGray et al., 2007, p. 33.
128 The GEF eventually introduced the notion of “additional” to replace “incremental” 
costs – the idea being that funding “additional” to ODA would be made available 
to “add” extra “climate adaptive” components onto existing development projects. 
McGray et al., p. 33. On the persistence of both “global environmental funding” 
and “incremental costs”, see Mace, 2005, pp. 226-228, p. 244 and pp. 335-336. 
In addition to these criteria a Resource Allocation Framework created to evaluate 
funding applications introduced governance criteria requiring indicators that, at the 
time they were introduced, did not exist for at least 23 of the countries most in need 
of adaptation funding. Mace, 2005, pp. 243-245. 
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[adaptation] implementation”, they remark, is “largely driven by the conflicts in 
funding procedures [and] has further exacerbated tensions in the international 
climate negotiations”.129 
Distrust has continued even where developing countries have participated 
actively in policy processes, such as in the elaboration of NAPAs for LDCs, and in 
the composition of the Kyoto-based Adaptation Fund Board, finally agreed in Bali. 
Donor countries have appeared to wish to assert control over these processes 
with minimal interference from the “beneficiary” countries. The NAPAs’ funding 
was minimal (US$200,000 for the plans intended to cover the most pressing 
needs of entire nations).130 Although 32 NAPAs have so far been elaborated, 
relatively little has been done to fund their implementation (see Chapter II 
below). To complicate matters, NAPAs have not generally been integrated with 
other development processes, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategies put 
together under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).131 The new Adaptation Fund Board, established to manage the 2% 
levy on CDM projects expected to produce significant funding for adaptation is 
considered a success for developing country negotiators. Nevertheless, it was 
determined at Bali that the Board Secretariat would be placed with the GEF (on 
an interim basis), and that body swiftly moved to set the new Board’s overall 
agenda and operating principles.132 
At the same time, the World Bank quickly announced the creation of the “climate 
resilience pilot program”, a new adaptation fund largely sponsored by the United 
Kingdom that would be attached to the Bank’s “climate investment funds”. The 
new fund was constructed without consultation with likely recipient countries 
and its executive board initially included only donor country representatives. 
(An immediate outcry forced the Bank to revisit these plans.)133 
A root cause of tension is the governance structure of the World Bank itself. 
The Bank acts as a trustee for the GEF as well as an implementing agency 
and, in addition, frequently co-finances GEF-supported projects. As a result 
the Bank wields enormous influence over the GEF. However, decision-making 
at the Bank is weighted in favour of its largest shareholders by financial 
contribution; this tends to minimise or exclude recipient countries from the 
129 McGray et al., 2007, p. 34.
130 For a good synopsis of common criticisms of the NAPAs, see UNDP, 2007, p. 189.
131 McGray et al., 2007, p. 34.
132 For the composition of the Board and the array of documents elaborated for 
approval by the GEF, acting as secretariat, at the first board meeting, visit the 
Board’s website: www.adaptation-fund.org.
133 Tan, 2008b.
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outset.134 In this context, the emphasis in Aarhus on public participation is again 
relevant, particularly when read in conjunction with the Article 3(7) requirement 
regarding international negotiations. For as long as the participation of some 
relevant actors can be curtailed by channelling decisions through the World 
Bank, donor countries will continue to exercise undue influence and recipient 
countries will continue to perceive consultation as merely formal. Since European 
countries are under a binding obligation under Aarhus Article 3(7) to introduce 
Aarhus principles into international negotiations on the environment and have 
recognised the essential role of national leadership over policy formation in 
the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, they might be expected to create 
appropriately inclusive policy fora. The fact that they have failed to do so in the 
case of the new Climate Investment Fund (for example) is an obstacle to the 
development of sound and legitimate policies to address climate change, and 
this should attract the attention of human rights advocates. 
Rights to participation are equally important when adaptation policies are 
implemented on the ground. Much work has already been done on the role 
that participation, access to information, and freedom of expression play in 
sound and accountable decision-making, both nationally and locally. When 
citizens are not well informed, or are disabled from participating in public 
discussion, this will affect not only the quality of decisions but also their 
implementation, because they will command little informed public support. 
Agreement between state and citizens is especially important if policies involve 
sacrifice, the allocation of scarce resources, or government interference in the 
day-to-day dealings of ordinary people. Since climate change will generate 
policy challenges in all these ways, it is clear that securing public consent for 
programmes of adaptation or mitigation will be essential if they are to succeed. 
Human rights provide an internationally-recognised and formally constructed 
framework, and to some extent a body of practice, that will be helpful when 
designing consultation and decision-making processes and assessing the 
quality of public participation in adaptation and mitigation programmes.
134 The five largest shareholders to the IBRD each appoint one of 24 Executive 
Directors on the Bank’s Board (the rest are elected). In December 2007, the top 
five contributors commanded almost 40% of the Bank’s voting powers (they are: 
France (4.3%), Germany (4.49%), Japan (7.86%), the United Kingdom (4.3%) 
and the United States (16.38%). See the Bank’s website (http://go.worldbank.org/
11PWB3RTM0 and http://go.worldbank.org/O9S0U0IOA0).
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v. etHICs And RIGHts: ConCePtuAl ConCeRns
Climate change raises some hard ethical questions, as this report has indicated 
throughout, many (if not all) of which can be framed as questions of justice. 
This chapter looks at four such questions. First, it explores four different justice 
demands that have informed climate change negotiations and that provide the 
ethical backdrop against which various human rights concerns arise. Second, 
it examines whether flexible provisions of the UNFCCC, such as equity and 
“common but differentiated responsibilities”, can provide a framework for 
addressing human rights violations attributable to climate change. Third, legal 
responsibility for transnational climate change-related harms is discussed, in 
relation to states, on one hand, and private actors on the other. Finally, the 
right to development, still contested in many human right circles, has some 
standing in the climate change field because of the references to it in both the 
Rio Declaration and the UNFCCC.
Justice	claims	in	the	climate	change	regime
The ethical issues raised by climate change are familiar because they were 
clearly identified from the outset of climate negotiations, and have been 
repeatedly rearticulated and developed ever since. They are nevertheless 
complex, because they involve justice claims that are both different in kind and 
not obviously compatible. 
At least four types of justice claim have been raised in the context of climate 
change. The first and most straightforward arises because the activities of one 
group of persons – those who overuse the carbon dump – have caused and 
continue to cause injuries affecting a different (much larger) group, who live 
in parts of the world likely to be hardest hit by climate change. This claim has 
the familiar contours of corrective justice. A is engaging in activities that are 
wrongfully injuring B, so A should (i) desist from these harmful actions and (ii) 
compensate B for any injuries experienced. Initially, this looks like a human 
rights problem or at least a tort problem: there are actors and injured parties, 
perpetrators and victims; the question is what mechanisms will serve to stop 
the perpetrators from acting in ways that are injurious to the victims and will 
compensate the latter for harms they have experienced. For reasons discussed 
in Chapter III above, tort-like litigation is likely to be more fruitful in the national 
than the international context, and with regard to past rather than future harms. 
Nevertheless, in part precisely because recourse to litigation is likely to be 
limited, this background justice claim will continue to influence the evolution of 
climate change responses. 
A second justice claim concerns the loss of future capacity and potential. 
The solution to climate change is generally acknowledged to require a steep 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions globally. Since the path to economic 
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growth and prosperity (as generally understood) has relied until now on 
technologies that produce these emissions, a global freeze on their usage 
will tend to lock in vast wealth disparities between groups in different regions, 
without offering any obvious or reliable means of reducing the gap in future. This 
is a substantive justice claim, in that it recognises that an injustice has taken 
place even though there was no relevant law to ward against it, and the relevant 
actors were probably acting in good faith, at the time they created the problem. 
As such it amounts to something like the following problem: how can a solution 
be found that will effectively reduce global dependence upon greenhouse gas 
emissions without in the process permanently disadvantaging a global majority 
who were not responsible but who may forfeit their future prosperity? This claim 
too has been front and centre of much climate change debate. 
Third, if climate change is viewed, as it often is, as a “global problem requiring 
a global solution” (that is, assuming some form of global solidarity) the justice 
issues again look different. Everyone, after all, is affected by climate change, 
not just those living in poor countries. The appropriate question is to ask who 
should pay how much of the cost of dealing with it? How should the burden of 
solving the problem be distributed? The justice stakes are well described by 
Henry Shue:
[F]our questions … are deeply involved in every choice of a plan for action. 
(1) What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that 
is still avoidable?; (2) What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the 
social costs that will not in fact be avoided?; (3) What background allocation 
of wealth would allow international bargaining (about issues like (1) and 
(2)) to be a fair process?; and (4) What is a fair allocation of emissions of 
greenhouse gases (over the long-term and during the transition to the long-
term allocation)?135 
It is in the context of a “global community” affected by a common problem that 
the “polluter pays principle” – which Shue recommends – is applicable.136 There 
are two elements to the justice claim presented here. First, because the emphasis 
is on allocation of costs and benefits, this claim involves “distributional justice”. 
Second, it focuses on procedural justice – on constructing mechanisms that 
will ensure that a just solution can be reached, that the concerns and interests 
of different stakeholders are heard fairly, and that steps are taken as a result. 
Since each of the four claims reviewed in this section has distributive (and 
redistributive) assumptions and consequences,137 it is the procedural element 
that is treated as distinctive in this third claim.
135 Shue, 1993, p. 40.
136 Simon Caney draws a distinction between a “beneficiary pays” and a “polluter 
pays” principle, noting that Shue’s formulation tends rather to the former, at least for 
past pollution. See Caney, 2005.
137 Caney, ibid, contends that because distributional justice saturates the climate 
change issue it must be viewed primarily through the lens of ethics and rights.
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A fourth way to think about climate change is to view it in terms of entitlements 
derived from prior usage or legitimate expectations. This account, like the 
second claim above, begins by noting that carbon intense economies have 
become hazardous to the global environment through no obvious wrongdoing. 
When those economies emerged, it was not realised that they posed a profound 
threat to the environment. Given that many livelihoods (indeed hundreds 
of millions) now depend upon carbon-intensive economies, a legitimate 
entitlement has been generated among carbon users that cannot be rescinded 
arbitrarily in favour of a larger policy goal. A persuasive argument might even 
be made that compensation should be due to the polluters if they are to give 
up their acquired entitlement to the global carbon dump.138 At the least, they 
might expect to have a decisive say, or veto, over the form that any solution 
takes. Paradoxically, the greater the scale of pollution, the stronger is a given 
polluter’s claim to shape the regime. This might be regarded as the formal 
justice perspective on climate change, in that it relies upon a strict reading of 
existing legal norms even though they may seem ill-suited to the problem at 
hand. Its strength lies not only in the claim of strict legal rectitude but also in the 
fact that a greenhouse gas abatement regime is likely to trigger the opposition 
of these actors, who are generally politically powerful. 
Each of these four discourses of justice has been present within the climate 
change debate from the outset – although, unsurprisingly, different perspectives 
have been favoured by different actors.139 No outcome can satisfy every claim, 
and in some cases the solutions suggested by each will conflict. This is in 
part because these various visions of justice conceive of the relevant rights- 
and duty-bearers in different ways. The first two claims clearly affirm that the 
primary relationship is between states; individuals and other private actors are 
second-order bearers of rights and duties. The richer states are the primary 
duty-bearers and the poorer states (potential) rights-bearers. The third claim 
need not assume that states are the primary actors, but most versions (Shue’s 
paper, for example) do so in practice. Negotiated regimes that allocate burdens 
and benefits will inevitably impact individuals’ rights, but the third scheme 
assumes these decisions are best made and regulated by means of inter-state 
negotiation, in which states represent (and therefore manage) individual rights 
within the context of an overriding public interest. By contrast, the fourth vision 
assumes that the primary right-bearers are private actors, though states remain 
138 Robert Nozick argued that any distributional outcome must be just if it results from 
lawful transactions following from an original just allocation or acquisition. Nozick, 
1974, p. 151.
139 A fifth justice claim commonly raised is not examined here: that is the claim of 
future generations to environmental and developmental resources equivalent 
to, or not significantly worse than, those available to present generations. On 
“intergenerational equity” (as this claim is generally known in international law) see 
Brown-Weiss, 1989. The claim is not pursued here under the assumption that, in 
terms of basic threshold human rights, claims of future generations, viewed locally, 
are not fundamentally different from those of present generations, viewed globally.
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the primary duty-bearers. If states are to mandate emission cuts in the public 
interest, they must do so while respecting the rights of individuals. All states 
might, in principle, be duty-bearers, required to agree a scheme globally that 
will respect private rights locally.
To some extent, each of these justice claims has generated its own climate 
change solution. First, international funding for the adaptation needs of 
vulnerable countries appears as a proposed solution to the problem of corrective 
justice. It can be conceived as compensation owed by those responsible for 
global warming to parties who are injured by it (even though there has been 
no acknowledgement of liability). Technology transfer appears intended to 
help overcome the second, substantive, justice problem of prohibited carbon-
intensive growth. Those in poorer countries agree not to compound a problem 
they have not caused on condition that income inequality is not locked in as a 
result. The transfer of clean technologies (developed on the basis of prosperity 
derived largely from dirty technologies) is not merely a condition of their 
engagement, but a condition of their future growth. The injustice of locked-in 
inequality is thus potentially avoided. The claim for procedural justice, third, is 
partially met in the arduous processes of negotiation itself. Indeed, the difficulty 
of reaching agreement on the appropriate allocation of burdens among states 
demonstrates the complexity of this task in light of the presence of each of the 
other claims outlined above. Finally, the desire for formal justice is met by the 
emissions trading regime established under the Kyoto Protocol, which grants 
emissions rights to states on the basis of prior usage, and has been elaborated 
in close consultation with affected private polluters. The trading regime is 
sensitive to claims that emissions entitlements were legitimately acquired 
by these actors. It provides them with a voice in the regime and flexibility in 
deciding how to alter their behaviour. Private actors have the potential to make 
a profit while making amends, and effectively may even be compensated, so 
long as emissions permits are given away freely rather than auctioned off.140 
A number of observations leap out from the above description. First, it is not clear 
that these different discourses of justice can coexist without generating marked 
contradictions or inconsistencies, at least in practice. However, the impact of 
any one claim on the others, if adopted, is not evident, in part because they are 
discussed by different parties in different venues with relatively little overlap, 
and in part because the substantive impacts will mainly be felt in the future 
and cannot easily be predicted. Second, some justice claims have had more 
practical traction than others. The emissions trading (as exemplified in the EU’s 
ETS), including the Clean Development Mechanism, is at an arguably more 
advanced stage than international adaptation funding or technology transfer. 
It appears that the “entitlements” claim, although it does not enjoy universal 
support, has been more effective than the substantive or corrective justice 
claims, despite the fact that the latter are widely agreed. This is counterintuitive, 
140 See p. 14 above.
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given that the other justice claims have received far more public attention. It is 
perhaps less surprising when it is remembered that the main actors asserting 
prior entitlements are also leaders in energy production and distribution and 
so have immense power to shape debates affecting energy futures. Lavanya 
Rajamani writes “It is indeed curious that international law can be read to 
endorse claims based on historical entitlements, yet deny claims for rectification 
of historical wrongs”.141 
While none of the justice claims outlined in this section translates unproblematically 
into human rights language, they are nevertheless highly relevant to the present 
investigation for two related reasons. This is, first, because the human rights 
concerns that have been highlighted elsewhere in this report rely for their force 
on a breach of background normative propriety – the sense that an injustice 
has been committed or is continuing to take place. Second, human rights today 
occupy much of the space of justice discourse, to the extent that injustices 
that cannot be easily articulated in human rights terms can appear exotic or 
abstruse. Climate change therefore presents a challenge to the authority of 
human rights as the dominant language of justice. If human rights law cannot 
accommodate these important claims, it risks becoming irrelevant in much of 
the world where their effects will be increasingly suffered. Conversely, if some or 
all of the justice claims already acknowledged within the climate regime can be 
refined and successfully channelled through human rights – or if human rights 
law can provide a basis for choosing among them – both disciplines will be 
enriched and many individuals stand to benefit. At present, however, it appears 
that inchoate property rights (to environmental entitlements) are trumping 
inchoate human rights (to protection from and reparations for environment-
related damages).
equity	and	“common	but	differentiated	resPonsibilities”	
The international law framework – the UNFCCC – includes language designed 
to mediate the various justice claims outlined above. Developing countries 
argued for a treaty that would recognise three fundamental distinctions 
between wealthier and poorer countries: different historical (and present day) 
responsibility for climate change; differing likely impacts of climate change, 
predicted to be far greater in poorer than richer countries; and different capacity 
to deal with the problems resulting from climate change and to develop non-
carbon intensive energy technologies. 
These distinctions are central to the “principles” laid out in Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC:
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement 
its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:
141 Rajamani, 2006, p. 143.
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1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country 
Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing 
country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.
In principle, as attested by the record of negotiations, the language of “equity” 
and of “common but differentiated responsibilities” was introduced precisely 
to acknowledge the justice claims of developing countries, and in particular 
to balance the differences of contribution and capacity.142 The clauses 
above appear to promise not only that resources will be made available for 
redistribution, but that responsibility would be attributed fairly: that those 
living carbon-intensive lives in richer countries would be held accountable, to 
some degree, for the catastrophic problems they had caused and continued 
to fuel, while those in poorer countries, who bore little responsibility and were 
struggling to deal with the consequences, would be compensated. If that was 
the promise, however, there is little sign to date that these principles are being 
fulfilled, or even that they are adequate to translate the ethical imperatives into 
legal obligations.
Equity appears comparatively rarely in international law, and plays an unusual 
and ill-defined role. The introduction of “equity” is an implicit recognition that 
the law is not always ideally formulated to treat every disagreement; and that 
occasions arise where proper application of formal law would lead to unjust or 
discriminatory outcomes. The search for “equitable” solutions under conditions 
of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) seems intended to 
compensate for the shortcomings of formal equality under law by acknowledging 
the reality that substantive differences exist between equally sovereign states. 
Equity might be thought to provide a means to reach a decision, given its 
association with deliberation and fairness (procedural and substantive justice). 
According to Shelton, “[t]he procedural and substantive dimensions of equity 
are often perceived as inter-related, based on the assumption that fairer 
proceedings lead to fairer outcomes.”143 But the two may also exist in tension, 
insofar as “substantive” justice outcomes are often expected to be redistributive 
whereas procedures are often designed to entrench formal equality (regardless 
142 See generally Rajamani, ibid; on “contribution and capacity”, see Rajamani, ibid, 
pp. 129-133.
143 Shelton, 2007a, p. 640. This section relies heavily on this text and also on Shelton, 
2007b.
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of wealth distributions).144 In other words, even if it is reasonably clear that equity 
is not the application of general rules uniformly in all contexts, it is much less 
clear what it is.145 “[D]ebate exists on the appropriate principles to determine 
equitable allocation, e.g. whether decisions should be based on need, capacity, 
prior entitlement, ‘just deserts’, the greatest good for the greatest number, or 
strict equality of treatment.”146 Philippe Sands explains further:
In the absence of detailed rules, equity can provide a conveniently flexible 
means of leaving the extent of rights and obligations to be decided at a 
subsequent date … In many respects, UNCED [the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development at which the UNFCCC 
was signed] was about equity: how to allocate future responsibilities for 
environmental protection between states which are at different levels of 
economic development, which have contributed in different degrees to 
particular problems, and which have different environmental needs and 
priorities.147 
In short, equity appears in the UNFCCC in part because, while there was 
agreement at the time of its signature that action must be taken, there was 
much less agreement about who should pay the costs and how. The insertion 
of equity acknowledges in principle the validity of different justice claims, while 
postponing any decision on their relative merit.148 This has been especially true 
in the climate regime, where the various different justice claims are unusually 
knotty and interdependent. While not an empty gesture, then, equity does not 
amount to a redeemable promise in favour of any particular justice outcome. 
144 Shelton, 2007a, p. 640, citing Franck, 1995, pp. 7–9. 
145 Equity is therefore an uneasy subject of judicial pronouncement. In North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (1982), the ICJ proclaimed that “the justice of which 
equity is an emanation is ... justice according to the rule of law: which is to say 
that its application should display consistency and a degree of predictability; even 
though it looks with particularity to the more peculiar circumstances in an instant 
case, it also looks beyond it to principles of more general application”, North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (1982) ICJ Reports 18. Shelton, 2007a, p. 647, notes 
that in this passage “the court seeks a degree of legal certainty in its choice and 
application of norms, but it must take into account the facts, the situations, and the 
specific interests or claims of the parties. Equitable norms themselves provide no 
guidance in selecting among the various facts or factors that could weigh in the 
decision. Thus, an element of subjectivity is probably present in all efforts to achieve 
an equitable result”. Commenting on the same case, Sands, 2003, p. 153, finds the 
court determined that “equity was not an exercise of discretion or conciliation or the 
operation of distributive justice”. 
146 Shelton, 2007a, p. 653. 
147 Sands, 2003, p. 262.
148 In short, to say that a solution must be “equitable” says little about what that solution 
should look like. Sands, ibid, p. 152: “in applying equity in [environmental] treaties, 
it will be proper to establish its meaning in the context of its use in a particular treaty. 
[H]owever, treaties rarely provide a working definition of equity…”.
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A second and closely related Article 3 principle, that of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, might appear to hold out greater hope. It has 
a pedigree in international environmental law beginning with the Stockholm 
declaration of 1972 and continuing through to the declaration of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development proclaimed in Johannesburg in 2002. 
Its definitive expression occurs in the (non-binding) 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Principle 7: 
States shall cooperate ... to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility 
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view 
of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.
Here is a clear recognition that richer countries are more at fault for “global 
environmental degradation” and should therefore play a greater role in mitigating 
the damage elsewhere while also contributing to “sustainable development”. 
Yet much of this language was lost in the transition from the non-binding Rio 
Declaration to the binding UNFCCC Article 3. Industrial countries worked hard 
in the negotiations to ensure that these references from Principle 7 were not 
included, and to introduce amendments that narrowed the scope of Article 3.149 
As Lavanya Rajamani makes clear, CBDR in the UNFCCC nevertheless entails 
a positive obligation on wealthier countries to “assist” poorer countries. But 
the terms are narrow. Industrial countries agree to provide “new and additional 
financial resources” to developing countries to meet the “agreed full incremental 
costs” of complying with their commitments and to cover the “agreed full costs” of 
their reporting obligations.150 The wording skews contributions towards funding 
mitigation in developing countries, rather than adaptation (where human rights 
needs are most urgent) and, as discussed in Chapter II above, its reference to 
“incremental costs” is inappropriate for adaptation programmes.151 
149 For a full account, see Rajamani, 2006, p. 137 and pp. 196-197. Among these 
was language to ensure the principles were to “guide” (not direct) “parties” (not all 
states) to the UNFCCC (not in general international law). A footnote was introduced 
to state that the title (“Principles”) was “included solely to assist the reader”. In 
general, prescriptive language (“shall”) in the Rio Principles was replaced with soft 
exhortatory language (“should”) in the UNFCCC. 
150 Rajamani, 2006, pp. 108-109. 
151 The most significant application of the principles of equity and CBDR in the climate 
regime is in the Kyoto Protocol, in setting emissions caps for developed but not 
developing countries. Kyoto is unusual in that the key commitments are taken on 
by only a subset of parties. It is precisely this aspect of the Kyoto Protocol that has 
fuelled US opposition to ratification. (See in this regard, Weisslitz, 2002; Biniaz, 
2002.) But Kyoto’s narrow interpretation of CBRD nevertheless leaves other climate 
change consequences and demands unaddressed. 
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In sum, whereas the references to equity and CBRD make clear that climate 
change responsibilities are relative, they are inadequate on their own to ensure 
that rights violations resulting from climate change can be addressed through 
the climate change regime. In this context, might human rights law help? 
International human rights law presupposes a world of formally equal states. At 
first glance there is little scope for any arrangement (such as “equity”) that would 
disturb the supposed universality of human rights. Nevertheless, a principle 
similar to CBDR operates in the International Covenant on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights, which implicitly acknowledges differences in capacity 
(if not responsibility), when it says that each state is required to take steps 
“individually and through international assistance and co-operation” with a view 
to “progressive realisation” of the rights in the Covenant (Article 2(1)).152 A case 
might also be made that recent developments in the field of equality and non-
discrimination law – emphasising that equal treatment requires treating unalike 
situations differently as well as like situations uniformly – have embraced the 
principle of equity and brought the two closer together. 
The ICESCR stipulation that developing countries should use international 
assistance firstly to attend to social and economic needs at home receives 
support elsewhere in the UNFCCC, in a further application of the CBRD principle 
found in Article 4(7):
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement 
their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under 
the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology 
and will take fully into account that economic and social development and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing 
country Parties.
This important proviso introduces two key conditions that must kick in before 
poorer countries undertake caps of their own. First, rich countries have to fulfil 
their obligation, not only to provide assistance but also to transfer relevant 
technology. Second, in language that echoes the ICESCR, “economic and 
social development” and “poverty eradication” are recognised as the “first and 
overriding priorities” for poor countries. The UNFCCC therefore requires that 
clean technologies be made available to developing countries to permit them 
not only to join in the global mitigation effort but also for purposes of adaptation 
and to ensure that energy transition can be undertaken while respecting 
and fulfilling social and economic rights in those countries. This requirement 
fits easily with the corresponding obligation on developing countries to use 
international assistance to those same ends. Both the UNFCCC and the ICESCR, 
then, appear to require that international assistance to address climate change 
152 See Craven, 1998, pp. 144-152; Rajamani, 2006, pp. 20-24, who also points out 
that the legality and frequency of reservations to human rights treaties involves a de 
facto licensing of differential treatment under human rights law. 
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be directed primarily towards social and economic rights fulfilment. And they 
further appear to support the effective transfer of technologies towards both 
environmental and development ends. 
Overall, nevertheless, the picture is hardly edifying. Even though (i) actions by 
rich countries resulting in global warming lead to the non-fulfilment or violation of 
human rights in poor countries of an increasingly severe and extreme nature; that 
(ii) all states parties to the UNFCCC also have obligations to respect and protect 
human rights; that (iii) rich countries are obliged by the UNFCCC to assist poor 
countries to tackle climate change; and that (iv) poor countries are obliged by 
the ICESCR and by UNFCCC Article 4(7) to channel resources made available 
by rich countries towards economic and social development first and foremost, 
the legal obligation on rich countries to desist from actions causing human 
rights harms in developing countries and to provide redress is extraordinarily 
elusive. At best, the increasingly clear evidence of harm, including human 
rights violations, might contribute to the “pressure” on wealthier countries, 
expressed in Rio Principle 7, to make amends in ways that go beyond the mere 
encouragement of mitigation measures (in developing countries as well as at 
home). It presumably requires robust support for adaptation at a minimum, and 
substantial transfers of relevant technology. Translating these implications in 
law into practice evidently requires further research and advocacy.
state	resPonsibility	and	Private	liability
If my neighbour decided to convert his bungalow into a palace, and in the 
process directed a channel of toxic sludge through my garden, killing off the 
livestock and crops upon which I depend for food and income and effectively 
leaving me and my family destitute, I would have a strong case against her in 
a court of law. The case would remain strong even if my neighbour could show 
the splendour of her new life and the difficulty of returning to the cramped space 
of her original bungalow. It would probably be good enough to ensure that my 
neighbour took steps to rectify or avoid the situation rather than let it go to court. 
The questions of justice in this hypothetical example look fairly clear-cut. 
Viewed from the perspective of the injured, climate change too looks fairly 
clear-cut. Yet the international legal system is simply not constructed to deliver 
justice of this kind. More than most global issues, climate change throws into 
relief the inadequacies of the international justice system, given the scale and 
intimacy of global interdependence that drives the problem and must also 
drive its solutions. The sheer difficulty of locating a judicial venue or attaching 
responsibility in relation to climate change highlights the inadequacy of the 
world’s institutions. A report such as this cannot propose remedies for these 
shortcomings. By articulating the issues, however, it can draw attention to the 
need for further research and advocacy that might eventually make it possible 
to translate responsibilities into solid legal liability, and ultimately improve 
accountability for transnational harms.
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Human rights litigation (and tort litigation generally) ordinarily works by 
addressing specific injuries caused by specific perpetrators and experienced by 
specific victims, who must have standing to bring the case before a competent 
tribunal. The tribunal must be situated in a state with relevant laws in place and 
functional judicial and enforcement mechanisms; it must also have jurisdiction 
over the case in hand.153 Litigation of harms resulting from climate change is 
troubled on almost every count. No-one doubts that climate change has victims 
– specific individuals who undergo suffering by, for example, contracting a 
tropical disease in northern Italy, or losing a season’s (or a decade’s) crop to 
drought. But the events that create such victims result from numerous diffuse 
acts performed by countless individuals in scores of locations, generally 
unrelated to one another. And the actual harms experienced are only indirectly 
linked, at best, to any particular act or person. 
Yet, for the individuals involved, things need not be so complex. A given victim 
of climate change-related harms can usually show a specific injury. The first real 
dilemma, then, arises in identifying the perpetrator. To take an extreme example, 
no single act caused the warming temperatures in Rimini that created conditions 
for tiger mosquitoes to survive winter and breed, contributing to an outbreak of 
chikungunya there in 2007.154 One might blame many intermediate actors for 
having allowed such an outbreak to happen: the passenger on the plane that 
brought the disease, the airline that allowed her to board, the public authorities 
in Rimini that allowed the mosquitoes to flourish. But if the real background 
cause is the fact that winters in Italy are warming, then final responsibility must 
lie with countless polluters located around the planet whose cumulative actions 
have led to global warming. This group can hardly be sued. 
All the same, specific actors are responsible for climate change – namely, 
those who overuse carbon fuels, albeit in highly varying degrees. Some 20 per 
cent of the world’s population cumulatively overuse the global carbon dump. 
The question is whether this group can be broken into definite and identifiable 
parties to whom responsibility can be attributed in a specific and discrete 
manner. For convenience, we look first at states, then at private parties. 
Governments and public actors
Governments represent “the people”, who in turn comprise a substantial 
constituency of polluters. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Environmental Protection 
153 The plaintiff will ordinarily need to show that the victim or perpetrator is a national of, 
or resident in, the state in which the court has jurisdiction, or that the act took place 
in that state. In states with laws entrenching “universal jurisdiction”, the locus of the 
victim, perpetrator and act may all be unimportant so long as the act amounts to a 
crime under the court’s jurisdiction, usually amounting to egregious human rights 
violations. 
154 Rosenthal, 2007. 
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Agency (an executive agency) was considered to be the relevant defendant 
because it was within its power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and 
thereby reduce the amount produced in the US (and thus globally). As the EPA 
did not act and the federal government did not require it to act (as they could 
have done), both might be seen as responsible. Had they acted, some injuries, 
both past and future, might conceivably have been avoided. That, at least, was 
the Supreme Court’s opinion.
In principle, this argument can be applied globally. Governments everywhere 
can regulate greenhouse gases, and where they fail to do so, resulting in harm, 
they might be held responsible, by act or omission, for injuries to others.
For such litigation to take place, however, at least two conditions must be 
fulfilled. First, laws and institutions must exist in the state in question that allow 
the state or state representatives to be sued in this way. Not every county is in 
this position. Second, a plausible case must be made that the government could 
have acted to slow or stop global warming and did not do so. For countries 
that contribute tiny amounts to global emissions, it is perhaps implausible to 
suggest they could exert such an influence. Even large emitters, however, can 
perhaps claim that they are acting merely by dint of engaging in prolonged 
negotiations to regulate emissions. A government could reasonably claim that 
it would be foolhardy to take steps to reduce emissions without first having the 
agreement of other states: if it did so, it would lose the benefits of a carbon 
economy while nevertheless suffering the consequences of climate change.155 
Ultimately, governments must act in the national interest, and this need not 
always coincide with the global interest.156 
Assuming these two conditions are met, the plaintiff must still generally have 
been harmed on the territory of the relevant state. It is not impossible to sue 
foreign governments or state officials for acts or omissions that have resulted 
in harms to individuals in other territories, but the barriers to doing so are high. 
Without very compelling evidence of direct causation and egregious harm, few 
national courts will accept petitions from victims located abroad against their 
own or foreign governments.157 
155 This argument was put forward by the US government in the case Massachusetts v. 
EPA discussed below. The fact that major emitting countries (such as China) were 
not bound by Kyoto targets meant, so it was claimed, that any US actions would be 
ineffective as well as painful. 
156 Powerful arguments can be made that acting to stop or slow climate change would 
not be in the general interest – or at least in the narrow national interest of states that 
have much to lose from economic restructuring but little to fear from limited global 
warming (“the American way of life is not up for negotiation”).
157 For such cases in US courts, see Dellapenna, 1988. For egregious harms, the 
relevant legal framework in national courts is long-arm jurisdiction, where it exists; 
or at international level, the International Criminal Court. These possibilities are 
discussed briefly below (p. 71). 
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Individuals do have standing to sue states before certain international 
institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Once again, 
however, a victim would ordinarily need to have been injured on the territory of 
the state in question in order to bring suit. Otherwise, as a recent treatise on the 
ECtHR notes: “the case law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the 
exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction is exceptional: it has done so when the 
respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its 
inhabitants as a consequence of military occupation, or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the authorities of that territory, exercises all or 
some of the public powers normally exercised by the latter.”158 It is unlikely that 
climate change harms will meet this narrow test, although the law may indeed 
evolve, given the scale of the unfolding catastrophe that climate change could 
represent. In general, nevertheless, tribunals like the ECtHR operate rather as 
courts of final appeal for harms at national level rather than as fora for the 
arbitration of transnational harms.
Once climate change really gets underway, and produces victims in countries 
with strong legal redress, such as the United States and some European states, 
cases by nationals against their own governments are likely to proliferate. 
Even if such cases are successful, however, they will still have a very limited 
capacity to address the human impacts of climate change, which will occur on 
a scale we are only beginning to imagine. For one thing, measures that target 
governments will have only a limited overall impact on global emissions (for 
reasons that will be further elaborated below). For another, the main victims 
of climate change will not be resident in the wealthy polluting countries, but 
people living in countries responsible for negligible emissions (such as in sub-
Saharan Africa), or where the legal system will not support legal action of this 
kind (such as, for example, China currently). These factors do not undermine 
the general value of pursuing cases where it is appropriate and possible to do 
so, but they are a reminder of the limitations of the legal machinery.
In principle, these justice claims are better addressed through the interstate 
framework. This route is necessarily political, particularly in a matter like 
climate change, given the immense economic interests involved. It is also 
closed to individual victims. Although it is well established in international law, 
the principle that each state has “responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” has rarely been 
invoked in cases of unintentional transboundary injuries.159 After Chernobyl, for 
example (as Dinah Shelton and Alexander Kiss point out) other harmed states 
did not sue, and chose not to support the construction of a remedial framework 
158 Van Dijk et al., 2006, p. 21. 
159 UNFCCC preamble. See also Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration; 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration; Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 3. 
See Kiss and Shelton, 2007, p. 2.
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for future harms of this kind: “The emphatic preference remains measures of 
prevention rather than cure.”160 
Strict liability of states, arguably a stronger form of accountability than “state 
responsibility”, appears to have been accepted by states only in “new” and 
experimental areas of activity, such as space exploration.161 Otherwise, states 
have apparently not accepted that they have general liability for environmental 
harms, at least to the extent that such harms occur lawfully or accidentally, as 
climate change damages have to date.162 Indeed, states have preferred to agree 
only to the civil liability of private entities that operate under their jurisdiction, 
for certain hazards involving damage to the commons (such as damage to 
the oceans from oil pollution or hazardous waste).163 Over time climate change 
may yet transform the relevant context here too. Having accepted emissions 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, for example, states that have missed their 
targets (such as Canada), might now risk being charged with having committed 
“internationally wrongful” acts. The “wrong” to other states represented by such 
breaches will only increase with future agreements and stricter commitments. 
If the status of international law remains unclear in this area, it may be that the 
urgency of climate change threats will force clarification.164 
transnational private actors
For a variety of reasons, even if suits against states or state officials were to 
be successful for particular plaintiffs, they would be unlikely on their own to 
cause policy changes that would reduce emissions sufficiently to end further 
harms. One reason for this is that settlements in such cases will usually reflect 
national rather than global priorities. Since wealthy countries can withstand 
greater climate pressures (because they are better equipped to adapt), and 
160 Ibid, p. 4. 
161 Ibid.
162 P. S. Rao, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of 
Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, “ UN Doc. A/CN.4/531 
(2003) and P.S. Rao, Third Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in 
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities,” UN Doc. A/
CN.4/566 (2006), cited in Kiss and Shelton, 2007, pp. 6-7.
163 Pollution in relevant international agreements to date is defined so as to effectively 
preclude the damage to the atmosphere caused by burning fossil fuels (“loss 
or damage caused outside the [vehicle] carrying oil by contamination resulting 
from the escape or discharge of oil from the [vehicle], wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur”.) See Kiss and Shelton, ibid, p. 10.
164 The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
which codifies state practice in this area, were adopted by the International Law 
Commission in July 2001. The General Assembly “took note” of them in December 
of that year (UN GA Resolution 56/83), but they do not (yet) have treaty status. For 
an overview, see the contributions to Provost, 2002.
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are mostly, in any case, less vulnerable, their national thresholds for tolerating 
climate change are likely to be higher than those elsewhere and than the global 
threshold. This means that generating sufficient pressure to reduce the number 
of likely climate victims in rich countries like the United States might not in itself 
contribute to lowering global emissions to a point at which victim rates in Africa, 
for example, might drop.
A second, more significant reason why national-level litigation may have 
only marginal impact is the fundamentally transnational basis of much GHG 
production. Many of the biggest emitters do not operate in one state: they act 
globally. The biggest American and European emitters (oil and gas and logging 
companies) generate many of their emissions abroad, in countries that do not 
have emissions caps or robust regulation or judicial enforcement. US and 
European car producers sell cars globally: even if fuel-efficiency regulations 
are introduced in their home countries, they can still be avoided elsewhere. 
(Many LDCs rely for transport on discarded fuel-inefficient vehicles from the 
West.) Airlines and shipping companies escape global emissions accounting 
altogether, although this is likely to change. Furthermore, if emission levels are 
evaluated across entire production and supply chains, it is quickly apparent 
that many of the emissions attributed to developing countries in fact serve to 
improve the lifestyles of the wealthy.165 In manufacturing too, companies can 
source or outsource the most polluting phases of production to other countries. 
For all these reasons, the most polluting private actors have many means to 
escape a state-centric emissions accounting regime. Indeed, a perverse effect 
of CBDR is that firms may seek ways to “dump” emissions in countries that do 
not have caps. 
Private actors might therefore be better targets of litigation than states, given 
the global reach and impact of their activities.166 Could they be held liable for 
human rights harms related to climate change? A growing body of literature on 
the human rights obligations of non-state actors suggests that the answer is 
only “maybe”. 
Transnational private liability for human rights, on one hand, and for 
environmental harms, on the other, are linked both directly and by analogy. The 
analogical link consists in the fact that it is difficult to hold transnational private 
actors to account, in much of the world, for either environmental or human rights 
damages committed by them, or on their behalf, or with their complicity.167 The 
165 For an account of the extent to which emissions are “exported”, see Simms et al., 
2007. 
166 Moreover, governments themselves are not the major producers of greenhouse 
gases – public sector emissions are less at issue (for public goods such as street-
lighting, healthcare and infrastructure building) than state failure to regulate the 
emissions of private actors.
167 For a full account, see Clapham, 2006. 
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direct link is that acts harmful to the environment may also result in harms to 
human rights, and vice versa. The link can clearly be shown when private 
activity results in polluted water or air, for example in industries such as mining, 
or radiation in the case of the nuclear industry, or in lost livelihoods (or lives) 
as a result of large scale logging. In the case of climate change, this link is 
more nuanced: fossil fuel extraction and deforestation in poorer countries, often 
subject to fewer social and environmental regulations, contribute directly to 
global environmental damage that in turn generates human rights violations in 
the same countries.
In instances of both environmental and human rights harms, liability is weak 
because effective jurisdiction has been historically difficult to establish in 
cases of these kinds. The “transnationality” of private actors is a key source 
of difficulty: large companies may be incorporated in multiple jurisdictions 
through subsidiaries or affiliates or shell companies established for tax or 
banking purposes. Companies may also outsource key parts of their supply 
chains across borders while still controlling them. Often a large company 
operating across different jurisdictions will choose to apportion its various 
legal obligations among them, in each case choosing the legal regime most 
beneficial to the company’s interests. 
Added to this, the capacity of judicial systems to enforce environmental or human 
rights protections is uneven. Plaintiffs often lack the means to pursue cases 
through the courts. Local law may be unclear or may not cover an adequate 
range of environmental harms; local courts may be weak, lack independence 
or corrupt.168 The great importance of large foreign companies to some small 
developing economies also increases their operational licence.
For all these reasons, companies that cause harm abroad may not face 
effective sanctions. Even if cases succeed, damages are often relatively small 
and insufficient to cause a company to desist from harmful behaviour. Given 
that most of the companies in question are based in rich countries and that 
most of their products and profits return to such countries, it might seem that 
protection of rights too would fall to rich country courts and governments. This 
has not generally been the practice. 
Large companies are often difficult to pursue in their home countries too (when 
one can be identified), due to a variety of legal obstacles, such as the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens.169 The handful of legal instruments generally noted 
168 For an overview, see Open Society Justice Initiative, 2006. 
169 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is often invoked by corporations in US and 
other courts to fend off claims based on actions in foreign territories; the essence of 
the claim is that a foreign court is the better location to hear such a suit. Forum non 
conveniens was famously invoked effectively in a New York court by Union Carbide 
in the Bhopal case. See Amnesty International, 2004
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in this context typically include: the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute, 
which allows for prosecutions in that court against private persons (although 
not against legal persons); long-arm domestic jurisdiction for grave breaches 
of international criminal law, introduced in many countries on ratification of the 
ICC Statute; and, in the United States, the long-arm jurisdiction provided by 
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA).170 
Although these instruments are increasingly invoked, they have so far had little 
success in court claims against corporate entities or their representatives. 
From a climate change perspective, a further significant difficulty is that they 
apply only to egregious violations, usually international crimes, and breaches of 
“the law of nations” – such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
slavery, torture and piracy. 
Extreme climate change harms are likely to include death or starvation resulting 
from drought or water salination, destruction and loss or property, shelter and 
livelihoods, the spread of fatal diseases, and exposure to war. It is far from 
clear that, even in the extreme forms they are likely to take, such outcomes 
will amount to breaches of international criminal law or the “law of nations”, 
or torture (or “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment”). Given the difficulty 
of attributing blame to any single actor in the case of climate change, notions 
of complicity, joint enterprise and aiding and abetting may be useful in such 
cases. All of these possibilities warrant further research, including whether 
liability might be attributed among multiple companies (jointly and severally), or 
among companies and governments. 
Where caps do not exist in wealthy countries, major polluters are free to 
generate as many greenhouse gases as they wish at home – but they might 
still be pursued in domestic courts for the human harms this behaviour causes 
elsewhere. Class actions might be conceivable in some contexts against major 
car or oil companies, for example. Climate change cases would differ from 
typical ATCA cases in that the acts in question would have taken place on US 
territory – only the victim would be located on foreign soil. (Whether this avoids 
or exacerbates the obstacle of forum non conveniens would still need to be 
determined.) In US and other courts, it may be possible to sue companies for 
misleading the public, using the sorts of arguments successfully invoked against 
tobacco companies. Certain companies appear to have funded the production 
and dissemination of false information regarding climate change, thereby 
delaying public action and so worsening the overall damage caused.171 
The very fact that such strategies would be innovative and somewhat 
conjectural indicates the difficulty of demonstrating liability for harms of this 
170 See Clapham, 2006, pp. 244-246 (on the ICC), pp. 252-263 and pp. 441-450 (on 
ATCA). On TVPA, see Fitzmaurice, 2004, pp. 205-206. On extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for grave breaches of international law, see Ramasastry and Thompson, 2006.
171 For background, see Wallace, 2002. 
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kind. The entrenchment of human rights norms in international law has not so 
far provided clear answers in such cases, in part because corporations have 
not been recognised as subjects of international law (except in the very limited 
case of crimes against humanity) and can plausibly argue that they have few 
direct obligations to ensure human rights fulfilment.172 In a perfect world where 
every state had the capacity and will to apply international law according to 
common standards, this would hardly be a problem. Failing that, however, 
attempts to expand international law to cover private actors directly have 
so far resulted in soft law “compacts”, an expanding CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) industry and private law arrangements. These are important 
developments, bringing incremental but substantial improvements in behaviour 
and accountability, through practices that may eventually coalesce into hard 
law. But they do not yet provide the legal security necessary to ensure protection 
against human rights harms.173 
This problem is well-known and often discussed in legal and human rights 
circles.174 Its relevance has not, however, so far been discussed in the context of 
climate change. One reason for this may be that the international climate change 
regime has accommodated corporate involvement far more than human rights 
law has done. Companies have long been engaged in shaping the climate 
regime, and there has been near universal recognition that, if any regime is to 
work, it must eventually tie in private actors. By contrast, in the human rights 
domain, the question of whether human rights norms should be legally binding 
on companies acting transnationally has been a source of contestation. Even 
on this point, nevertheless, the issues are perhaps not as far apart as they first 
appear. In both cases a functional regime ultimately depends upon obligations 
becoming binding to some degree, and in both, the true contest is rather over 
“how binding”: what limits should be set, and how they should be monitored 
and enforced. In both environmental and human rights cases, for a variety 
of systemic reasons, obligations are likely to have greater (binding) force in 
wealthier than in developing countries – and in both, the possibility arises that a 
company can avoid or reduce its obligations where all or part of its operations 
are based in developing countries. 
This last problem is arguably worsened under the climate change regime, where 
disparity is built explicitly into the system. As it currently operates, the principle 
of “common but differentiated responsibilities” offers transnational companies 
172 See Nollkaemper, 2004, pp. 224-227; and Bekker, 2004, p. 210.
173 See for an overview Clapham, 2006, pp. 195-237. The principle instruments are the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, and the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights adopted by the UN’s Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
174 See, for example, contributions to Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi, 2000; International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002. 
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space to exploit differences of standards between states. Regardless of how 
emissions are reduced, companies may find ways to avoid restrictions by 
moving operations into non-Annex I countries. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol, 
as currently constructed, creates conditions that are peculiarly beneficial for 
carbon-intensive companies acting transnationally. When a company starts a 
new project in a developing country, and can demonstrate some “additional” 
GHG reductions from a notional “business-as-usual” development baseline, it 
is entitled to use those reductions to offset the cuts it would otherwise need 
to have made by law in its home country.175 In such a scenario, the company 
will (a) produce a net increase in emissions (in cases where the new project 
represents a development initiative additional to anything already in existence); 
(b) avoid limits set on its home operations; and (c) stand to make an additional 
profit on any excess “reductions” it may be able to sell afterwards. 
The CDM has not yet operated on a scale large enough to produce this problem 
and it is possible that a post-Kyoto regime will include safeguards against 
abuse. Nevertheless, the scenario described is merely an extreme illustration 
of a problem that will arise due to the principle of CBDR itself because, as 
currently conceived, it is based on a rich/poor differential between states but 
not between private actors. If CBDR is truly to promote development, it will 
need to identify who benefits from the looser regime in developing countries. If 
emissions capacity is simply handed back to rich countries, allowing companies 
that operate internationally to emit GHGs in developing countries but send the 
profits and finished products home, little will have been achieved.176 Further 
research is needed here. 
the	right	to	develoPment
The right to development is frequently raised in the context of climate change, 
partly because the preamble of the UNFCCC makes an ambiguous reference 
to it.177 It is mainly relevant, however, because climate change poses a profound 
threat to development as well as human rights, and in a manner that highlights 
the links between them. Some participants in the climate change debate 
have wielded the right to development as a rhetorical device to advance their 
development objectives. However, the right to development is not an easy tool 
175 Some companies have introduced internal trading regimes that would allow different 
subsidiaries and national branches to trade emissions reductions with one another 
with a view to interchange within an international regime. 
176 An increasing number of transnational companies originate in and operate out of 
developing countries. The relevant assessment therefore is not where a company is 
domiciled, but where the benefits of its emission-producing activities are ultimately 
consumed. 
177 The immediate precursor is Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, which invokes the 
”right of development” as a means of ”equitably” meeting the developmental and 
environmental needs of future generations.
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to grasp and use. Though many references have been made to it in a variety 
of international law documents, its status under international law remains 
ambiguous and its content contested. It is not even clear who is the subject 
of the right to development. Individuals are, to be sure, but the implication that 
the corresponding obligation extends beyond a given state to the “international 
community” as a whole suggests that the state is a corporatised bearer of the 
right – if only as mediator between the individual and the world. Paradoxically, 
it is just this inchoate status of the right to development that underpins its 
relevance to climate change. 
The fraught history of the right to development has been well documented.178 
It is enough to note here that, as originally affirmed in the Declaration on the 
Right to Development passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986, 
the right contained a number of clauses and ideas that were toxic to wealthier 
countries at the time.179 Scholars also criticised the Declaration on a variety of 
grounds.180 The right was nevertheless referenced in a number of subsequent 
international documents.181 After 1993 in particular it was reopened by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, leading to discussion of the subject 
between her Office and the principal international financial institutions, the 
establishment of a working group on the subject, and ultimately the appointment 
of a Special Rapporteur, Arjun Sengupta.182 
Sengupta produced four reports progressively redefining the right to 
development. Showing a clear debt to Amartya Sen’s notion of “freedom as 
178 See, for example, Orford, 2001; Salomon, 2005. 
179 These included an assertion of “the inalienable right of peoples […] to full sovereignty 
over all their natural wealth and resources” (Article 1(2)), that revived long-running 
conflicts within the UN over “permanent sovereignty”. The notion that “[a]ll human 
beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively” 
(Article 2(2)), appeared to fuse or confuse individual and collective rights and 
responsibilities. The Declaration gave states “the right and the duty to formulate 
appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of 
the well-being of the entire population” (Article 2(3)), introducing ambiguity about 
the apportionment of rights and duties among states and individuals. Finally, the 
document called for “effective international co-operation […] in providing [poor] 
countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive 
development” (Article 4), which wealthy states disliked.
180 For contemporary criticisms, see Ghai, 1989; and Donnelly, 1984.
181 Examples include: UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, 12 July 1993; ASEAN Working Group on Human Rights, Asia 
Intergovernmental Meeting, Bangkok, 29 March - 2 April 1993, Bangkok Declaration; 
and UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September 
2000.
182 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/17, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 1996/12, 30 December 1996; UN Doc A/51/539, 
Report of the Secretary-General, 23 October 1996; Robinson, 2001.
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development”,183 he focused on the 1986 declaration’s statement that the 
“human person is the central subject of development” (Article 2(1)), and on 
this basis elaborated the right as a composite “vector” of all other human rights 
(economic, social, cultural, civil and political).184 Actions taken to promote or 
fulfil one right that had a deleterious effect on another could be viewed as 
inconsistent with the right to development. Sengupta’s principal goal appears 
to have been to make development processes, and international development 
agencies in particular, more attentive to the rights of individuals.185 Although his 
favoured innovation (“development compacts” to be associated with Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers)186 was not adopted, Sengupta’s general concern 
with using the right to “mainstream” rights awareness in development activities 
reflected a larger shift in the same direction within the United Nations. 
Today the Working Group continues to meet and is supplemented by a High-
Level Task Force that brings together a distinctive group of academics, 
state representatives (North and South), developmental economists and 
representatives of international financial institutions. Although the right to 
development is today no closer to functioning as a legal doctrine, or even 
an operational guideline, discussion continues in the midst of an explosion 
of efforts to integrate human rights within development programming (which 
generally make no reference to the right). Its discussion is largely confined to 
professionals and diplomats in Geneva and New York. As such, it has provided 
a rarefied forum, away from the fray, in which conflicting principles, aims and 
methods associated with development can be articulated, evaluated and 
renegotiated, and in which Northern and Southern governments have made 
slow and tentative steps towards resolving their differences.187 
Bearing the above in mind, work on the right to development might be relevant 
to climate change in two respects. First, it affirms several relevant links between 
human rights and development: that rights taken together reflect more than the 
183  Sen, 2000.
184 UN Doc. E/CN.4/WG.18/2, Third report of the independent expert on the right to 
development, Mr. Arjun Sengupta, submitted in accordance with Commission 
Resolution 2000/5, 2 January 2001.
185 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2/Add.1, Addendum to the fourth report of the 
independent expert on the right to development, Mr. Arjun Sengupta, submitted in 
accordance with Commission resolution 2001/9, February 2002.
186 See Alston, 2001, pp. 281-283. 
187 Salomon, 2005, p. 410, describes the positions as follows: “While most if not all States 
agree that the right to development has both national and international dimensions, 
Northern States tend to place considerable emphasis on the fulfillment of human 
rights, including good governance and anti-corruption measures, in developing 
countries, while Southern countries emphasise the need for an international 
economic environment conducive to being able to develop economically, socially 
and culturally.”
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sum of their parts; that economic growth must be viewed as a means to an end, 
not an end in itself; and that economic progress can, as a matter of policy, be 
managed towards the goal of achieving human rights (“growth with equity”).188 
Its language has also been hard won: were climate change negotiators to use 
it, they would know it had survived years of diplomatic argument between 
governments of North and South.
Climate change throws up difficult questions about the prioritisation of resources 
under conditions of strain. The right to development might provide a framework 
for addressing such issues, and ready-made language for negotiating the 
contrasting interests of North and South. It might provide compromise solutions 
for at least some of the disagreements that have stalled climate change policy 
at global level, or language and principles around which agreement might 
more easily be reached. In addition, it could add vocabulary and to some 
extent policy tools for the translation of global policies into regional and local 
programmes of action.
The right to development might prove useful and beneficial in a second way. 
Echoing the current development paradigm, it emphasises that sustainable 
and authentic development depends on a three-way relationship between 
individuals, the state and the international community.189 Whereas the 
importance of this triangular relationship has always been understood in 
development circles, it is absent from international human rights law, which 
imagines instead a world in which monadic states have bilateral relationships 
with abstract individual citizens. This is no doubt one reason why development 
and human rights thinking have been slow to converge.
Reframing rights within this three-way relationship shifts the focus somewhat 
from liability and responsibility, towards principles of due diligence, 
accountability, social impact measurement and indicators of effective 
cooperation.190 If principles such as these are applied with the objective of 
assessing the human rights impacts of international assistance across a range 
of economic activities, they will also be relevant to assessment of climate 
change impacts and policy. A good example is the Task Force’s efforts to 
evaluate the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in terms of human rights, 
drawing on the opinions of UN human rights treaty bodies.191 It is already clear 
that fulfilment of the MDGs is threatened by climate change, which threatens 
food and water supplies and health prospects, all of which are MDG priorities. 
Mitigation policies are likely to depress development prospects too, which will 
also jeopardise achievement of MDG targets. Finally, MDG 8, which affirms 
188 Ibid, p. 412 and pp. 427-428. 
189 Ibid, pp. 413-414. 
190 Ibid, pp. 417-427.
191 Ibid, p. 418. 
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the need for international cooperation and assistance, will presumably need to 
be reviewed in light of the additional demands for assistance that adaptation 
programmes will require, taking account of the ICESCR and UNFCCC 4(7). The 
continuing low-key work on the right to development may, in each case, provide 
a useful handle for many who, under the advancing shock of climate change, 
will turn to the language of rights for the first time.
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ConClusIon
Climate change is already threatening livelihoods and food and water security 
across the globe. It will pose an immense challenge to the development 
aspirations of the world’s poorest countries. The scale and urgency of the 
problem are beyond past challenges: treating it will mean destabilising and 
reorienting current global economic growth patterns. For all these reasons, 
it cannot be presumed that governments and other implicated actors will 
quickly muster the political will required to head off “dangerous” anthropogenic 
interference with the atmosphere. 
Climate change throws up significant questions of justice and distribution that 
do not sit easily within the existing human rights framework. Though a short 
report cannot give these issues the attention they deserve, the many areas 
of infirmity it has identified underline the inadequacy of old habits of thought. 
Negotiators and policy-makers will need both to overcome these and reach for 
new solutions. There is an acute need for intelligent collective action. 
In this respect, the report suggests that human rights imperatives might help 
generate some forward momentum. They can do so by returning a policy focus 
to the human suffering that climate change is causing and will continue to cause. 
They can provide clarity and direction by recognising the moral link between 
local causes and distant effects. For example, is climate change relevant to the 
“responsibility to protect”, which has been under discussion in diplomatic and 
human rights circles since the General Assembly adopted it in 2005? When it 
comes to climate change harms, “protection” across borders can be achieved 
without ever leaving home. In addition, human rights provide a shared and 
legally codified moral language around which consensus can be built. This is 
relevant when it comes to finding solutions, both at international level, where 
binding agreement must be reached, and at intra- and transnational levels, 
where many of the causes of climate change lie.
As a matter of law, the human rights of individuals must be viewed in terms of 
state obligations. It is the state that is responsible for human rights fulfilment. 
This assignation of responsibility may seem inadequate in the context of climate 
change, where social and economic rights in poor countries are threatened 
primarily by actions undertaken elsewhere. Nevertheless, when they adopt 
negotiating positions that defend their “right” to development, poor countries 
are acting in accordance with their obligations to protect and fulfil social and 
economic rights domestically. Since every state is under a prior obligation to 
“take steps… to the maximum of its available resources” to fulfil those rights, they 
are logically obliged to ensure that, insofar as they can influence international 
assistance and cooperation, the latter contribute to fulfilment of their citizens’ 
social and economic rights and do not undermine them. 
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The special responsibility of wealthy countries to mitigate climate change 
remains – and is widely accepted. In practice this requires not just cutting 
emissions at home, but aiding in the timely delivery of adaptation solutions 
abroad. This too is widely accepted but has not so far been achieved. Whereas 
wealthy states are exhorted by human rights law, rather than obliged, to help 
underwrite the protection and fulfilment of the human rights of citizens in poorer 
countries, they arguably do have such an obligation under the climate change 
treaty regime. Human rights considerations are clearly relevant to adaptation 
policies and technology transfer, both areas where wealthy countries are under 
a duty of international assistance. The present report suggests that climate 
change responses can be made more effective if policy-makers include human 
rights criteria (or thresholds) when they assess future harms, identify areas of 
likely vulnerability and evaluate comparatively the various policy measures 
available for treating identified challenges.
The report suggests a number of specific areas where policies can benefit from 
applying human rights thresholds (defined as minimum acceptable levels of 
protection). Such thresholds would clarify assessment of threats to basic social 
rights – water and food security, exposure to diseases, access to housing, 
shelter and land, availability of resources on which livelihoods depend. In each 
of these areas, human rights-sensitive climate change scenarios can help 
to locate risks and to assess the existing base of institutions and resources 
for mitigating those risks. They can suggest how best to head off threats in 
advance. The extensive information needs for sound adaptation policy are well-
known; in addressing them, a human rights focus can be critical in orienting 
research to the most useful ends. 
Human rights thresholds are also relevant to global and local mitigation policies. 
Where fuel substitution is contemplated, for example – such as switching to 
biofuels or nuclear power – policy guidance will be improved through attention 
to the likely human rights outcomes. In this context, environmental impact 
assessments should be distinguished from the assessment of human rights 
impacts (an intervention can have harmful human rights effects even if its 
overall environmental impact is good). Mitigation policies too, such as REDD 
programmes, must be seen in their local context. The commodification of forest 
preservation bestows new opportunities and resources upon particular groups 
in particular places. Resource redistribution of this kind is not automatically 
benevolent, however, and needs to be evaluated in terms of actual and 
predictable impacts. Finally, overarching global schemes, such as an emissions 
trading market and the clean development mechanism, involve considerable 
transfers of development potential, including use rights to the atmosphere, 
much of it from public into private hands. These regimes must be investigated 
for their long-term effects, particularly in countries most in need of development 
capacity. 
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Beyond this, rich states must ensure that the equitable provision of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” does not work only to enrich companies that 
can profitably switch operations to countries with low or no emissions caps. 
The companies in question are primarily large emitters that have significant 
presence (and political influence) in poor countries: oil, gas and other extractive 
and energy companies; manufacturers reliant on high-carbon production 
processes; loggers and industrial farmers who generate or benefit from other 
greenhouse gas emissions (such as methane or the elimination of carbon 
sinks); vehicle producers and other companies reliant on carbon-based energy 
distribution systems. These companies should not find it possible to shift their 
emissions burdens to poor countries (with low or no caps) while redirecting the 
benefits of those emissions to rich country consumers (in the form of finished 
products and profits), an outcome that would certainly distort the intent of 
the UNFCCC’s differential regime. Human rights concerns also arise where 
companies (including mining or private water companies) rely on or control 
basic resources, such as water, that will be rendered scarce by climate change. 
In all these areas of concern, the well-known weaknesses of the international 
human rights legal framework, as well as the recent history of attempts to 
overcome them, may hold lessons and cautions for those developing the 
climate change regime.
Over the long-term, private companies have other distinctive responsibilities. 
Some play a key role in consolidating development paths in many countries, 
because they drive energy distribution and use patterns, and generate the 
technological innovations on which economies are built. Where poorer countries 
are not yet locked into carbon intensive economies, technical innovation 
and transfer must be initiated immediately, to make possible and to promote 
alternative development paths. The patents and investment on which innovation 
depends are often controlled privately. Being at once private and international, 
companies may escape obligations here too, by capitalising on the differential 
treatment of national (public) entities. Richer states will need to ensure that this 
area of policy is properly and equitably regulated.
Finally, the rights to information and participation are relevant. Many states, 
particularly in Europe, are obliged to inform their citizens about environmental 
threats; to compile information in a proactive way; and to ensure that 
takeholders are proactively consulted about public policies that affect them. 
Furthermore, parties to the Aarhus Convention are obliged to promote the 
same principles of access to information and public participation when they are 
involved in international negotiations. On these grounds, the policies governing 
information distribution and participation in the international climate change 
regime might be revisited, particularly where decision making is channelled 
into international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, with narrow 
executive constituencies. 
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If conditions are to be created to control climate change and foster a sustainable 
world for everyone – including those most at risk – states everywhere will need 
to accept and actively implement mutual obligations that go well beyond the 
narrow ambit of many current negotiating positions. In doing so, they will need 
to remain attentive to their own obligations, to the development and human 
rights needs of the people whose lives climate change will affect most, and 
to the incidental and accidental regulatory failures that have left too many 
individuals exposed to date.
APPendICes
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I: FutuRe ReseARCH And AdvoCACY AGendAs
The following summary conclusions gather the principal areas for further work 
that are raised and recommended in the report. They do not detail specific rights 
affected by climate change, such as rights to food, water, shelter, and health; or 
rights associated with gender, indigenous peoples, non-discrimination, migration 
and conflict – though all these issues evidently require more research. Rather, 
like the report itself, the following synopsis suggests cross-cutting research and 
advocacy agendas that will be relevant to all or many human rights.
adaPtation	
Forecasting human rights impacts. The report concludes that efforts to assess 
the human impacts of climate change can be improved by applying human 
rights tools and principles. This would require refining methods for forecasting 
the social impacts of expected physical and meteorological changes on 
individuals and communities. This in turn implies first identifying threats to 
rights (likely breaches of human rights thresholds) and those persons and 
communities who are particularly vulnerable. It involves, second, assessing the 
presence or absence of safeguards, the availability of climate change–related 
information and public access to it, and the capacity of institutions to manage 
each of these concerns.
Local monitoring and forecasting. Climate change is measured at macro 
level, but will be experienced locally. There is an enormous need to improve 
the ability to monitor local social and economic impacts, including their rights 
implications. It will not be possible to operationalise or finance adaptation or 
compensation programmes equitably or effectively in the absence of much 
more detailed information about local impacts on livelihoods and vulnerability, 
and about how different groups of people will be affected. It will be necessary 
to develop methodologies for tracking impacts on specific rights (food, health, 
water, shelter, property, and so on) and more general vulnerability. This work too 
will require research into institutional capacity and the robustness of process 
rights (such as access to information). 
Adaptation funding and programming. There is widespread agreement that the 
amounts needed for effective adaptation are far in excess of current funds. 
Research into expected human rights impacts will help to clarify the appropriate 
scale and orientation of adaptation funding, as well as operationalising its 
expenditure in ways that are accountable, transparent and effective. More 
accurate forecasting of the human rights impacts of climate change will not 
only help mobilise international funds, it will assist local planners to set priorities 
for adaptation programmes.
The right to information as a policy tool. Much of the extensive and nuanced 
information required to prepare sensibly for future climate change harms is still 
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lacking. The most affected persons are often not well informed either about 
likely climate changes, or their effects, or the availability of adaptation funding. 
This simultaneously affects their rights and detaches policy-makers from 
some the best sources of local information. A sound and proactive approach 
to information-gathering and dissemination (as recommended in the Aarhus 
Convention), including burden sharing where needed, will help.
Mutually reinforcing obligations under the UNFCCC and the ICESCR. States’ 
obligations under the ICESCR and the UNFCCC overlap: both prioritise respect 
for and fulfilment of social and economic rights through development and 
poverty eradication. Under the ICESCR, states’ primary obligations are to those 
under their jurisdiction, whose rights they are required to support using “the 
maximum of available resources” including “through international assistance 
and cooperation”. With similar objectives, the UNFCCC also includes obligations 
between states, to provide international support for adaptation and technology 
transfer programmes. Together, the two treaties create a matching architecture 
of rights and duties between states, citizens, and the international community 
– but more research is needed to clarify their content.
Technology transfer. This is relevant both to adaptation (irrigation, seawalls, 
crop selection, desalination and so on) and longer-term mitigation (renewable 
energies, other climate-friendly technologies). Although transfer of technology 
is entrenched in the UNFCCC and is considered to be a condition of developing 
country participation in addressing climate change, progress has been slow. If 
new and existing technologies are not made available where they are needed, 
there will be direct human rights consequences. This is true not only for those 
who are most vulnerable but also for whole societies, as they will soon be unable 
to rely for development on outmoded and carbon-intensive technologies. 
Attention to human rights priorities can help inform and guide evolving policies 
for the appropriate transfer of technology, by identifying pressing needs and 
potential solutions.
Adaptation governance. The 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters contains exemplary provisions on proactive information collection 
and distribution, and the involvement of affected persons in regimes that will 
affect them. The Convention imposes an obligation on signatory states (so 
far exclusively European) to apply its provisions in international negotiations. 
This is highly relevant to climate change negotiations, and in particular to 
the governance of adaptation funds, which is systemically skewed towards 
developed countries. 
mitigation
“Dangerous” global warming. Until recently, international policy was converging 
on a greenhouse gas stabilisation target that would keep global warming to 
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2°C above preindustrial levels. Such a target already carries significant human 
rights consequences, because some areas will be affected much more severely 
than others, directly harming the lives and livelihoods of many thousands. 
Although these costs have not yet been calculated adequately, some actors 
are nevertheless now abandoning the 2°C target as “unrealistic”. A human 
rights analysis requires taking stock of the full human costs of any chosen 
path of action and setting policy accordingly. It will be critical to gather sound 
information about the specific human rights consequences of any suggested 
stabilisation target. 
Biofuels. Biofuel production has recently surged, contributing to rising food 
prices in a number of countries, many of which are already vulnerable to the 
likely future impacts of a changing climate. Given the scale and influence of 
biofuel investment (assuming it presents a climate-friendly alternative to carbon 
fuels), it is essential to ensure that programmes take account of social and 
human rights impacts.
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. A key feature of the 
nascent REDD regime is its potential to increase the financial benefits accruing 
from control over forest resources. These might fall to forest-dependent 
peoples, which might in turn yield human rights benefits. Unless human rights 
safeguards are built into REDD programming from the outset, however, better 
established and resourced actors are likely to obtain most of the benefit.
Forecasting long-term impacts on development. Globally, greenhouse gas 
reduction will require alternative development paths, particularly in poorer 
countries. These paths will have consequences for human rights protection 
and fulfilment. What steps should be being taken to ensure that human rights 
protection does not diminish, but increases, as development paths shift? Will 
technology transfers advance or impede human rights protection? Will they 
reflect a country’s development needs rather than the economic interests of 
exporting countries? 
The long-term effects of a global emissions market. The immense influence 
that emissions trading will have on the long-term economic prospects of non-
Annex I countries has barely been registered, let alone researched, in many of 
the poorest countries. In the mid- to long-term, the market might conceivably 
have the paradoxical effect of prohibiting those most in need of carbon-
based development from being able to afford it, to the detriment of human 
rights fulfilment. For this and related reasons, the scope and likely distributive 
effects of carbon markets should be closely scrutinised. Forward research into 
appropriate and meaningful transfer of technologies would also help.
The role of private companies in the context of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. Under any post-Kyoto arrangement, different countries will 
accept different emissions caps. Quite properly, many states will not have caps 
for the moment. However, companies that face penalties if they emit greenhouse 
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gases in wealthy countries will have an incentive to shift operations to developing 
countries. Such an outcome would distort the intent of the UNFCCC’s differential 
regime, because it would transfer the emissions burden to poorer countries 
with low or no caps. This would result in only minor development dividends in 
host countries, while the benefits of emissions are redirected to rich country 
consumers, in the form of finished products and profits. Research is needed 
to establish the likelihood of this outcome, identify measures to prevent it, and 
provide incentives for more equitable investment that would in turn strengthen 
human rights protections. 
Other mitigation strategies. It would be useful to analyse the likely human 
rights impact of other proposed strategies, not broached in the present report, 
including carbon taxes or nuclear energy. Where countries are weighing up 
different mitigation options, human rights might help comparative evaluation. 
legal	and	ethical	research	agendas
The report outlines several conceptual, ethical and legal questions that are 
relevant to the impact of climate change on human rights. The following issues 
merit further investigation: 
State responsibility for climate change harms, to other states and to the 
individuals harmed.
Liability of private actors for their role in harms caused at a distance. 
The conflicts and confluences between different justice claims in a future 
climate regime.
Comparison of the entrenchment of new alienable emissions rights, rather 
than human rights, under international law. 
As understanding improves and injuries deepen, consideration of climate 
change as a crime rather than a tort?
advocacy
Inserting human rights sensitivity into a post-Kyoto regime. Given the relevance 
of human rights to so much of the climate change problem – to its impacts 
but also to the policies being prepared for treating it – it would seem valuable 
to recognise and reference human rights principles within the climate change 
regime. Treaties under the UNFCCC umbrella could usefully note that actions 
taken in the context of adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer should 
respect human rights. This would underline legal obligations; redirect attention 
to where harms will be worst felt; and help to set programme priorities. 
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Mainlining climate change into human rights advocacy. Few if any human rights 
organisations have begun to talk seriously about climate change. The subject 
no doubt appears complex. Because the worst injuries are forecast to occur 
in future, they do not provide an obvious handle for human rights advocacy 
agendas. Yet climate-related harms are increasingly inevitable and are likely 
to be severe. In addition, climate change will ultimately have an impact on 
the protection and fulfilment of numerous human rights for vast numbers of 
people. Human rights activists should therefore engage with climate change 
and develop strategies to lessen the harms it is likely to cause. 
Mobilising and targeting adaptation and technology transfer. Human rights 
advocates can help to flesh out adaptation agendas in particular countries 
and identify how transfers of technologies can help alleviate climate-related 
suffering and head off future global warming. This would assist in-country policy-
makers, and provide leverage at international level where adaptation funding 
and technology transfer have been slow in coming. Robust legal tools (under 
human rights and climate change law) can be used to press governments to 
create policies and provide funding for addressing climate change impacts, 
locally and internationally. 
Mitigation regime construction. Mitigation policies have clear human rights 
dimensions. On one hand, any strategy (or mix of strategies) that is successful 
at global level will tend to determine the long-term access that many millions 
of people will have to basic public goods. On the other, choices made in the 
shorter-term – such as whether and where to cultivate biofuels or preserve 
forests – will affect food, water and health security, and by extension cultures 
and livelihoods throughout of the world. Over time, however, an initial 
information gap between poorer and richer countries has meant that the former 
have participated relatively little in defining the key mitigation regimes, such 
as the emissions market. If this trend continues, it will exclude many of the 
least resourced countries from shaping a global carbon trading regime that will 
directly affect their futures.
Litigation. As long as effective policies are not in place to slow or stop climate 
change, creative and strategic litigation is likely to flourish. Several areas are 
likely to appear promising, depending on jurisdiction: 
Cases, including class actions, targeting high emission industries for human 
rights harms.
Cases, including class actions, targeting high emission industries for 
misleading the public.
Cases targeting public officials and government regulators for harms due to 
failure to regulate or seeking injunctive relief.
The World Bank Inspection Panel may be prodded to examine Bank 
subsidies to high emission industries.
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Export credit agencies, banks or investors in any country may be targeted 
for financing high emission industries. 
Trade treaties may be applied where countries have failed to impose the 
costs of climate pollution on domestic industry, amounting to a form of 
protectionism.
The right to development and the MDGs. For many of those involved in climate 
change negotiations, the right to development brings together the human 
rights and developmental concerns that climate change raises. The right to 
development is not an easy tool to grasp or use, but given the profound threat 
that climate change poses to the MDGs, on one hand, and the gradual progress 
that has been made over the years in achieving agreement on the content of the 
right to development, on the other, it may be worth investigating the contribution 
it might make to climate change discussion.
▪
▪
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II: exPeCted ClIMAte CHAnGe IMPACts
human	rights	imPacts	of	climate	change	by	region
Excerpts from: IPCC AR4 WGII, Summary for Policymakers, pp. 13-15, pp. 59-63; Stern 
Review, pp. 103-105 (references excised).
africa	
From IPCC AR4: 
By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people are projected to be 
exposed to increased water stress due to climate change. If coupled with 
increased demand, this will adversely affect livelihoods and exacerbate 
water-related problems. 
Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries 
and regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate variability 
and change. The area suitable for agriculture, the length of growing seasons 
and yield potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid 
areas, are expected to decrease. This would further adversely affect food 
security and exacerbate malnutrition in the continent. In some countries, 
yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% by 2020. 
Any changes in the primary production of large lakes are likely to have 
important impacts on local food supplies. For example, Lake Tanganyika 
currently provides 25 to 40% of animal protein intake for the population of 
the surrounding countries, and climate change is likely to reduce primary 
production and possible fish yields by roughly 30%. The interaction of 
human management decisions, including over-fishing, is likely to further 
compound fish offtakes from lakes. 
Local food supplies are projected to be negatively affected by decreasing 
fisheries resources in large lakes due to rising water temperatures, which 
may be exacerbated by continued overfishing.
Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea-level rise will affect low-
lying coastal areas with large populations. The cost of adaptation could 
amount to at least 5-10% of GDP. Mangroves and coral reefs are projected 
to be further degraded, with additional consequences for fisheries and 
tourism. 
New studies confirm that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents 
to climate variability and change because of multiple stresses and low 
adaptive capacity. Some adaptation to current climate variability is taking 
place; however, this may be insufficient for future changes in climate. 
▪
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From Stern Review:
Africa will be under severe pressure from climate change. Many vulnerable 
regions, embracing millions of people, are likely to be adversely affected by 
climate change, including the mixed arid-semiarid systems in the Sahel, arid-
semiarid rangeland systems in parts of eastern Africa, the systems in the Great 
Lakes region of eastern Africa, the coastal regions of eastern Africa, and many 
of the drier zones of southern Africa.
Tens of millions of additional people could be at risk of malaria by the 2080s. 
Previously unsuitable areas for malaria in Zimbabwe could become suitable 
for transmission with slight temperature and precipitations variations, whist in 
South Africa the area suitable for malaria may double with 7.8 million people at 
risk by 2100.
Water pressures may be intensified as rainfall becomes more erratic, glaciers 
retreat and rivers dry up. While there is much uncertainty about flow of the 
Nile, several models suggest a decrease in river flow, with nine recent climate 
scenario impacts ranging from no change to more than 75% reduction in flows 
by 2100. This will have a significant impact on the millions of people that have 
competing claims on its supplies.
Many large cities in Africa that lie on or very close to the coast could suffer 
severe damages from sea level rise. According to national communications to 
the UNFCCC, a 1 meter sea-level rise (a possibility by the end of the century) 
could result in the complete submergence of the capital city of Gambia, 
and losses of more than US$470 million in Kenya for damage to three crops 
(mangoes, cashew nuts and coconuts).
asia	
From IPCC AR4:
Climate change is projected to impinge on the sustainable development 
of most developing countries of Asia, as it compounds the pressures on 
natural resources and the environment associated with rapid urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and economic development. 
Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease primarily 
associated with floods and droughts are expected to rise in East, South 
and South-East Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle 
associated with global warming. Increases in coastal water temperature 
would exacerbate the abundance and/or toxicity of cholera in South Asia. 
A 1 m rise in sea level would lead to a loss of almost half of the mangrove 
area in the Mekong River delta (2,500 km2), while approximately 100,000 ha 
of cultivated land and aquaculture area would become salt marsh. Coastal 
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areas, especially heavily populated megadelta regions in South, East and 
South-East Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the 
sea and, in some megadeltas, flooding from the rivers. For a 1 m rise in sea 
level, 5,000 km2 of Red River delta, and 15,000 to 20,000 km2 of Mekong 
River delta are projected to be flooded, which could affect 4 million and 3.5 
to 5 million people, respectively. 
Glacier melt in the Himalayas is projected to increase flooding, and rock 
avalanches from destabilised slopes, and to affect water resources within 
the next two to three decades. This will be followed by decreased river flows 
as the glaciers recede. Tibetan Plateau glaciers of under 4 km in length are 
projected to disappear with a temperature increase of 3°C and no change 
in precipitation. … If current warming rates are maintained, Himalayan 
glaciers could decay at very rapid rates, shrinking from the present 500,000 
km2 to 100,000 km2 by the 2030s. 
Around 30% of Asian coral reefs are expected to be lost in the next 30 
years, compared with 18% globally under the IS92a emissions scenario, 
but this is due to multiple stresses and not to climate change alone. 
It is estimated that … 120 million to 1.2 billion and 185 to 981 million 
people will experience increased water stress by the 2020s and the 2050s, 
respectively. The per capita availability of freshwater in India is expected to 
drop from around 1,900m3 currently to 1,000m3 by 2025 in response to the 
combined effects of population growth and climate change. More intense 
rain and more frequent flash floods during the monsoon would result in a 
higher proportion of runoff and a reduction in the proportion reaching the 
groundwater. 
Freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East Asia, 
particularly in large river basins, is projected to decrease due to climate 
change which, along with population growth and increasing demand arising 
from higher standards of living, could adversely affect more than a billion 
people by the 2050s. Agricultural irrigation demand in arid and semi-arid 
regions of East Asia is expected to increase by 10% for an increase in 
temperature of 1°C. 
It is projected that crop yields could increase up to 20% in East and South-
East Asia, while they could decrease up to 30% in Central and South Asia 
by the mid-21st century. Taken together and considering the influence of 
rapid population growth and urbanisation, the risk of hunger is projected to 
remain very high in several developing countries. 
The frequency and extent of forest fires in northern Asia are expected to 
increase in the future due to climate change and extreme weather events 
that would likely limit forest expansion.
▪
▪
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From Stern Review:
Temperatures will increase for all months. Consequently, during the dry 
premonsoon months of April and May, the incidence of extreme heat is likely 
to increase, leading to greater mortality. … Changes in the intensity of rainfall 
events, and the … cycles of the monsoon – combined with an increased risk 
of critical temperatures being exceeded more frequently – could significantly 
change crop yields. For example, mean yields for some crops in northern India 
could be reduced by up to 70% by 2100. This is set against a background of 
a rapidly rising population that will need an additional 5 million tons of food 
production per year just to keep pace with the predicted increase in population 
to about 1.5 billion by 2030.
latin	america	
From IPCC AR4:
In the future, the frequency and intensity of hurricanes in the Caribbean 
Basin are likely to increase. 
As a result of climate change, rice yields are expected to decline after 
the year 2020, while increases in temperature and precipitation in south-
eastern South America are likely to increase soybean yields if CO2 effects 
are considered. 
The number of additional people at risk of hunger under [one] emissions 
scenario is likely to attain 5, 26 and 85 million in 2020, 2050 and 2080, 
respectively, assuming little or no CO2 effects. Cattle productivity is very 
likely to decline in response to a 4°C increase in temperatures.
By mid-century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil 
water are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by 
savanna in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced 
by arid-land vegetation. There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through 
species extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America. 
In drier areas, climate change is expected to lead to salinisation and 
desertification of agricultural land. Productivity of some important crops is 
projected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with adverse 
consequences for food security. In temperate zones soybean yields are 
projected to increase. 
Sea-level rise is projected to cause increased risk of flooding in low-lying 
areas. Increases in sea surface temperature due to climate change are 
projected to have adverse effects on Mesoamerican coral reefs, and cause 
shifts in the location of south-east Pacific fish stocks. 
Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are 
projected to significantly affect water availability for human consumption, 
▪
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agriculture and energy generation. … By the 2020s between 7 million and 77 
million people are likely to suffer from a lack of adequate water supplies, while 
for the second half of the century the potential water availability reduction 
and the increasing demand, from an increasing regional population, would 
increase these figures to between 60 and 150 million.
Some countries have made efforts to adapt, particularly through 
conservation of key ecosystems, early warning systems, risk management 
in agriculture, strategies for flood drought and coastal management, and 
disease surveillance systems. However, the effectiveness of these efforts 
is outweighed by: lack of basic information, observation and monitoring 
systems; lack of capacity building and appropriate political, institutional 
and technological frameworks; low income; and settlements in vulnerable 
areas, among others.
From Stern Review: 
Countries in Latin American and the Caribbean are significantly affected by 
climate variability and extremes…. The region’s economy is strongly dependent 
on natural resources linked to climate, and patterns of income distribution and 
poverty exacerbate the impacts of climate change for specific subregions, 
countries and populations. … Living conditions and livelihood opportunities 
for millions of people may be affected. By 2055 subsistence farmers’ maize 
production (the main source of food security) in the Andean countries and 
Central America could fall by around 15% on average … The potential die-
back, or even collapse, of the Amazon rainforest … presents a great threat to 
the region. The Amazonian forests are home to around 1 million people of 400 
different indigenous groups, and provide a source of income and medical and 
pharmaceutical supplies to millions more.
middle	east	and	north	africa	
From Stern Review: 
The region is already very short of fresh water and faces difficulty meeting the 
needs of fast-growing populations. Most if not all the region may be adversely 
affected by changing rainfall patterns as a result of climate change. An 
additional 155 to 600 million people may be suffering an increase in water stress 
in North Africa with a 3°C rise in temperature according to one study. Yemen is 
particularly at risk given its low income levels, rapidly growing populations and 
acute water shortages today. Competition for water within the region and across 
its borders may grow, carrying the risk of conflict.
Reduced water availability combined with even modestly higher temperatures 
will reduce agricultural productivity and in some areas may make crops 
unsustainable. Maize yields in North Africa, for example, could fall by between 
15-25% with a 3°C rise in temperature according to one recent report.
▪
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Some parts of the region – notably the Nile Delta and the Gulf coast of the 
Arabian peninsula – are in addition vulnerable to flooding from rising sea levels 
which could lead to loss of agricultural land and/or threats to coastal cities. 
Others are vulnerable to increased desertification. 
small	islands
From IPCC AR4: 
Small islands, whether located in the tropics or higher latitudes, have 
characteristics which make them especially vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change, sea-level rise and extreme events. 
Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of beaches 
and coral bleaching, is expected to affect local resources, e.g., fisheries, 
and reduce the value of these destinations for tourism. 
Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion 
and other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infrastructure, settlements 
and facilities that support the livelihood of island communities. 
Climate change is projected by mid-century to reduce water resources in 
many small islands, e.g., in the Caribbean and Pacific, to the point where 
they become insufficient to meet demand during low-rainfall periods. 
International airports on small islands are mostly sited on or within a few 
kilometres of the coast, and the main (and often only) road network runs 
along the coast. Under sea-level rise scenarios, many of them are likely to 
be at serious risk from inundation, flooding and physical damage associated 
with coastal inundation and erosion. 
Without adaptation, agricultural economic costs from climate change are 
likely to reach between 2-3% and 17-18% of 2002 GDP by 2050, on high 
terrain (e.g., Fiji) and low terrain (e.g., Kiribati) islands ... 
Outbreaks of climate-sensitive diseases such as malaria, dengue, filariasis 
and schistosomiasis can be costly in lives and economic impacts. Increasing 
temperatures and decreasing water availability due to climate change is 
likely to increase burdens of diarrhoeal and other infectious diseases in 
some small-island states. 
Studies so far conducted on adaptation on islands suggest that adaptation 
options are likely to be limited and the costs high relative to GDP. Recent 
work has shown that, in the case of Singapore, coastal protection would be 
the least-cost strategy to combat sea-level rise under three scenarios, with 
the cost ranging from US$0.3-5.7 million by 2050 to US$0.9-16.8 million by 
2100.
▪
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climate	change	imPacts	by	affected	human	right
Excerpts from IPCC AR4 WGII Technical Summary, pp. 44-47; and Stern Review, pp. 
62-76 (references excised).
right	to	Water	
From IPCC AR4:
Water volumes stored in glaciers and snow cover are very likely to decline, 
reducing summer and autumn flows in regions where more than one-sixth 
of the world’s population currently live. 
Drought-affected areas will probably increase, and extreme precipitation 
events, which are likely to increase in frequency and intensity, will augment 
flood risk. Increased frequency and severity of floods and droughts will 
have implications for sustainable development. 
Up to 20% of the world’s population live in river basins that are likely to be 
affected by increased flood hazard by the 2080s in the course of global 
warming. 
Many semi-arid areas (e.g., Mediterranean Basin, western USA, southern 
Africa and north-eastern Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources 
due to climate change. 
The number of people living in severely stressed river basins is projected 
to increase from 1.4-1.6 billion in 1995 to 4.3-6.9 billion in 2050, [according 
to one] scenario. 
Sea-level rise will extend areas of salinisation of groundwater and estuaries, 
resulting in a decrease in freshwater availability for humans and ecosystems 
in coastal areas. 
Groundwater recharge will decrease considerably in some already water-
stressed regions, where vulnerability is often exacerbated by the rapid 
increase in population and water demand. 
Higher water temperatures, increased precipitation intensity and longer 
periods of low flows exacerbate many forms of water pollution, with impacts 
on ecosystems, human health, and water system reliability and operating 
costs. 
Areas in which runoff is projected to decline will face a reduction in the 
value of services provided by water resources. The beneficial impacts of 
increased annual runoff in other areas will be tempered by the negative 
effects of increased precipitation variability and seasonal runoff shifts on 
water supply, water quality and flood risks.
▪
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From Stern Review:
People will feel the impact of climate change most strongly through changes in 
the distribution of water around the world and its seasonal and annual variability 
… Areas that are already relatively dry, such as the Mediterranean basin and 
parts of Southern Africa and South America, are likely to experience further 
decreases in water availability, for example several (but not all) climate models 
predict up to 30% decrease in annual runoff in these regions for a 2°C global 
temperature rise and 40-50% for 4°C…
The effects of rising temperatures against a background of a growing population 
are likely to cause changes in the water status of billions of people. Considerably 
more effort and expense will be required on top of existing practices to meet 
people’s demand for water. 
Climate change will have serious consequences for people who depend heavily 
on glacier meltwater to maintain supplies during the dry season, including large 
parts of the Indian sub-continent, over quarter of a billion people in China, and 
tens of millions in the Andes. In the Himalaya-Hindu Kush region, meltwater 
from glaciers feeds seven of Asia’s largest rivers, including 70% of the summer 
flow in the Ganges, which provides water to around 500 million people. In 
China, 23% of the population (250 million people) lives in the western region 
that depends principally on glacier meltwater. Virtually all glaciers are showing 
substantial melting in China, where spring stream-flows have advanced by 
nearly one month since records began. In the tropical Andes in South America, 
the area covered by glaciers has been reduced by nearly one-quarter in the 
past 30 years. Some small glaciers are likely to disappear completely in the 
next decade given current trends. Many large cities such as La Paz, Lima and 
Quito and up to 40% of agriculture in Andean valleys rely on glacier meltwater 
supplies. Up to 50 million people in this region will be affected by loss of dry-
season water. 
right	to	food	
From IPCC AR4:
Future climate change is expected to put close to 50 million extra people at 
risk of hunger by 2020 rising to an additional 132 million and 266 million by 
2050 and 2080 respectively.
Projected changes in the frequency and severity of extreme climate events, 
together with increases in risks of fire, pests and disease outbreak, will 
have significant consequences on food and forestry production, and food 
insecurity, in addition to impacts of projected mean climate. 
Smallholder and subsistence farmers, pastoralists and artisanal fisherfolk 
will suffer complex, localised impacts of climate change. 
▪
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Global food production potential is likely to increase with increases in global 
average temperature up to about 3°C, but above this it is very likely to 
decrease. 
Local extinctions of particular fish species are expected at edges of ranges. 
[Stern Review: “About one billion people worldwide (one-sixth of the world’s 
population) rely on fish as their primary source of animal protein.”]
Food and forestry trade is projected to increase in response to climate 
change, with increased food-import dependence of most developing 
countries. 
In mid- to high-latitude regions, moderate warming benefits cereal crops 
and pasture yields, but even slight warming decreases yields in seasonally 
dry and tropical regions. Further warming has increasingly negative impacts 
in all regions. 
From Stern Review:
Around 800 million people are currently at risk of hunger (~ 12% of world’s 
population), and malnutrition causes around 4 million deaths annually, almost 
half in Africa. … Once temperatures increase by 3°C, 250-550 million additional 
people may be at risk – over half in Africa and Western Asia, where (1) the 
declines in yield are greatest, (2) dependence on agriculture highest, and (3) 
purchasing power most limited. 
In tropical regions, even small amounts of warming will lead to declines in yield. 
In higher latitudes, crop yields may increase initially for moderate increases in 
temperature but then fall. Higher temperatures will lead to substantial declines 
in cereal production around the world ….
By 4°C, entire regions may be too hot and dry to grow crops, including parts of 
Australia. Agricultural collapse across large areas of the world is possible at even 
higher temperatures (5 or 6°C) but clear empirical evidence is still limited… The 
impacts will be strongest across Africa and Western Asia (including the Middle 
East), where yields of the predominant regional crops may fall by 25-35% … 
or 15-20% … once temperatures reach 3 or 4°C. Maize-based agriculture in 
tropical regions, such as parts of Africa and Central America, is likely to suffer 
substantial declines …
right	to	health	
From IPCC AR4:
The projected relative risks attributable to climate change in 2030 show an 
increase in malnutrition in some Asian countries.
▪
▪
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Later in the century, expected trends in warming are projected to decrease 
the availability of crop yields in seasonally dry and tropical regions. This 
will increase hunger, malnutrition and consequent disorders, including child 
growth and development, in particular in those regions that are already most 
vulnerable to food insecurity, notably Africa.
By 2030, coastal flooding is projected to result in a large proportional 
mortality increase; however, this is applied to a low burden of disease 
so the aggregate impact is small. Overall, a two- to three-fold increase in 
population at risk of flooding is expected by 2080. 
Estimates of increases of people at risk of death from heat differ between 
countries, depending on the place, ageing population and adaptation 
measures in place. Overall, significant increases are estimated over this 
century. 
Mixed projections for malaria are foreseen: globally an estimated additional 
population at risk between 220 million and 400 million has been estimated. 
In Africa, estimates differ from a reduction in transmission in south-east 
Africa in 2020 and decreases around the Sahel and south-central Africa 
in 2080, with localised increases in the highlands, to a 16-28% increase 
in person-months of exposure in 2100 across all scenarios. For the UK, 
Australia, India and Portugal, some increased risk has been estimated. 
By 2030 an increase in the burden of diarrhoeal diseases in low-income 
regions by approximately 2-5% is estimated. An annual increase of 5-18% 
by 2050 was estimated for Aboriginal communities in Australia. 
In eastern North America under the [one] climate scenario, a 4.5% increase 
in ozone-related deaths is estimated. A 68% increase in average number 
of days/summer exceeding the 8-hour regulatory standard is projected to 
result in a 0.1-0.3% increase in non-accidental mortality and an average 
0.3% increase in cardiovascular disease mortality. 
By 2085 it is estimated that the risk of dengue from climate change increases 
to include 3.5 billion people.
From Stern Review:
Climate change will amplify health disparities between rich and poor parts 
of the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that climate 
change since the 1970s is already responsible for over 150,000 deaths each 
year through increasing incidence of diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition 
predominantly in Africa and other developing regions. … Just a 1°C increase in 
global temperature above pre-industrial could double annual deaths from climate 
change to at least 300,000 according to the WHO. At higher temperatures, 
death rates will increase sharply, for example millions more people dying from 
malnutrition each year. 
▪
▪
▪
▪
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